English
The ability is said to exist in the conventional truth, and such objects are called self-characteristics and general characteristics. The ability to function and not function are said to be the nature of the self and general dharmas. The two truths in the context of terminology are also established in that way. Second, refuting impossibility and being too broad. First, the opponents who rely on the school that says there is no self-nature say, if we examine in this way with the reasoning of ultimate truth, Just as two moons do not exist, one moon also does not exist, so the two become equal. Therefore, it is established by valid cognition that all dharmas do not have the ability to function in ultimate truth, so the ability to function in ultimate truth is impossible. If we examine with ultimate truth, it is true that no dharma can be found, but that does not prevent the ability to function in the context of examining the objects of conventional valid cognition, because it is impossible to refute that in the face of conventional valid cognition. The reason for that is that the mere appearance of dependent origination, such as seeds producing their own fruits such as sprouts, and fire being able to perform cooking and burning, etc., the ability to function in self-characteristic objects is undeniably seen by conventional valid cognition. If it is thought that the ability to function that appears in convention is also a conventional truth that is falsely imputed by the minds of individuals, because if we examine with ultimate truth, we cannot find the functioning of birth, etc., and not functioning is equal to two moons. Why do things function in that way without relying on the imputation of individuals? It should not change. The other party says that such functioning is also a conventional truth that is falsely imputed by the minds of individuals. If it is not falsely imputed, the nature of the functioning of seeds producing sprouts on their own is not established, and we strongly agree. Because it is not established by examining with ultimate truth, and the Tathagata also said that all dharmas are merely established according to conceptualization. The meaning of that should be explained in detail. If we examine with ultimate truth, we also strongly agree that the place of focus for dharmas separated from one and many is not found. The mere appearance of dependent origination is the appearance due to conditions.
Chinese
仅仅在名言层面成立，但这并不是要证明通过胜义的分析就看不到它。如果你认为这是可以接受的，那么就像由于缘起的力量而显现的二月一样，外境没有自相；就像显现的单月一样，外境有自相。这二者存在于对外境进行分析的世间名言层面，但这并不是要通过胜义的分析来否定它们。如果你也认为这是可以接受的，那么在这里，所谓“在胜义中起作用”，如果这是指在分析外境时，将“有自相”作为术语来使用，那么你如何能够反驳它呢？请思考一下。如果说，能起作用和不能起作用，都只是显现而已，在胜义中都没有成立，所以它们是相同的，因此你要否定名言中自相成立的事物，那么你就需要说明，像有自相的单月和没有自相的二月一样，在名言中会变得相同的原因。如果你说，原因是它们在胜义中没有成立，那么如果因为在胜义中没有成立，就在名言中变得相同，那么梳子和真头发也应该因为能起作用和不能起作用而在名言中变得相同，但没有人能证明它们在名言中是相同的，因为名言的分析本身就无可辩驳地证明它们是不相同的。如果你说，真头发的作用也只是由概念捏造的，而不是事物本身起作用，那么“由概念捏造”是什么意思呢？是指对事物产生错觉，还是指没有错觉的意识？如果你认为这是指意识对事物不存在的事物进行捏造的错觉，那么在没有被误导或没有被概念捏造的情况下，事物本身不起作用，例如，没有概念的错觉，如二月，在没有被错觉的原因误导之前，该事物不会显现；又如概念的错觉，如将花绳误认为蛇，在概念没有捏造之前，该事物不会在意识中成立。必须是这样，如果一切都仅仅是把不存在的事物捏造成存在的错觉，那么一切缘起的、无可辩驳的显现都会对佛陀不显现，因为他没有被错觉所捏造。
English
It is established only on the conventional level, but it is not to prove that it is not visible by the ultimate analysis. If you think that this is acceptable, then just as the appearance of the two moons due to the power of dependent origination, the external object has no self-characteristic; just as the appearance of the single moon, the external object has self-characteristic. These two exist on the worldly conventional level of analyzing external objects, but it is not to deny that they do not exist by the ultimate analysis. If you also think that this is acceptable, then here, the so-called "functioning in the ultimate sense," if this refers to using "having self-characteristic" as a term when analyzing external objects, then how can you refute it? Please think about it. If you say that the ability to function and the inability to function are all just appearances, and they are not established in the ultimate sense, so they are the same, therefore you want to deny the things that are established by self-characteristic in the conventional sense, then you need to explain the reason why, like the single moon with self-characteristic and the two moons without self-characteristic, they become the same in the conventional sense. If you say that the reason is that they are not established in the ultimate sense, then if because they are not established in the ultimate sense, they become the same in the conventional sense, then the comb and the real hair should also become the same in the conventional sense because they can function and cannot function, but no one can prove that they are the same in the conventional sense, because the analysis of the conventional sense itself proves irrefutably that they are not the same. If you say that the function of real hair is also just fabricated by concepts, and not the thing itself functioning, then what does "fabricated by concepts" mean? Does it refer to a delusion about things, or a consciousness without delusion? If you think that this refers to the delusion of consciousness fabricating things that do not exist, then in the case where things themselves do not function without being misled or without being fabricated by concepts, for example, a delusion without concepts, such as the two moons, the thing will not appear until it is misled by the cause of delusion; and a delusion of concepts, such as mistaking a flower rope for a snake, the thing will not be established in consciousness until the concept is fabricated. It must be like this, if everything is just a delusion of fabricating things that do not exist, then all the dependent origination and irrefutable appearances will not appear to the Buddha, because he is not fabricated by delusion.
Chinese
如果观察到，也会承认是由于错觉而妄加臆测。如果所谓的“假立”是不错乱的，那么就只是显现事物本身所具有的。例如，火本身具有烧煮的功能，这也只是在其自身状态上被安立为名言，而不仅仅是假立。因此，仅仅因为胜义谛的观察分析未成立，并不能导致所有的世俗显现都变成臆测和错觉。因为世俗显现中，有相对于世俗本身而言的臆测和非臆测两种，所以，没有臆测的、无垢的世俗显现，与世俗观察的量成立并不矛盾。因此，善逝（佛陀）所说的“一切法皆由分别念而显现，由分别念而安立，由分别念而假立”，是指无论这些仅仅是因缘聚合的显现如何，如果用胜义谛的观察来分析，没有任何事物能被证实是真实存在的。因此，执着于这些事物是真实存在的，都只是分别念的臆测而已。这并不是要否认在世俗谛的量面前，事物本身具有作用，并且被量所证实。如果认为即使事物本身没有被量证实，仅仅是分别念的臆测，那么在分别念的层面，被分别念所证实的就没有任何矛盾，那么，常我等在分别念前显现的一切，都应被量所证实，那么非量的意识及其对境都将无法成立。由于这样的原因，即使承认仅仅是因缘聚合的显现是世俗谛，并且不允许用理智去分析，而只是按照世间所公认的那样来区分真假，这也是可以的，这是主张无自性的宗派的观点。或者，通过世俗谛的量来分析，将世俗谛分为能起作用和不能起作用两种，或者仅仅将能起作用的自相视为世俗谛，这也是主张无自性的宗派的观点。无论这些是哪种宗派的观点，在世俗谛的量面前，能起作用的事物和不能起作用的共相，永远不会等同。因为世间所公认和成立的名言，仅仅是通过事物在显现上不欺骗地发挥作用来确立的。
English
If observed, it would also be admitted that it is due to delusion and false imputation. If the so-called "establishment by thought" is not mistaken, then it is merely the appearance of what exists in the object itself. For example, fire itself has the function of cooking and burning, which is established as a convention in its own state and is not merely established by thought. Therefore, the mere fact that it is not established by ultimate analysis does not mean that all conventional appearances become mere imputations and illusions. Because in conventional appearances, there are two types: imputation and non-imputation, relative to convention itself. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the fact that the non-imputed, flawless conventional appearance is established by the valid cognition of convention. Therefore, the Sugata (Buddha) said that "all dharmas appear due to conceptualization, are established by conceptualization, and are merely imputed by conceptualization," which means that no matter how these appearances of mere aggregates of conditions appear, if analyzed by ultimate analysis, nothing can be proven to be truly existent. Therefore, clinging to these things as truly existent is merely an imputation of conceptualization. This is not to deny that in the face of conventional valid cognition, the object itself has a function and is proven by valid cognition. If it is thought that even if the object itself is not proven by valid cognition, there is no contradiction in the fact that the mere imputation of conceptualization is proven as valid cognition in the realm of conceptualization, then if something does not exist on the object itself but is merely transformed by thought, then everything that appears to conceptualization, such as permanence and self, should be proven by valid cognition, and therefore non-valid cognition and its object would not be established. For such reasons, even if one admits that the appearance of mere aggregates of conditions is conventional truth and does not allow analysis by reasoning, but distinguishes between truth and falsehood according to what is commonly known in the world, this is acceptable, and it is the view of the school that asserts no self-nature. Alternatively, by analyzing through conventional valid cognition, dividing conventional truth into two types: those that can function and those that cannot, or merely considering the self-characteristic that can function as conventional truth, this is also the view of the school that asserts no self-nature. Regardless of which school these are, in the face of conventional valid cognition, things that can function and universals that cannot function will never be equal. Because the conventions that are commonly known and established in the world are established merely by the fact that things function without deception in appearance.