English
Just as mindfulness of death is the most excellent of all mindfulnesses, so too, among all concepts, the concept of impermanence is the most excellent. Thus it is said. Thirdly, regarding the way of being able to perform a function, just as a rabbit's horn and the like are merely names and have no essence of their own whatsoever, so too, all non-existents are similar to that in meaning, being merely the negation of a thing, and having no independence whatsoever. Therefore, things that cannot perform a function, such as the sky, etc., cannot be established as existent by conventional valid cognition, and therefore should be understood as non-existent in reality. Therefore, the object of acceptance and rejection for a person is only a thing that exists inherently in convention and is able to perform a function, and therefore it should be regarded as conventional truth here. As it is said: When one thing is established, it is the basis, and the others are like being neutral. As it is said. The basis for understanding in this context, from learned scholars to foolish cowherds, is the thing that is known to be able to perform a function, the unimpaired sense faculty that perceives its own characteristic, and the trees that are able to produce future fruits, etc., are the objects to be measured by conventional valid cognition. Based on that, existent and non-existent, affirmation and negation, general and particular, contradictory and related, substance and attribute, expresser and expressed, appearance and elimination, and so on, an infinite number of distinctions are applied and designated, and therefore the actual object of the term "conventional" is only that which is able to perform a function. Now, one might think that the final moment of a continuous cessation does not possess the characteristic of being able to perform a function. Even if it does not, it is said that there is no fault because it has the ability when it meets with conditions. Even if it does not meet with conditions, it will not produce a future result, but it will not become completely non-functional either. In other treatises, the term "erroneous" is also applied to conventional truth. From the point of view of appearance, there is no contradiction in merely applying that term here as well. However, since this treatise examines the state of convention with valid cognition, all methods of establishment must be like those of a treatise on valid cognition. Therefore, even in convention, it is not permissible to establish things that are unable to perform a function as objects of conventional valid cognition, and therefore it is necessary to hold that only things that are able to perform a function are conventional truth. For example, the object of erroneous clinging, such as the appearance of two moons, etc., is merely an appearance to consciousness itself, and therefore is not included in conventional truth.
Chinese
没有过失。如果思考显现如幻的事物，它本身的自性是否成立，那仅仅是不存在而已。如果认为它在名言上存在，但它没有包含世俗的体性，那么它就变成了不包含在二谛中的第三种所知。如果承认它存在且不是刹那性的，那么它就会变成常法的显现，并且也不会变成虚假的。这样一来，就会导致无法成立无谛的相似例子等过失。因此，比起世间普通人，还不如像愚蠢的牲畜一样保持沉默，而对那些精通事物真相的智者进行辩论，这真是一个令人捧腹大笑的绝佳理由。同样，对于通过遮遣的力量而执着于非有事物的现象，也应该这样理解，例如“非有事物的自性是空性”等等。对于那些对量论的理解不透彻的人来说，如果他们认为对世俗的区分是周遍于对世俗具有作用，那么名言量的要点就非常深刻了，这是长期习惯于法称论师宗派的人才能理解的。因此，虽然从区分的角度显示了三种体性，但从总决的角度来看，一个世俗的自性必须具备这三种体性。也就是说，名言量所获得的意义，或者说，所有能够显现自相的事物，或者说，虽然显现却不存在的事物，这些都是世俗的自性，这是反复强调的。总而言之，简要地说，区分和总决的方式是，通过排除非彼或排除其他的方式来对这些进行命名。排除的方式有两种：如“无瓶”般的无遮遣的他排除，以及如“非瓶”般的非遮遣的他排除。也就是说，通过排除非自的方式来了解它的自性是区分，通过成立自己的自性的方式来排除一切非自是他决。因此，如果通过区分来否定非彼，那么它的自性就成立为他决。同样，一般而言，也应该了解反过来成立的方式。具体来说，可以分为声音和意义的区分两种。像这样，所有的声音都是以排除其他为对境的，因此，声音的
English
There is no fault. If we consider whether the self-nature of things that appear like illusions is established or not, it is merely non-existent. If it is assumed to exist conventionally, but it does not include the characteristics of conventional truth, then it would become a third knowable that is not included in the two truths. If it is admitted that it exists and is not momentary, then it would become an appearance of permanence and would not be false. In that case, it would lead to the impossibility of similar examples for proving the absence of truth, and so on. Therefore, it is better to remain silent like a foolish animal than to argue with those who are extremely knowledgeable about the reality of things, which is a great reason for laughter. Similarly, it should also be applied to the appearance of grasping non-existent things through the power of negation, such as "the self-nature of non-existent things is emptiness," and so on. For those who do not fully understand the meaning of the treatises on valid cognition, if they hold in mind that the distinction of conventional truth is pervasive with the ability to perform a function for conventional truth, then the key point of conventional valid cognition is very profound, which is the domain of those who have long been accustomed to the system of Dharmakirti. Thus, although three characteristics are shown from the perspective of distinction, all three characteristics must be complete in the nature of one conventional truth in terms of complete determination. That is, the meaning found by conventional valid cognition, or all things that can appear as self-characteristics, or things that appear but do not exist, these are the nature of conventional truth, which is repeatedly explained. To put it briefly, the method of distinction and complete determination is to name these by means of excluding what is not it or excluding others. There are two ways of excluding: the exclusion of others by non-affirming negation, such as "absence of a pot," and the exclusion of others by non-negation, such as "non-pot." That is, understanding its nature by excluding what is not itself is distinction, and excluding all that is not itself by establishing its own nature is complete determination. Therefore, if what is not it is negated by distinction, then its nature is established as complete determination. Similarly, in general, the way of establishing it in reverse should also be understood. Specifically, there are two types of distinction: distinction of sound and distinction of meaning. Like this, all sounds have the exclusion of others as their object. Therefore, the sound of
Chinese
以遮遣非所诠之力的作用，似乎是所诠之自性成立为遣除一切般理解。何须说具有意义的能诠，即使对于诸如“兔角”这种不符意义的表达，如果没有遮遣非兔和非角，而成立所诠之自性，则不会产生对该境的语识。如果未产生，则也就不可能产生执持其为彻底不存在的语识。虽然如此，除了仅凭声音的力量投向意识境之外，对于兔角的自性，由于没有其他由二者遮遣所成立的，因此实际上在名言中也不存在。对于意义的遮遣，有以遣除一切和分别遮遣所成立的两种。其中，无实事仅以分别遮遣实事为根本。虽然依赖于遮遣所应遮，在名言中似乎其自性成立为遣除一切般，但实际上除了以分别遮遣之力成立外，其自身自性丝毫没有成立为遣除一切。实事则以其自性成立为遣除一切的力量，遮遣一切非自身，因此虽然由二者遮遣所成立，但主要以遣除一切之力的作用，分别遮遣也随之成立。因此，如果不区分声音和意义的分别遮遣，则无法区分以名称所表达的意义在名言中存在与否的差别。如果不区分意义的自性由分别遮遣所成立和由遣除一切所成立的差别，则无法区分实事和无实事的差别，因此区分二者的方式如此这般非常重要。在某个差别之基础上，要成立任何差别法时，有两种成立方式：一种是遮遣该法不具备该基础，然后成立具备；另一种是遮遣该法在其他事物上具备，然后成立仅在该事物上具备。如果将其应用于定义，那么对于在该基础上具备的方式，也有两种情况：一种是遮遣根本不可能存在的情况，例如在知道根本不可能存在的情况下，像安立由微尘组成一样，然后安立其可能存在，这被称为“不容有之分别遮遣”；另一种是仅知道在该基础的某一方面可能存在，但在该基础的其他方面不普遍的情况，例如安立依赖于眼根而产生的境识，遮遣了在该基础的所有方面都不具备的情况，从而普遍存在。
English
By the power of negating what is not expressed, it appears as if the nature of what is expressed is established as a complete exclusion. What need to mention meaningful expressions? Even for expressions like "rabbit's horn" which do not conform to meaning, if there is no negation of non-rabbit and non-horn, and the nature of what is expressed is established, then no verbal consciousness of that object arises. If that does not arise, then it is also impossible for a verbal consciousness to arise that holds it as utterly non-existent. Although this is so, apart from merely projecting into the realm of consciousness by the power of sound, for the nature of a rabbit's horn, since there is nothing else established by the two negations, it does not actually exist even nominally. As for the negation of meaning, there are two types established by complete exclusion and by differentiation. Among these, non-entities are rooted only in the differentiation of entities. Although, depending on the negation of what is to be negated, it appears in name as if its nature is established as a complete exclusion, in reality, apart from being established by the power of differentiation, its own nature is not at all established as a complete exclusion. Entities, on the other hand, by the force of their nature being established as a complete exclusion, negate all that is not themselves as differentiation, so although they are established by the two negations, the differentiation is established implicitly by the action of the force of complete exclusion as primary. Therefore, if one does not distinguish between the differentiation of sound and meaning, one cannot distinguish the difference between whether the meaning expressed by names exists or does not exist nominally. If one does not distinguish the difference between the nature of meaning being established by differentiation and being established by complete exclusion, one cannot distinguish the difference between entities and non-entities, so this way of distinguishing between the two is extremely important. When establishing any distinguishing characteristic on a particular basis of distinction, there are two ways of establishing it: one is to negate that the characteristic is not present on that basis and then establish that it is present; the other is to negate that the characteristic is present on other things and then establish that it is present only on that thing. If we apply this to definitions, then regarding the way of being present on that basis, there are two situations: one is to negate a situation that is fundamentally impossible, for example, in knowing that it is fundamentally impossible, like positing that it is composed of particles, and then positing that it is possible, which is called "differentiation of impossibility"; the other is to only know that it may be present on one aspect of that basis, but not universally on other aspects of that basis, for example, positing the consciousness of an object arising dependent on the eye faculty, negating that it is not present on all aspects of that basis, thereby being universally present.