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RDW004 0021.Commentary on Chapter Eleven.g2.0f

Chinese

因为没有成立的量,没有以量成立的意义,对于任何先入为主的分别念都不予承认。如果中观派认为只有圣者的无分别平等智慧才是量,那么由它成立的意义,连头发尖剖成一百份的微尘也不存在。因此,应当了知中观派没有任何自宗的承诺。 第二,破斥现在: 假设过去和未来被遮止,但现在是存在的,因为它的存在,未来也会存在,因为未来完全转变就是现在。 如果这样说,这也是不合理的,因为完全转变本身没有成立。如果认为未来有完全转变,是通过自身本性消失,还是通过存在而认为的呢? 如果是前者,一个消失,另一个产生,这就是转变,只是以生和灭来命名转变而已。 如果我们所说的转变不是这样,比如牛的精液的物质,自身本性存在,其他法,如牛奶的状态改变成酸奶的状态一样,三种 गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:rajas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:tamas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思)的未来状态改变成现在的状态,这就是转变。 如果这样说,世间没有见到未来的三种 गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:rajas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:tamas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思)转变成为现在,因此这种转变是不合理的。 酸奶也不是牛奶的变异,因为牛奶和酸奶的味和功能不同,而且除了味和功能之外,它们也没有其他的物质。 这样,未来的事物转变成现在,这件事,不要说五根识不能执取,就连能够完全断定微细、间断和非物质之义的意识也不能执取。 虽然如上所说,没有见到现在的因完全转变,但即使如此,不聪明和愚笨的人,自己不能确定自己的本性,他们也会认为现在是存在的。 第二,破斥能立,分为破斥事物的能立和破斥忆念的能立两种。 首先: 时间是存在的,因为它的因,事物是存在的。

English

Because there is no valid cognition that establishes it, and the meaning not established by valid cognition is not accepted by anyone who holds preconceived notions. If the Madhyamikas consider only the non-conceptual wisdom of the noble meditative equipoise as valid cognition, then the meaning established by it does not even exist to the extent of a part of a hair tip split into a hundred pieces. Therefore, it should be understood that the Madhyamikas have no assertions of their own system. Second, refuting the present: If the past and future are blocked, but the present exists, and because of its existence, the future will also exist, because the complete transformation of the future is the present. If you say that, that is also unreasonable, because the complete transformation itself is not established. If you think that the future has complete transformation, is it thought of through the loss of its own nature, or through existence? If it is the former, one disappears and another is born, which is transformation, and it is only named transformation by birth and death. If our so-called transformation is not like that, for example, the substance of bull's semen, its own nature remains, and other dharmas, such as the state of milk changing to the state of yogurt, the three gunas (藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:rajas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:tamas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) change from the future state to the present state, which is transformation. If you say that, the world has not seen the future three gunas (藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:rajas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) गुण:tamas गुण(藏文,梵文天城体,梵文罗马拟音,汉语字面意思) transform into the present, therefore this transformation is unreasonable. Yogurt is also not a variation of milk, because milk and yogurt have different tastes and functions, and they have no other substance other than taste and function. In this way, the transformation of future things into the present, this matter, let alone the five sense consciousnesses cannot grasp, even the mind that can completely determine the meaning of subtle, intermittent, and non-material cannot grasp it. Although, as mentioned above, the complete transformation of the cause of the present is not seen, even so, those who are not clever and foolish, who cannot determine their own nature, will think that the present exists. Second, refuting the proof, divided into refuting the proof of things and refuting the proof of memory. First: Time exists because its cause, things, exist.

Chinese

由于时间不是有情,所以自己不能完全断除,如果说是依靠事物而断除,那么,时间的因是事物,有事物就有时间,没有事物就没有时间。像这样,事物在每一个刹那都在坏灭,没有停留。因为没有停留,哪里会有时间的实物呢?没有的。为什么没有停留呢?被无常吞噬的事物哪里会有停留?如果停留存在,那么从不变化的停留的事物,就不会发生从一个状态转变为另一个状态的衰老。因为这两者是互相矛盾的。如果最初停留存在,那么后来也停留在那个状态,最终就会变成不会变旧,因此要认识到先前是没有停留的。从这个道理来说,也是没有停留的。像这样,如果先前的意识所缘的对境,后来出现的其他意识也缘,从而认为先前见到的对境停留在后来的意识之间,所以认为停留是存在的。这不可能,因为一个刹那的意识,如何不能区分先后两个对境,同样,先后两个刹那的意识,如果不能区分一个对境,那么对境也因为是缘起而成为刹那。因此,在两个意识的持续期间是不停留的。如果这样,那么在《法蕴论》中,“二者的识,后之五。”说是五个对境被两个意识所知,这有矛盾啊。没有矛盾,因为根识是能完全断除现在对境的显现的形象而生起的。那些根识也和自己的对境一起灭亡,所以,从根识的因的力量,意识生起根识的对境的形象的显现,在世间的说法中,说是两个识的所知。但实际上,意识只是执持根识的对境的总相,而不是自己的本体,因为那时已经灭亡了。如果停留存在,因为是现在的时间的特征。因为没有停留,现在本身是不可能的。如果这样说,时间有停留还是没有停留?如果时间依靠停留而存在,那么所依和能依是不同的

English

Since time is not sentient, it cannot completely eliminate itself. If it is said that it is eliminated by relying on things, then, if the cause of time is things, there is time if there are things, and there is no time if there are no things. Like this, things are destroyed in every moment, and there is no staying. Because there is no staying, where would there be a real thing of time? There isn't. Why is there no staying? Where would there be staying for things devoured by impermanence? If staying exists, then the staying thing that does not change will not experience aging, which is the transformation from one state to another. Because these two are contradictory. If staying exists at first, then it will stay in that state later, and eventually it will not become old, so you should realize that there was no staying before. From this reasoning, there is also no staying. Like this, if the object that the previous consciousness perceived is also perceived by other consciousnesses that appear later, and thus it is thought that the object seen before stays between the later consciousnesses, so it is thought that staying exists. This is not possible, because how can a consciousness of one moment not distinguish between the two objects before and after, similarly, if the two consciousnesses of the moments before and after cannot distinguish one object, then the objects are also momentary because they are dependently originated. Therefore, it does not stay during the duration of the two consciousnesses. If so, then in the Abhidharma, "The consciousness of the two, the five of the latter." It is said that five objects are known by two consciousnesses, this is contradictory. There is no contradiction, because the sense consciousnesses arise as the appearance of the manifestation that can completely eliminate the present object. Those sense consciousnesses also cease together with their own objects, so, from the power of the cause of the sense consciousness, the mind consciousness arises as the manifestation of the object of the sense consciousness, which is said to be the knowable object of the two consciousnesses in the worldly saying. But in reality, the mind consciousness only holds the general aspect of the object of the sense consciousness, not its own essence, because it has ceased at that time. If staying exists, because it is the characteristic of the present time. Because without staying, the present itself is impossible. If you say so, does time have staying or not? If time exists relying on staying, then the supported and the supporter are different.

Tibetan

ཕྱིར། གནས་པ་དུས་སུ་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཁྱིམ་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ལྷ་སྦྱིན་ཁྱིམ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་བ་བཞིན། དེའི་ཕྱིར་གནས་པ་དུས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་མ་ཡིན་པས་དུས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུའང་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཅི་སྟེ་དུས་ལ་གནས་པ་མེད་ན་གནས་པ་མེད་པའི་དུས་ལ་མཐའ་སྟེ་འཇིག་པའང་ཡོད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ད་ལྟ་བའི་དུས་ཡུན་རིང་དུ་གནས་པར་འགྱུར་ལ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་དུས་དེ་རྟག་པའི་ཕྱིར་ད་ལྟ་བའི་དངོས་པོའང་རྟག་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་གནས་པ་ཡོད་དེ། དེ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ལ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། གལ་ཏེ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འགའ་ཞིག་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་ལས་གཞན་ཉིད་དམ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ཡིན་གྲང་། གཉིས་ཀ་ལྟར་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། གལ་ཏེ་མི་རྟག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ལས་གཞན་ཡིན་ན་དངོས་པོ་མི་རྟག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་གྱི་རྟག་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ལས་མི་རྟག་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དེ་ལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་རྟག་པ་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་དངོས་པོ་གང་ལ་གནས་ཏེ་གནས་པ་གཏན་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་གནས་པ་མེད་ལ་གནས་པ་མེད་པས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་ཅིང་དེ་མེད་པས་དུས་ཀྱང་མེད་དོ། །གང་ཡང་སྔར། གནས་མེད་དངོས་པོ་གང་ལ་ཞིག །མི་རྟག་པས་གནས་ག་ལ་ཡོད། །ཅེས་བརྗོད་པ་དེ་ལ། གནས་པ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡོད་དེ། གནས་པའི་དུས་ན་གནས་པ་ཆེས་སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་གྱི། མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྟོབས་ཆུང་བས་སྟོབས་ལྡན་འཇོམས་ནུས་པའང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། གནས་པ་སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་དུས་དེར་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་གང་སྟོབས་ཆུང་བ་ཡིན་ན་དུས་ཕྱིས་སྟོབས་ཆུང་བ་ལས་བཟློག་པ་གནས་པ་འཇོམས་ནུས་ཀྱི་སྟོབས་ལྡན་དུ་རྒྱུ་ཞེས་མཐོང་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་ཡང་ན་སྔར་ནས་སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་པའམ་ཡང་ན་ཕྱིས་ཀྱང་སྟོབས་ཆུང་བ་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་སྔ་ཕྱི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་གནས་པའི་དུས་སུ་གནས་པ་སྟོབས་ཆུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡིན་ན་ཕྱི་ནས་དེ་དག་ངེས་པར་སྟོབས་ལྡན་ལས་བཟློག་ནས་མི་རྟག་པས་འཇོམས་ནུས་ཀྱི་སྟོབས་ཆུང་ངུ་རྒྱུ་ཅིས་ན་མཐོང་བར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་དགག་པ་སྟོན་པ་མ་རངས་པའི་ཚིག་གོ ། གཞན་ཡང་གལ་ཏེ་མི་རྟག་པ་སྟོབས་ཆུང་མིན་ཞིང་སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་ལ་ཁྱབ་པར་ཡོད་ན། དེའི་ཚེ་དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་ལ་གནས་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར

Chinese

复次,安住不成为时间,如同在家里的施主不成为家一样。因此,安住不是时间的自性,所以也不是时间的体性。如果时间没有安住,那么没有安住的时间也不会有终结,即坏灭。因此,现在的时间会长时间存在。这样一来,因为时间是常恒的,所以现在的物体也会是常恒的。如果安住存在,并且与此相关的物体具有无常性,那么,如果所谓的无常以其自身的体性存在,它与物体是异体还是同体呢?两种情况都不合理。如果无常与物体是异体,那么物体不会变成无常,反而会变成常恒,因为无常与物体以不同的体性存在于物体之外。如果物体和无常是同体,那么无常本身就是物体,物体安住在哪里呢?安住会完全消失,因为它是无常的自性。因此,没有安住,没有安住就没有物体,没有物体也就没有时间。之前也说过:没有安住,物体在哪里消逝?无常又在哪里安住?对于这些话,如果说安住存在,无常也存在,安住的时候安住最有力量,而不是无常,因为力量小,所以也不能摧毁强大的安住,那么,安住有力量的时候,如果无常本身是力量小的,那么后来力量小的反而能摧毁安住,会显现出具有强大的力量,或者从一开始就有力量,或者后来也还是力量小,因为前后的因缘没有差别。同样,在安住的时候,如果安住不是力量小的而是有力量的,那么后来这些必然会从有力量转变为无常,怎么会显现出无常能摧毁安住的力量小呢?这是显示否定的不悦之语。另外,如果无常不是力量小的,而是有力量的,并且它也普遍存在于一切物体中,那么,那时一切物体都会没有安住。

English

Furthermore, abiding does not become time, just as a householder in a house does not become the house itself. Therefore, abiding is not the nature of time, so it is not the characteristic of time either. If time does not have abiding, then time without abiding will not have an end, i.e., destruction. Therefore, the present time will exist for a long time. In that case, since time is permanent, the present object will also be permanent. If abiding exists, and the object associated with it has impermanence, then, if the so-called impermanence exists with its own characteristic, is it different from the object or the same? Neither is reasonable. If impermanence is different from the object, then the object will not become impermanent, but will become permanent, because impermanence exists outside the object with a different characteristic from the object. If the object and impermanence are the same, then impermanence itself is the object, where does the object abide? Abiding will completely disappear, because it is the nature of impermanence. Therefore, there is no abiding, and without abiding there is no object, and without the object there is no time. It was also said before: Without abiding, where does the object perish? Where does impermanence abide? To these words, if it is said that abiding exists, and impermanence also exists, at the time of abiding, abiding is the most powerful, not impermanence, because it is weak, so it cannot destroy the powerful abiding, then, at the time when abiding is powerful, if impermanence itself is weak, then later the weak will be able to destroy abiding, it will appear to have great power, or it has been powerful from the beginning, or it is still weak later, because there is no difference between the prior and later causes and conditions. Similarly, at the time of abiding, if abiding is not weak but powerful, then later these will necessarily change from powerful to impermanent, how will it appear that impermanence can destroy the small power of abiding? This is a disapproving word showing negation. Furthermore, if impermanence is not weak, but powerful, and it is also universally present in all objects, then at that time all objects will have no abiding.