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And as * joy ' is the satisfaction of 13 The mental pleasure, the mental ease which on that occasion is the pleasant, easeful experience born of contact with thought, the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact with thought — this is the ease that there then is. [11] What on that occasion is self-collectedness (cittass' ekaggata)?! The stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought^ which on that occasion is the absence of distraction, gaining (potentially or actually) what we desire, so is 'ease' the enjoyment of the flavour (French, savour er) of what we have gained (Asl. 117). See further § 60. ' Mental ease' (cetasikam sukham) is perhaps more correctly somanassam, rendered (§ 1, etc.) by 'happiness,' sukh am being sometimes distinguished as bodily (kayikam) only. See S. v. 209. 1 'Citt' ekaggata, the one-peaked condition of mind, is a name for concentration (samadhi),' says the Cy. (p. 118). And accordingly, whereas under § 15 it gives no further description of samadhi, it here applies to citt' ekaggata the metaphors used in Mil. 38 to illustrate samadhi, viz., the centre part of a tent-shaped hut, and a chieftain leading his army. It then adds that ' this samadhi, which is called self-collectedness, has, as its characteristic mark, the absence of wandering, of distrac- tion ; as its essence, the binding together of the states of mind that arise with it, as water binds the lather of soap ; and as its concomitants, calmness, or wisdom — for it is said, " he who is at peace he understands, he sees things as they really are " — and ease. The steadfastness of thought is likened to the steadiness of a lamp-flame in a windless place.' See ' Yogavacara's Manual,' p. xxvi. ^ These three cognate terms are in the text cittassa thiti santhiti avatthiti. According to the Cy. (p. 143), the standing unshaken in or on the object (arammane) connoted by thiti is modified by the prefix sam to imply kneading together (sampindetva) the associated states in the object, and by the prefix ava to imply the being im- mersed in the object. The last metaphor is in Buddhist doctrine held applicable to four good and three bad states — faith, mindfulness, concentration ( = self-collectedness) and wisdom ; craving, speculation and ignorance, but most of all to self-collectedness. 14 balance,^ imperturbed mental procedure, quiet,^ the faculty and the power of concentration, right concentration — this is the self-collectedness that there then is. [12] What on that occasion is the faculty of faith (saddhindriyam)?^ The faith which on that occasion is a trusting in, the professing confidence in,* the sense of assurance, faith,^ ^ Avisaharo, avikkhepo [v. § 57). Distraction and loss of equilibrium are attributed to the presence of ' excite- ment and perplexity ' (§§ 425, 429 ; Asl. 144). ^ Samatho. Distinguished as of three species : mental calm (so used here) ; legal pacification, or settlement ; calm in all the sanskaras, by which, according to the Cy. (144), is meant the peace of Nirvana. ^ On * faculty,' see Introduction. Faith is characterized and illustrated in the same terms and approximately the same similes as are used in Mil., pp. 34-60. That is to say, it is shown to be a state of mind where the absence of perplexity sets free aspiration and energy. It is described as trust in the Buddha and his system. There is, however, no dwelling just here on any terminus ad quern, as St. Paul did in speaking of ' the prize for the mark of the high calling,' etc., towards which he pressed in ardent faith. There is, rather, an insistence on that self-confidence born of conviction of the soundness of one's methods and efforts which is, as it were, an aspect of faith as a vis a tergo. In the simile of the stream, the Cy. differs from Trenckner's version of the Milinda to the extent of making the folk afraid to cross because of alligators and other monsters, till the hero takes his sword and plunges in. See the note on ' faith ' in the translation of Mil. i. 56. * I.e., in the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order. Buddhaghosa is only interested in making the etymology bear on ethics, and compares the ' downward plunge ' of confidence (o-kappana) in the attitude of faith to the ' sinking ' in * mindfulness,' the ' grounded stand ' in ' con- centration,' and the ' sounding ' penetration of ' wisdom ' Asl. 144, 145). ^ The Cy. puts forward an alternative explanation of the repetition in the description of this and following com- pounds of the first term of the compound, viz., ' faith.' 15 faith as a faculty and as a power — this is the faith that there then is. [13] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy (v i r i y i n d r i y a m) ?^ The mental inception^ of energy which there is on that occasion, the striving and the onward effort, the exertion According to the former, it is the method of Abhidamma to set out in isolation the adjectival part of a compound on which the substantival part depends: faith-faculty = faith (faculty of). According to the latter, the identity between the two abstractions, faith and faith-faculty, is brought out. The case of woman and attribute of femininity, it remarks, is different. (This may be a groping after the distinction between concrete and abstract.) ^ Viriyam is by Buddhaghosa connected with (a) vira, the dynamic effectiveness which is the essence of the genus ' hero ' (viro), (b) iriya, vibrating movement. He charac- terizes it by the two notions, ' supporting ' and ' grasping at,' or * stretching forward' (pag^aho), and, again, by 'exerting' (ussahanam). Of. Mil. 36; Sum. Vil. 63. And he cites the same similes as nppear in the Milinda. He seems to have wished, as modern psychologists have done, to account for the two modes of conscious effort : Resistance and Free Energy. But he also emphasizes the fact that the energy in question is mental, not bodily (pp. 120 et seq., 145). 2 Arambho (c/. ar am man am), overt action as distin- guished from inaction, hence action at its inception, is dis- tinguished by the Cy. as having six different implications, according as there is reference to karma, to a fault com- mitted, to slaying or injury, or to action as such (k iriya), or energy as such. I do not pretend that the four following pairs of words fit those in the text exactly. They are mere approximations. 'Endeavour' is vayamo, the term representing 'energy' in the Noble Eightfold Path. ' Unfaltering ' effort (asithila-parakkamata) is the attitude of one who has made the characteristic Buddhist vow : Verily may skin and nerve and bone dry up and wither, or ever I stay my energy, so long as I have not attained whatsoever by human vigour, energy, and effort is attainable ! (M. i. 480). The desire sustained — lit., not cast down — is that felt on an occasion for making good karma. IG and endeavour, the zeal and ardour, the vigour and forti- tude, the state of unfaltering effort, the state of sustained desire, the state of unflinching endurance, the solid grip of the burden, energy, energy as faculty and as power, right endeavour — this is the energy that there then is. [14] What on that occasion is the faculty of mindfulness (satindriyam) ?i The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting, calling back to mind ; the mindfulness^ which is remember- ing, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality^ and of obliviousness ; mindfulness as faculty, mindfulness as power, right mindfulness — this is the faculty of mindfulness that there then is. 1 Buddhaghosa's comment on sati, in which he closely follows and enlarges on the account in Mil. 37, 38, shows that the traditional conception of that aspect of conscious- ness had much in common with the Western modern theory of conscience or moral sense. Sati appears under the metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating between good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far as to render it by ' conscience,' but this slurs over the in- teresting divergencies between Eastern and Western thought. The former is quite unmystical on the subject of sati. It takes the psychological process of representative functioning (without bringing out the distinction between bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under an ethical aspect. See also under hiri, §30; and the notion as described in ' Questions of Milinda,' 38, n. 2. 2 The threciold mention of sati in the reply (c/. § 12) agrees with K., but not with Puggala Panfiatti (p. 25). It is not noticed by the Cy. ^Apilapanata.