Chinese
因为成为意义本身的缘故，是自相。诸如“头发”等的分别念，是头发显现等的总相的行境。仅仅有头发的显现，而如显现般，事物头发本身的自相丝毫也不存在。因此，头发本身不会变成可量三事，在那里显现的是无分别的意识，没有它而分别等只是有分别的意识而已。如果那样，在执瓶分别念中显现的瓶子一样的总相，如果是意识的体性的意义本身，那么也会成为自相的过失，因此不能成立二种可量。如果这样问，那么分析显现，考察所分别的境自己的体性是内在意识的实物还是外在的事物。因为它安住于内在意识的体性中，所以承许是自相，因此没有任何过失。那么，被称为总相不能起作用的可量，会有完全不能成立的过失吗？不是有那样的过失，在词语分析的时候，以执着显现为一的方式，所分别的境的显现与有境的意识相异，执着为境的体性本身，在那样的角度，将它安立为总相。如何将识相虚构为外境事物的体性的相，并由于特别执着的力量，而称为事物的总相呢？因为对于事物自相的一切，也同样执着为仅仅是它的体性，而随之相同，所以是由于思考的力量而假立为总相。并且，它的根本也依赖于所执着的事物与非它的相异的异体遮遣，因此那样安立是合理的。第二，总相与自相的差别。真实显示总相的特点，宣说具有它的总相的分类。第一，总相是由理证成立的无实法，相反，自相被说是实物。第一，显示七种理证，因此成立无实法。第一，因为是被声音所表达的，与一和异不相容，并且没有作用。
English
Because it becomes the meaning itself, it is a self-character. The discriminating minds such as "hair" are the objects of the general appearance of hair, etc. There is only the appearance of hair, but as it appears, the self-character of the thing hair itself does not exist at all. Therefore, hair itself will not become the third measurable object, what appears there is the non-discriminating consciousness, and without it, discrimination, etc. are only discriminating consciousness. If so, if the general appearance like the vase appearing in the vase-holding discriminating mind is the meaning of the nature of consciousness itself, then it will also become the fault of self-character, so the two measurable objects cannot be established. If you ask this, then analyze the appearance and examine whether the nature of the object being discriminated is the substance of the inner consciousness or the external thing. Because it abides in the nature of inner consciousness, it is admitted to be self-character, so there is no fault. Then, is there a fault that the measurable object called the general appearance cannot function will not be established at all? There is no such fault, because when analyzing words, by clinging to the appearance as one, the appearance of the object being discriminated is different from the consciousness of the object-possessor, and it is clinging to the nature of the object itself. From that perspective, it is established as the general appearance. How can the knowledge appearance be fabricated as the appearance of the nature of external objects, and called the general appearance of things due to the power of special clinging? Because for all the self-characters of things, it is also equally clinging to only its nature, and follows the same, so it is nominally established as the general appearance due to the power of thinking. Moreover, its root also depends on the other exclusion that the object being clung to is different from the non-it, so it is reasonable to establish it that way. Second, the difference between general appearance and self-character. The characteristics of the general appearance are actually displayed, and the classification of the general appearance with it is explained. First, the general appearance is a non-real dharma established by reason, and conversely, the self-character is said to be a real thing. First, the seven kinds of reason are shown, therefore the non-real dharma is established. First, because it is expressed by sound, it is incompatible with one and other, and has no function.