Chinese
对于已确立的对境，存在不具足的遮诠，以及虽然周遍于所依，但对于不欲表达的其他法也过于周遍，如可作为心识对境的确立。通过遮除存在于他者，确立唯独存在于彼者，称为在他者存在遮诠。以三种遮诠的方式，舍弃三种过失的定义，被认为是无过失的。因此，在所立事上成立差别法，无论是唯独存在于彼者，还是也存在于他者，都以两种遮诠的方式，按照想要表达的意义进行成立。因此，对于任何所依，存在任何差别之法，都可以从反体方面进行区分，可以分为那么多。而遮除一切非自体的体性，与总遮相同。如果从所依和差别法进行区分，则会变成仅仅是蓝色所依的反体，以及蓝色之上的有为、无常等差别法的反体。如果分为名称、所诠、所依三者，则这三者的反体被称为意义反体、自体反体、所依反体等。总之，一切反体都是从遮除或排除非彼者的角度来安立的。在此处非常清晰地展示了两种遮除的方式。如果认为是世俗，那么就必须使上述三种法在同一个所依上不可分离地存在。有些人说，这不合理。如果合理，那么，作为有法的不可爱的感受之事物，应成为未经观察就令人愉悦的事物，因为是世俗。不能承认，因为是不令人愉悦的。如果这样说，那么，作为梵天、自在天、转轮王的存在的安乐之事物，应成为痛苦，因为一切有漏皆是痛苦的自性。不能承认，因为是安乐。其他像这样的例子还有很多。如果揭示了一个，另一个也会被揭示。又有人说，仅仅是否定不存在的空性，应成为刹那生灭，因为是世俗。理由成立，因为自释中说：所谓的世俗，是依赖于分别念的智慧，因此，不生等成为世俗，而不是胜义谛，就像木头等词语的意义一样。并且，不生等也属于真实的世俗。
English
For an established object, there is the exclusion of what is not possessed, and even though it pervades the basis, it also excessively pervades other phenomena that are not intended to be indicated, such as the establishment of what can be made an object of mind. By excluding what exists in others, establishing that it exists only in that, it is called the exclusion of what exists in others. The definition that abandons the three faults by means of the three types of exclusion is considered faultless. Therefore, establishing a distinguishing characteristic on a qualified basis, whether it exists only in that or also exists in others, is accomplished according to the meaning one wishes to express, in the manner of two types of exclusion. Therefore, for any basis, whatever distinguishing characteristics exist, they can be distinguished from the opposite aspect, and can be divided into that many. And the nature of excluding all that is not oneself is the same as total exclusion. Also, if one distinguishes between the qualified basis and the distinguishing characteristic, then it becomes the opposite of merely the blue qualified basis, and the opposite of the distinguishing characteristics such as impermanence, which is created, on top of the blue. If one divides it into name, object, and basis, then the opposites of these three are known as meaning opposite, self opposite, and basis opposite, and so on. In short, all opposites are established from the aspect of excluding or eliminating what is not that. Here, the manner of the two exclusions is shown very clearly. If it is considered conventional, then the above three phenomena must be complete and inseparable on the same basis. Some say that this is not reasonable. If it is reasonable, then the object of unpleasant feeling, as a subject, should be pleasant without examination, because it is conventional. It cannot be accepted, because it is unpleasant. If one says that, then the happiness of the existence of Brahma, Indra, and the Wheel-Turning King, as a subject, should be suffering, because all contaminated things are of the nature of suffering. It cannot be accepted, because it is happiness. There are many other such examples. If one is revealed, the other will also be revealed. Again, someone says that emptiness, which is merely the negation of existence, should be momentary, because it is conventional. The reason is established, because the self-commentary says: What is called conventional is dependent on the wisdom of conceptual thought, therefore, non-arising and so on become conventional, but not ultimate truth, just like the meaning of words such as wood. And non-arising and so on also belong to the true conventional.
Chinese
因为已经说了“是”，所以不能同意。如果说是“因为是无实有”，那么，空性无遮，作为法，你成为不可思议和不可言说，因为你是胜义谛。遍布是有的，因为胜义谛的真理，连心的运行都没有，更何况文字呢？因为已经说了“还需要说什么呢？”所以不能同意，因为与现量相违。还有人说，虚空等非为造作，作为法，成为能起作用，因为是世俗谛。宗成立，因为所知确定为二谛。虚空等不是胜义谛的缘故。不能同意，因为是能起作用的空性。如果说，这虽然是从理证的角度理解，但已经变成了词语力量所表达的意义。如果是这样，那么在世间名言中也没有的石女之子，如果与之相比，那么他自己也应该知道那是完全没有的。词语相同，但意义的体性与一切无实有相同。如果区分意愿等的差别，那么区分另一个也就足够了。如果认为这两者不相同，因为在名言中存在与不存在有差别。如果在自相的意义上不能成立有差别，那么仅仅通过区分而成立，在观察意义的时候，也会变成相同的观察对象。这样仅仅稍微陈述一些玩笑般的过失，意义是这样的：所谓“未经观察令人愉快”，就像幻象一样，未经观察而随意放置，看起来好像是真的，所以可以说令人愉快。但幻象一定是令人愉快的，这并不遍及，因为也会出现恐惧的景象。在这里也是一样，如果不观察，就会用这种术语来诱导或使自以为是的知识令人愉快，而不是仅仅执着于身体、心灵和感觉的快乐。因此，第一个辩论只是词语上的纠缠，没有太大的意义。但后两个辩论有很大的理解空间。空性无遮是相对于远离一切名言的胜义谛自性而安立为世俗谛的。名相的胜义谛的同伴怎么会是世俗谛呢？如果按照那个，那就是胜义谛了。因此，区分名言和胜义谛的类别，对于讲解经论来说就像眼睛一样。
English
Because it has been said "is," it cannot be agreed. If it is said, "because it is unreal," then, emptiness non-affirming, as a dharma, you become unthinkable and unspeakable, because you are the ultimate truth. The pervasion exists, because the truth of the ultimate truth is such that even the movement of the mind is absent, what need is there to mention letters? Because it has been said, "What need is there to say anything more?" it cannot be agreed, because it contradicts direct perception. Furthermore, someone says, space, etc., unconditioned, as a dharma, become capable of performing a function, because they are conventional. The sign is established, because knowables are definitely numbered as two truths. Because space, etc., are not ultimate. It cannot be agreed, because it is the emptiness of being able to perform a function. If it is said that this is understood from the meaning of the sign, but it has become meaningful in the force of the words, then, in that case, if one compares it to the son of a barren woman, who does not even exist in worldly conventions, then he himself should know that it is completely non-existent. Since the words are the same, but the nature of the meaning is the same for all unreal things, if one distinguishes the differences of intention, etc., then it is enough to distinguish the other as well. If one thinks that these two are not the same, because there is a difference between existence and non-existence in conventions, then if one cannot establish that there is a difference on the basis of the self-characterized meaning, then merely establishing it through distinctions will become the same object of investigation when examining the meaning. Thus, after arranging a few faults merely for the sake of amusement, the meaning is this: the so-called "delightful without investigation" is like an illusion, if one leaves it unexamined and carefree, it seems as if it is true, so it can be said to be delightful. But it is not pervasive that every illusion is delightful, because there are also appearances of fear and terror. Here too, if one does not investigate, one uses such terms to seduce or make delightful the self-grasping consciousness that seems to be established, but one should not grasp only the delightful experience of bodily and mental feelings of pleasure. Therefore, the first debate is merely a verbal entanglement and has no great meaning. But the latter two debates have great potential for understanding. Emptiness non-affirming is established as conventional in relation to the ultimate nature that is devoid of all conventions. How could the companion of the nominal ultimate truth be the conventional truth? If it is according to that, then it is the ultimate truth. Therefore, distinguishing the categories of conventions and ultimate truth is like the eyes for explaining the scriptures.
Chinese
如果没有这个，哪里也去不了。按照第三个辩论的教义，虚空等是无实体的，仅仅是它们存在的名称，这是由于可断绝的对立事物本身的威力所致。一般来说，不会没有所知，也不会没有它们的名称，因此，虽然不会以各种方式承认这一点。但由于没有包含在世俗谛中，也不会变成既非二谛中的任何一个。就像在断定所知是常与无常时，无法找到借口说它没有包含在不可思议的任何一个自体中一样。在这里，认为虚空等没有包含在世俗谛和胜义谛中，也应该知道与此类似。虚空只是在没有阻碍和触觉的部分上安立的名称。虽然虚空和石女之子仅仅在名称上区分了存在与不存在，但如果从意义上分析，则没有任何自相存在与不存在的差别。因此，当说“兔角”时，虽然声音像断绝了兔角的存在一样，心也似乎如此执着，但由于兔角的自相在所知中是不可能的，所以只能说是非所知。如果不是这样，仅仅执着于名称，它就变成了所知，那么兔角也会变成所知。最终，非所知的根本就不成立，这样一来，就不存在任何不可能的事物了。同样，虚空等无实体也只是执着于名称而已。实际上无法成立，因此，按照意义的划分是合理的。其他论典中也说：“虚空与石女之子相同。”那么，如果没有虚空，在世间就被算作五大种之一，并且在论典中也被用作例子等，这难道没有矛盾吗？如上所述，只是在没有阻碍和触觉的部分上安立的名称，只是在不分析的情况下，在自以为是的角度上才这样说。如果进行分析和研究，就没有能证明虚空存在的量。因为虚空没有自相，所以眼识等认识对境的现量无法成立。如果成立，就会变成色等。如果通过自证成立，就会变成识。如果认为通过体验而成立，那只是没有执着和触觉而已。如果能确定其体性，那么虚空也不行。因为没有自己的体性，所以两种关系都不可能存在。
English
Without that, one cannot go anywhere. According to the doctrine of the third debate, space and so on are non-entities, and the mere term for their existence arises from the power of the object to be cut off. In general, it will not be without knowable things, nor without their terms, so although it is not admitted in all ways. But since it is not included in the conventional, it will not become either of the two truths. Just as when deciding whether what is to be known is permanent or impermanent, there is no way to find an excuse that it is not included in any of the inconceivable self. Here, it should be understood that presuming that space and so on are not included in the conventional and ultimate is similar to this. Space is merely a term applied to the part without form, obstruction, or touch. Although space and the child of a barren woman are distinguished by the mere term of existence and non-existence, if one examines the meaning, there is no difference between self-characteristic existence and non-existence. Therefore, when one says "rabbit horns," although the sound seems to cut off the existence of rabbit horns, and the mind also seems to grasp it in that way, since the self-characteristic of rabbit horns is impossible in what is to be known, it is only said to be non-knowable. If it were not so, and one merely grasped at the name, it would become knowable, and then rabbit horns would also become knowable. In the end, the basis of non-knowable things would not be established, and in that case, there would be nothing impossible. Similarly, non-entities such as space are merely grasped at by name. In reality, they cannot be established, so such a classification based on meaning is reasonable. In other texts, it is also said, "Space is the same as the child of a barren woman." If there is no space, is it not contradictory to be counted as one of the five elements in the world, and to be used as an example in the scriptures? As mentioned above, it is only a name applied to the part without obstruction or touch, and it is only said in that way from the perspective of self-conceit without analysis. If one analyzes and examines, there is no valid cognition to prove the existence of space. Because space has no self-characteristic, the direct perception of object-knowing consciousnesses such as eye consciousness cannot establish it. If it were established, it would become form, etc. If it were established by self-awareness, it would become consciousness. If one thinks it is established through experience, that is merely the absence of obstruction and touch. If one could determine its essence, then space would also be impossible. Because it has no own essence, neither of the two relations is possible.