Chinese
如果进行解说，在刹那成立的道理中，有不依赖和有损害两种。第一，凡是实有的事物，都遍及于不依赖于其他毁灭之因，而是由自身的刹那所毁灭。例如，就像闪电和火焰等。声音也是实有的。就像这样。对此，有些人认为，瓶子等在未遇到毁灭之因之前是常有的，只要没有被锤子等砸成碎片，那么昨天那个瓶子就是今天的这个。认为今天的这个也是明天的那个。对此，毁灭的对象和毁灭的无实有，都可以使用“毁灭”这个词语，但无论如何都不需要其他的因。像第一种情况，除了自身产生的原因之外，不需要其他的；像后一种情况，根本不可能有因。如果举例说明一个瓶子从产生到一百个刹那之间没有遇到毁灭之因，之后遇到而毁灭，那么必须存在刚产生时的第一个刹那，以及之后依次存在的第二个刹那等。如果不是这样，而是这些刹那的阶段都是同一个瓶子，那么刚产生的刹那和最终消亡的刹那的瓶子就必须是同一个。如果是这样，那么这个瓶子就会在一个刹那间毁灭，而不是存在一百个刹那。同样，如果中间的每一个刹那都不是各自不同的，那么这些刹那就不完整了。刹那这个概念也与瓶子的本体不同，瓶子是常有的，而刹那可以单独计数，这是不可能的。同样，无论日、年、劫存在多久，它们都是由刹那组成的。就像没有积累刹那，就无法形成年等一样。说居住一百年，也是计算每一个年为一百。年也必须有十二个月份才算一年，月份也必须有三十天，天有六十དབྱུ་གུ，每一个དབྱུ་གུ有六十སྲང་，每一个སྲང་有六口气息，每一次气息有呼气和吸气。它们的每一个都有许多刹那。就像用针快速刺穿一百层莲花花瓣一样，刹那都是依次产生的，不可能无序产生。其中一个刹那如果是不完整的
English
If we explain, in the reasoning of establishing momentariness, there are two types: independent and detrimental. First, whatever exists as a real entity is pervaded by being destroyed by its own moment, without relying on other causes of destruction. For example, like lightning and flames, etc. Sound is also a real entity. Like that. Some argue that objects like pots remain constant until they encounter a cause of destruction. As long as they are not shattered by hammers, etc., the pot of yesterday is the same as the one of today. They think that the one of today is also the one of tomorrow. Regarding this, the term 'destruction' can be applied to both the object to be destroyed and the non-real destruction. However, in any case, no other cause is needed. In the first case, nothing other than its own generating cause is needed; in the latter case, a cause is impossible. If we illustrate with the example of a pot that is not destroyed from its creation up to a hundred moments, and then encounters a cause and is destroyed, then there must be the first moment when it is first created, and then successively the second moment, and so on. If it is not like that, but the pot is the same in all those moments, then the pot at the moment of creation and the pot at the moment of final cessation must be the same. If that is the case, then the pot would be destroyed in one moment instead of lasting for a hundred moments. Similarly, if each of the intermediate moments is not distinct, then those moments would be incomplete. The concept of a moment is also different from the essence of the pot; it is impossible for the pot to be permanent and for the moments to be counted separately. Similarly, no matter how long a day, year, or eon lasts, it is composed of moments. Just as years, etc., cannot be formed without accumulating moments. Saying 'to live for a hundred years' also means counting each year as one hundred. A year must have twelve months to be a year, a month must have thirty days, a day has sixty dbyu gu, each dbyu gu has sixty srang, each srang has six breaths, and each breath has inhalation and exhalation. Each of these has many moments. Just as piercing a hundred layers of lotus petals quickly with a needle, moments occur sequentially, and it is impossible for them to occur randomly. If one of those moments is incomplete
Chinese
又，以其数量而停留的时间不可能短暂。如果第一个和第二个刹那的事物是同一个，那么就像只有第一个刹那一样，第二个刹那将变得毫无意义。如果它不从第一个刹那移动且不毁灭，那么最终的转变也是不可能的。总之，对于第一个刹那所指定的法，也不允许指定其他，新旧和先前存在与现在存在的差别，是否成为谁的感官对象，做与不做的物体必须变得没有差别。如果不是这样，那么必定是从先前的一个产生后来的状态。例如，对于像瓶子一样的事物，如果先前没有水的时候和现在有水的时候的瓶子是同一个，那么必须在没有水的状态下也存在有水，这是不可能的，因此必须知道先前没有水的瓶子已经停止了。如果它没有停止，那么就不可能有出现水的机会。同样，如果任何事物显现为有作用，如果先前的刹那没有停止，那么后来的刹那就不会产生，因此必须知道事物自身的生和灭是由一个原因所推动的，而灭亡不需要其他原因。虽然这样以刹那生灭，但由于相似的连续不断地出现，就产生了错觉的原因，而被执着为一体。例如，就像“去年我渡过这条河，明年也要渡过”一样，虽然认为去年、今年和明年的河流是同一个常有的，但如果考察，不要说去年和明年，即使是今天早上的水的痕迹也没有，而是出现了一条新的河流。因此，认为像瓶子一样的东西会被锤子摧毁，这只是说瓶子的未来刹那的连续产生被阻止了，所以才说瓶子被破坏了，但实际上并不是瓶子毁灭的原因。如果考察锤子是用锤子自己，还是用碎片，或者用其他东西来做，那么自己做是不可能的。瓶子的近取因和锤子一起作为俱生缘而产生碎片，但即使产生了碎片，又破坏了什么瓶子呢？如果认为一个锤子同时使瓶子变成非物质的毁灭，并产生碎片这两种事物，那么物质和非物质两种行为的
English
Furthermore, it is impossible for the duration of its existence to be short in number. If the entity of the first and second moments were to be the same, then the second would become meaningless, just like the first moment alone. If it does not move from that first moment and does not perish, then ultimate transformation is also impossible. In short, it is not permissible to designate anything other than what is designated for the first moment. The difference between old and new, and what existed before and what exists now, whether or not it becomes the object of someone's senses, the entity of doing and not doing must become without difference. If it is not like that, then it is certain that the later state arises from the former. For example, even for something like a vase, if the vase is the same when there was no water before and when there is water now, then it must be that there is water even when there is no water, which is impossible, so it must be known that the vase of the time when there was no water before has ceased. If it does not cease, then there is no possibility of water appearing. Similarly, if any phenomenon appears to be functional, if the previous moment has not ceased, then the later moment will not arise, so it must be known that the arising and ceasing of the phenomenon itself are propelled by one cause, and ceasing does not require another cause. Although it arises and ceases in moments like that, it is because of the uninterrupted occurrence of similarity that it becomes the cause of delusion and is grasped as one. For example, just as one thinks, "Last year I crossed this river, and next year I will cross it again," and thinks that the river of last year, this year, and next year is the same and permanent, but if one examines it, not to mention last year and next year, there is not even a trace of dew in the place of this morning's water, but a new river has appeared. Therefore, thinking that something like a vase is destroyed by a hammer is just saying that the continuous arising of the future moments of the vase has been stopped, so it is said that the vase has been destroyed, but in reality, it is not the cause of the vase's destruction. If one examines whether the hammer is doing it with the hammer itself, or with fragments, or with something else, then it is impossible to do it by itself. The co-arising cause of the vase and the hammer together cause fragments to arise, but even if fragments arise, what vase has been destroyed? If one thinks that one hammer simultaneously causes the vase to become a non-material destruction and produces fragments, then the two actions of material and non-material
Chinese
在其他地方是不行的。如果用瓦片以外的东西来做，瓶子就不会坏，就像用柱子来做瓶子就不会坏一样。如果认为用锤子砸瓶子会坏，就像瓦片被火烧成灰烬一样是自然而然的，那么陶匠也会把泥土砸坏，但不会做成瓶子，等等，这太过分了。因此，凡是说坏灭是由非实有之因造成的，实际上就是承认因什么也不做。这就像说“看作没有”和说“没有可看的”在意义上是相同的。第二，有损害的理由是：有些人说，虽然乌鸦大多是黑色的，但也可能有白色的，就像事物大多是无常的，但自在天等一些事物虽然是事物，但也可能是常有的。如果任何常有之物不能次第或同时起作用，那么它就一定不是事物，例如虚空。自在天如果是常有的，也就不能起作用了。因为任何起作用的事物都必须是次第的和刹那的。常有之物不可能变化，因此不能起作用。任何不能起作用的事物都不可能是事物。总之，常有和事物是相违的，事物和常有也是相违的。要知道，这二者的共同基础在所知中是不存在的。这样一来，常有的事物是不存在的，任何存在的事物，其坏灭都不依赖于其他因，这是成立的。因此，要知道在所知的范围内，没有任何常有的事物。任何不能起作用的事物，如虚空等，实际上是不存在的，它们只是对排除其他事物的部分所作的假立。以虚空常有等为例，只是被认为是无常的，但没有任何事物是成立为常有的自性的。以这样的方式理解生起本身就是坏灭的意义，这在名言量中是极其殊胜的意义。依靠这一点，可以毫无错误地理解能作者、作用、因果的分类和名言的实相。可以遣除对有的执着和常有实物等颠倒的分别念。因为这是轻松进入无实有之空性等一切清净白法的根本。因此，薄伽梵也说：一切足迹中，大象的足迹
English
It is not permissible in other places. If something other than tiles is used, the vase will not be destroyed, just as the vase will not be destroyed if pillars are used. If it is thought that the vase will be destroyed by hammering, just as the tiles are burned by fire into ashes, then it is natural, but the potter will also break the clay, but will not make a vase, etc., which is too extreme. Therefore, whoever says that destruction is caused by a non-existent cause is actually admitting that the cause does nothing. This is like saying that "to regard as non-existent" and saying "there is nothing to see" are the same in meaning. Secondly, the reason for the harm is: Some people say that although crows are mostly black, there may be white ones, just as most things are impermanent, but some things such as Isvara, although they are things, may also be permanent. If any permanent thing cannot function sequentially or simultaneously, then it must not be a thing, such as space. If Isvara is permanent, then it cannot function either. Because anything that functions must be sequential and momentary. It is impossible for a permanent thing to change, so it cannot function. Anything that cannot function cannot be a thing. In short, permanence and thing are contradictory, and thing and permanence are also contradictory. It should be known that the common basis of these two does not exist in the knowable. In this way, permanent things do not exist, and it is established that the destruction of any existing thing does not depend on other causes. Therefore, it should be known that there is no permanent thing anywhere in the realm of the knowable. Anything that cannot function, such as space, etc., does not actually exist, they are merely imputations on the part that excludes other things. The example of space being permanent, etc., is only regarded as being impermanent, but nothing is established as the nature of permanence. Understanding that arising itself is the meaning of destruction in this way is an extremely excellent meaning in the measure of convention. Relying on this, one can understand without error the classification of agent, action, cause and effect, and the reality of convention. It can eliminate attachment to existence and inverted discriminations such as permanent entities. Because this is the root of all pure white dharmas such as easily entering the emptiness of non-inherent existence. Therefore, the Bhagavan also said: Among all the footprints, the elephant's footprint
Chinese
如同忆念死亡是所有忆念中最殊胜的一样，在所有观念中，无常的观念是最殊胜的。如是说。第三，关于能起作用的方式，如同兔角等仅仅是名称，而自身本质丝毫没有一样，所有非实有也与此相同，仅仅是否定事物，而丝毫没有独立存在的。因此，不能起作用的虚空等，不能通过名言的量成立，因此应当了知在胜义中是不存在的。因此，士夫所取舍的对境，在名言中是具有自相的、能起作用的事物，因此在此应将其视为世俗谛。如是说： 成立一法时，彼为所依，其他则如舍弃中等。 如是说。此处应知的基础，从智者班智达到愚笨的牧童，都公认的能起作用的事物，对于无害的根识显现自相，以及树木能产生未来的果实等，都是名言量所衡量的实有。依靠它，实有与非实有，遮破与成立，总相与别相，相违与相关，实体与属性，所说与能说，显现与遣除等无边差别得以成立和施设，因此，所谓的“世俗”一词的真实对境，就是能起作用的事物。那么，是否最后一刹那的常断，不具备能起作用的特征呢？即使不具备，如果与因缘聚合，则具有作用，因此没有此过失。即使不与因缘聚合，也不会产生未来的果实，但也不会完全不起作用。对此，在其他论典中，也对世俗谛施设了颠倒的名称。从显现方式的角度来说，在此也仅仅是施设了该名称，没有矛盾。然而，此论典以量来衡量名言的状况，因此一切安立方式都必须如同量论一样。因此，即使在名言中，对于不起作用的事物，也不能安立为名言量的行境，因此必须将能起作用的事物执为世俗谛。例如，对于颠倒执着的对境，如二月等，在那里显现的仅仅是识的显现，因此不包括在世俗谛中。