English
It must be able to withstand analysis. In that case, since there is no other possibility than the two, contact and non-contact, or interruption and non-interruption, it is necessary to generate in the manner of either of these two. If one is separated from these two, there is no other way to generate cause and effect, so cause and effect are also unreasonable. However, for the side that does not accept cause and effect as truly existent, it is sufficient that the cause itself is the nature of things that has become the cause of that effect without which it would not arise. It is not necessary to accept either of the two ways of generation, contact or non-contact. Even if one does not accept it in this way, cause and effect will not become unreasonable, and moreover, cause and effect are very reasonable, as will be explained below when showing the conventional establishment, in the context of "I, the cause, earlier and earlier..." and so on. In this way, these reasonings that refute false appearances are very powerful, and if one can well experience the unique profound points contained therein, one can thoroughly understand the tenets of the Mind-Only school and reveal the secret essence of the Middle Way, so for the system of the two truths, there is nothing more important than this. Second, establishing the absence of true duality: Whatever things are analyzed, In each of them, there is no one. Where there is no nature of one, In each of them, there is also no many. Thus it is said. Therefore, when analyzing whether or not there is a single established "one" in all things, such as permanence and impermanence, pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness, coarse and fine, knower and knowable, etc., which are accepted by the schools of self and other, for things that appear to be single in the face of non-analysis, like a mass of foam, if the burden of investigation is heavier and more solid than a million vajra mountains, even a tiny particle cannot bear it, and it can only be broken into hundreds of pieces and scattered. Therefore, in those things, there is nothing that can be established as a single existent "one." Where there is no nature of one, there is also no many, because many must begin from one, so where can there be many without one? Just as there is no forest without trees. As it is said in the Lankavatara Sutra: If analyzed by wisdom, Self-nature cannot be grasped. Therefore, they are said to be inexpressible, And self-nature is also said to be unobtainable. If analyzed by wisdom, There is no other-power and no discrimination. If there is no established thing,
Chinese
以智慧如何分别？自性不有且无识，事物不有亦无基，如尸婴儿之妄想者，恶者等众分别此等。从相、事物、识，以及意的动摇为何，我的佛子善超越，彼等不分别而行。如是说，以智慧观察分析，则一与多之自性不可取亦不可得。是故事物彼等，语不能说此与此等一与多之真实，且意亦无执取彼与彼之自性。如是显示外境无有。又，为显示视所知为内亦是彼义故，以智慧分析，则他起、遍计、圆成实之三事物亦全无，彼等存在以智慧如何分别耶？又，如是若无，内外之事物此等于世间如何称说耶？外境之色等自性不有，有境眼识等之识亦无，内外显现为处身受用之事物不有，且执持彼等种子之阿赖耶亦无，然于真实义上，以与分别之智慧耶识分离故，或如实分别法之智慧动摇分离故，如死尸之相同。以婴儿有恶分别之故而称说，彼等如是真实分别，然非真实也。又，若然，善巧于法之正理者，以如何之住而安住耶？青黄等之相，内外之生处事物，眼识等之识，以及他起之意的动摇等，从分别一切之戏论中，我的佛子等超越后，善巧者彼等对任何亦不分别而行。如是说。此外，智慧极白之论师法称（Dharmakīrti）亦云：何者以事物决定观察，真实则事物彼不有，如是彼等一与多，一之自性不曾有。于种种事物之义上，若一性不合理，则
English
How does one discriminate with intelligence? There is no self-nature, and there is no consciousness. There are no objects, and there is no basis. Like the deluded thoughts of a corpse-like child, the wicked ones discriminate these things. From characteristics, objects, consciousness, and whatever movement of the mind, my sons have completely transcended, and they act without discriminating those things. Thus it was said. If one examines and analyzes with intelligence, the essence of one and many cannot be grasped or found. Therefore, those objects cannot be truthfully spoken of as this or that, one or many, and there is no essence of grasping them as this or that with the mind. Thus, it is shown that external objects do not exist. Furthermore, to show that the meaning is the same even when viewing what is to be known as internal, if one analyzes with intelligence, then the three objects of other-powered, completely imputed, and thoroughly established are also completely non-existent. How should one discriminate with intelligence that they exist? Furthermore, if they do not exist in that way, how are these internal and external objects known in the world? The self-nature of external forms and so on does not exist, and the consciousness of the object-possessing eye consciousness and so on also does not exist. There are no objects that appear as dwelling, body, and enjoyment, and there is no basis that holds the seeds of those things. However, in the true meaning, either because it is separated from the discriminating wisdom of knowledge, or because it is separated from the movement of wisdom that distinguishes the Dharma as it is, it is like a dead corpse. It is spoken of because children have evil discriminations. They discriminate in that way as true, but it is not true. Furthermore, if so, how do those who are skilled in the true nature of Dharma abide? From all the elaborations of discriminating characteristics such as blue and yellow, objects of internal and external sense bases, consciousnesses such as eye consciousness, and the movement of the mind of other-powered, my sons have transcended, and those skilled ones act without discriminating anything. Thus it is said. Furthermore, the teacher Dharmakīrti, whose intelligence is extremely white, also said: Whoever definitively examines objects, in reality, that object does not exist. Thus, those one and many, the nature of one has never existed. On the meaning of various objects, if oneness is not reasonable, then
Chinese
思维种种显现，如何才能成为唯一？如是如是思其义，如是如是离分别。因此，因其自性空，故说无自性。智者们所说之语，其义显明。如是说，道理亦相同。第二，成立周遍：除了一个和多个之外，具有其他形态的事物是不允许的，因为这两者是互相排斥而存在的。如是说。也就是说，无论自方或他方宗派所说的，在所知法（作为论题）之上，这个理由是成立的，并且与相似例子相随也是成立的。但仍然会想，即使离开了“一”和“多”，是否还存在真实的事物呢？因为怀疑理由与不相似方的相违周遍，所以认为这个理由的周遍是不确定的，并希望能够反驳。但这种希望只是徒劳无功的欺骗。如果存在既非“一”也非“多”的事物，即使“一”和“多”都不真实，也并不一定意味着一切所知都是不真实的。因为除了“一”和“多”之外，不可能存在具有其他形态，既非“一”也非“多”的事物。理由是，“一”和“多”这两者是互相排斥而存在的性质，所以不可能有其他的聚合。这样，对于所知法，无论自方或他方宗派所说的，都具有远离真实“一”和“多”的理由。因为在论题上理由成立，并且周遍是确定的，所以一切法都被证实为无自性。对此，有些人认为，“一”和“多”是事物的类别，与此相反的“离一多”是不存在的事物。这样，能立和所立两者都是不存在的事物，没有差别。如果在这个论题上，所立的无自性没有成立，那么与它本质无别的理由也不会成立。如果理由成立，那么所立的事物之无自性也就成立了。例如，一旦确定了远离“一”和“多”，就不会有人承认兔角等事物是存在的。因此，认为这个理由是违背承诺的意义。
English
Even the appearance of various thoughts, how can it become one? As one thinks about the meaning, so it is separated from distinctions. Therefore, because of the emptiness of characteristics, it is well explained as without inherent existence. Whatever the wise ones say, its meaning becomes clear. It is said that the reasoning is similar to that. Second, establishing pervasion: Apart from one and many, an entity with other characteristics is not permissible, because these two exist by mutually excluding each other. It is said. That is, even though it is established that the sign is established on the subject of what is said by one's own and others' schools, and that it follows the similar example, there is still doubt as to whether there is a truth even if it is separated from one and many. Because of doubting the reverse pervasion of the sign from the dissimilar side, the hope that this sign's pervasion is uncertain and that it can be refuted is merely a fruitless, false deception. If there could be an entity that is neither one nor many, even if neither one nor many is true, it does not necessarily follow that all knowable things must be untrue. Because apart from one and many, it is not permissible for an entity with other characteristics that is neither one nor many to exist, because the reason is that these two, one and many, are characteristics that exist by mutually excluding each other, so there can be no other aggregates. Thus, for the knowable phenomena, whatever is said by one's own and others' schools, that sign of being separate from a true one and many is established as a property of the subject, and since the pervasion is certain, all phenomena are established as being without inherent existence. Some say that one and many are categories of entities, and the opposite of that, being separate from one and many, is a non-entity. Thus, both the probandum and the proof are non-entities and are not different. If the probandum, the lack of inherent existence, is not established on that subject, then the reason that is not different in essence from it is also not established. If the reason is established, then the lack of inherent existence of the probandum, the entities, is also established. For example, once it is certain that one is separate from one and many, no one would admit that rabbit horns, etc., exist. Therefore, it is thought that this reason contradicts the meaning of the commitment.
Chinese
如果说是变成同一方，并非如此。即使事物安住于无自性，由于无始的愚昧不了解这一点，依靠唯一的理由而使之了解。比如，对于聚集的粪便等不认为是牛，因为具有粪便、鬃毛和垂皮，所以说这是牛；或者说，眼前所见的作为认识对象的瓶子不存在，如果存在就应该被认识，但它没有被认识。任何没有认识到无自性的显现于意识中的法，就像树倒了影子也倒一样，一个真实的遍及（之处）真实，在多处真实，真实倒塌，所遍及的真实也倒塌。因此，能立和理由二者在认识方式上并非没有差别，因此这个相（指理由）成立法上的无真实性。就像瓶子无自性，用瓶子是无真实的相来成立一样，不会变成相和所立相同的名称，因为这个理由使不了解的了解，使已经了解的更加清晰，因此具有消除与无自性相反的增益的能力。第二，在世俗中显示事物存在，分为：认识显现即空性的世俗，以及分开解释它的自性两部分。第一，因此这些事物，持有仅仅是世俗的特征。如果想要这个自我的意义，我对于它能做什么？如是说，像这样无论在一还是多中都无法堪忍观察，因此这些事物全部，就像幻化的马、牛和人等一样，不观察时令人愉悦，持有仅仅是世俗的特征。如果这些事物全部，没有持有虚假的世俗特征，而是想要如显现般的自我或体性真实存在，我对于它能做什么呢？事物的法性是它自己的存在方式，不是其他人想要就能稍微改变的。例如，幻化的马牛显现，如果如显现般成立为马牛，就不能说它是虚假的。因此，诸佛世尊出现在世间
English
If it is said that it becomes the same side, it is not so. Even if things abide in selflessness, due to beginningless ignorance not understanding this, relying on a single reason, it is made to understand in this way. For example, not considering a pile of dung etc. as a cow, because it has dung, mane and dewlap, so it is said that this is a cow; or, the vase that is the object of cognition aimed at here in front does not exist, if it existed it should be cognized, but it is not cognized. Whatever dharma appears to the consciousness that has not realized selflessness, just like when a tree falls, its shadow also falls, one true pervader (of it) is true, in many places it is true, when truth collapses, the truth that is pervaded also collapses. Therefore, there is no difference in the way the proponent and the reason are understood, so this sign (referring to the reason) establishes the lack of truth on the subject. Just like the vase is selfless, using the sign that the vase is without truth to establish it, it will not become the same name for the sign and what is to be established, because this reason makes the unknown known, and makes the known clearer, so it has the power to eliminate the imputation contrary to selflessness. Second, showing that things exist in the conventional, divided into: recognizing the conventional that is mere appearance and emptiness, and explaining its nature separately. First, therefore these things, hold only the characteristics of the conventional. If you want this self's meaning, what can I do for it? It is said, like this, unable to withstand examination in either one or many, therefore all these things, like illusory horses, cows, and people, are pleasing when not examined, holding only the characteristics of the conventional. If all these things do not hold the false conventional characteristics, but want the self or essence that appears to be truly existent, what can I do for it? The nature of things is its own way of being, and cannot be changed even slightly by what others want. For example, the appearance of illusory horses and cows, if it is established as horses and cows as it appears, it cannot be said to be false. Therefore, the Buddhas, the Bhagavat, appeared in the world