English
To say that everything is one, this is to say that the many are one. Because they have no clothes, they are called "sky-clad," is this the doctrine of the Naked Ones? If diverse things exist because there are many, how can that be one? Therefore, diverse things are not truly of a single nature. For example, gold, silver, coral, turquoise, and other various jewels, and what is included by the word "etc.," the nature of consciousness that exists in various mindstreams, is also like that. The Naked Ones and these two (referring to the opponent) are similar in holding the many as one. Similarly, the Secret Ones also say that everything is of the nature of consciousness, but they do not accept only one consciousness, but accept eight aggregates of consciousness. Moreover, these eight aggregates of consciousness exist in the mindstream of each being, and they are momentary. The Secret Ones, however, believe that there is only one permanent consciousness, which does not exist differently in all beings. This is just a difference. Therefore, this refutation is said to be common. This debate can also be stated as an argument with two parts: Whatever appears as many, is necessarily not uniquely true. For example, various jewels, etc. This consciousness is also many. Therefore. (This is the argument.) This reason is the observation of contradictory nature. That is, stating as a reason the diverse things that contradict the single nature. This example is for the Naked Ones. For the Mind-Only school, since jewels have not been proven, it should be stated as "like the consciousness existing in various mindstreams." Kamalaśīla said so. However, in terms of the way things appear, there is no contradiction in stating various jewels. The second explanation is: If diverse things have a single nature, then how can diverse things appear as diverse essences, and being obscured and unobscured, etc., how can these differences exist? If all the aspects of diverse things are of the nature of a single essence, then how can these dissimilar natures, appearing as diverse essences, some being obscured, some being unobscured, some arising, some ceasing, etc., in short, how can these dissimilar or different appearances exist? For example, if jewels like dzi beads also become like diverse essences mixed into one, then how can the parts of difference be observed? In the face of harmless cognition, difference
Chinese
那些显现为各异的事物，确立为各异是没有错乱的，如同各异的珍宝一样。如果不是各异，那么就会导致一者被认知，一切都被认知；一者动摇，一切都动摇；一者产生，一切都产生等等。第二，驳斥假相唯识宗的观点，分为：陈述宗义和驳斥宗义两部分。第一部分：如若自性中，彼之此等相，实则无有者，真实无相识，由错乱而显现。如若是说，识的自性或本体中，这些识的相也不存在。认为识的自性是远离一切相的，如同清净的水晶球一般。那么，这些形形色色的相不是在心中显现吗？虽然显现，但在真实的意义上，是对无相的识由错乱或错误而显现的。例如，就像被咒语等扰乱眼睛的人们，将泥土等看成马和牛一样。因此，那些相不是作为心的自性来承认的，而是像虚空中发丝的显现一样是虚假的。因此，心不会变成那么多的数量。如果相是真实的，那么在一体性上会有矛盾；但是，在虚假的事物上，没有一体、各异等的矛盾。因此，认为可以没有上述对真实相所说的所有过失，而承认光明觉知的识是真实成立的。第二，驳斥它，分为：简要地指出驳斥、详细地解释其含义、以及驳斥对过失的辩解这三部分。第一部分：若无彼等相，如何如是明，了知彼实体，非是如是识。如是说，如果那些相不存在，那么从孩童到智者，如何能如此清晰、无欺、无可否认地体验和感知到这些相呢？凡是不存在的，就一定没有体验，就像兔子角所穿的孔的触觉、虚空花的香味、以及石女之子的形象一样，是不可能体验到的。对于此，假相唯识宗的人们不能承认显现的相完全不出现，因此，如果它显现，就不能说它不存在。因此，即使不存在，仅仅是体验也是合理的，因为
English
Those appearances that seem different are undoubtedly established as distinct, just like different jewels. If they were not distinct, it would follow that if one thing is cognized, everything is cognized; if one thing moves, everything moves; if one thing arises, everything arises, and so on. Second, refuting the system of false aspects, which has two parts: stating the assertion and refuting it. First: "If in its essence, these aspects of it do not exist, then in reality, the formless consciousness appears due to error." That is, if it is said that in the essence or intrinsic nature of consciousness, these aspects of that consciousness also do not exist. It is asserted that the essence of consciousness is devoid of all aspects, like a pure crystal ball. Then, aren't these various aspects appearing in the mind? Although they appear, in the true sense, it is the formless consciousness that appears due to delusion or error. For example, just as those with eyes disturbed by mantras, etc., see horses and cows in clay, etc. Therefore, since those aspects are not accepted as the nature of the mind, but are false like the appearance of hair in the sky, the mind does not become that many in number. If the aspects were true, there would be a contradiction in oneness; however, in false things, there is no contradiction of one, different, etc. Therefore, thinking that all the faults stated above for true aspects are absent, it is sufficient to accept the clear and knowing consciousness as truly established. Second, refuting that, which has three parts: briefly stating the refutation, explaining its meaning in detail, and refuting the response to the fault. First: "If those aspects do not exist, how is it that they are perceived so clearly? The consciousness that is different from its entity is not like that." That is, if those aspects do not exist, how is it that from children to the wise, these aspects are experienced and felt so clearly, unmistakably, and undeniably? Whatever does not exist is necessarily not experienced, just as the tactile sensation of a hole pierced by a rabbit's horn, the scent of a sky flower, and the form of a barren woman's son cannot be experienced. In this regard, those who hold to false aspects cannot claim that the appearing aspect never appears at all, so if it appears, it cannot be said that it does not exist. Therefore, even if it does not exist, it is reasonable that there is only experience, because
Chinese
就像没有毛发幻影，但它会出现在心中一样。这种想法是不合理的，如果这样详细地分析，那么所有显现的事物都只是在心中显现，没有其他可能。虽然识和相都像是心，但如果从相对的角度来区分，可以安立为能执的识和所取的相，但这二者只是从相对的角度用分别念来区分，它们的体性是一样的，所以没有任何好坏、真假、有无等的差别，因为一个不存在，另一个也必须不存在。然而，唯识宗认为识是存在的，而相是不存在的，从而区分了有无。也就是说，按照唯识宗的普遍观点，如果承认存在一种不同于识的实物，那就超出了唯识的范围，所以没有人会承认这一点。因此，任何法存在，都必须以识的自性而存在。然而，这位假相论者认为相不应是识的自性，因此说它不存在。如果不这样认为，那么如果相存在，就不应以不同于识的实物而存在；如果相与识是同一实物，那就与真相论者没有区别了。因此，要么相不存在，要么相不是识的自性，要么承认相是假的而识是真的。对于此，假相论者，即使如你所说相不存在，但认为存在的识，像水晶球一样，独自一个，怎么可能清晰地显现和体验各种各样的相呢？如果没有相，那么识缘于什么而生起，并成为它的自性呢？请思考一下。例如，当空中显现毛发幻影时，即使没有毛发幻影，但显现为毛发幻影，这是识显现为毛发幻影。虽然说没有毛发幻影，但存在显现的体验并不矛盾，但如果说显现为毛发幻影的相也不存在，那就如同自己心中生起毛发幻影的体验也完全不存在一样。因此，说相不存在，和承认任何相都不可能显现，在这两种情况下是相同的。如果什么都不显现，那就是没有相；如果一旦显现了相，那么它就是相，也是识，不能说它不是识。
English
It is like thinking that even without hair-like illusions, they can appear in the mind. This idea is unreasonable because, upon detailed examination, everything that appears is merely an appearance in the mind, and there is no other possibility. Although both consciousness and appearance seem to be the same as mind, if distinguished relatively, they can be labeled as the apprehending consciousness and the apprehended appearance. However, these two are only distinguished by conceptual thought from a relative perspective; their essence is the same. Therefore, there is no difference in terms of good or bad, true or false, existence or non-existence, because if one does not exist, the other must also not exist. However, the false-aspectarian distinguishes between existence and non-existence by saying that consciousness exists, but appearance does not. That is, according to the general tenet of Mind-Only, if one were to assert an entity that is different in substance from consciousness, it would be going beyond the bounds of Mind-Only, so no one would assert such a thing. Therefore, whatever dharma exists must exist as the nature of consciousness. However, this false-aspectarian, seeing that the appearance is not suitable as the nature of consciousness, says that it does not exist. If it were not posited as non-existent, then if it exists, it should not exist as a substance different from consciousness; and if it exists as the same substance as consciousness, it would become no different from the true-aspectarian. Therefore, either the appearance does not exist, or the appearance is not true as the nature of consciousness, or one asserts that the appearance is false and consciousness is true. To that, false-aspectarian, even if the appearance were allowed to not exist as you say, how could the consciousness that is believed to exist, like a crystal ball, alone and without a companion, clearly manifest and experience various kinds of appearances? If there is no appearance, then upon what does that consciousness focus and arise as its nature? Please consider. For example, when hair-like illusions appear in the sky, even though there are no hair-like illusions, the fact that they appear as hair-like illusions means that consciousness itself appears in the form of hair-like illusions. Although saying that there are no hair-like illusions but there is the experience of appearing is not contradictory, if one says that the appearance of appearing as hair-like illusions also does not exist, it is as if the experience of one's own mind arising with the appearance of hair-like illusions also does not exist at all. Therefore, saying that appearance does not exist and asserting that no appearance can possibly arise are the same in this context. If nothing arises, then there is no appearance; if an appearance arises, then that itself is appearance and also consciousness; it cannot be posited as not consciousness.
Chinese
哦。如果不是知识，那么就像超越知识范围的寡妇之子的颜色一样，任何知识都不可能成为对象，这是一般的说法。因此，像这样非常清晰地体验到的就是虚假的，而没有体验到的就是真实的，这样说有什么好处呢？没有。总之，知识和形象只是被视为不同的方面而分开的。实际上，无论如何都不能确定它们之间存在或不存在差异。因为形象只是知识在各个对象上认识的清晰部分，除此之外没有其他区分。因此，与形象的实体不同的独立知识在任何情况下都不可能存在。因此，区分并仔细思考这种不存在的、不明显的谬误的引入方式非常重要。否则，那些仅仅抓住无自性，然后无缘无故地停留，最终也对自己说出同样谴责的人，是远离精微细致的中观之道的。因此，唯识宗的特征是形象是真实的，因此这个形象真实是稳固的宗义。而形象虚假者认为外境在心中也是不真实的，因此更接近于真实空性，似乎与中观相符，因此即使按顺序将此置于较高位置，也会在名言上产生很大的不合理，因此应该只承认名言是形象真实的。这样，如果掌握了根本的要点，那么在下面的反驳中也能以同样的方式轻松理解。第二，详细解释，形象不存在是不合理的。仅仅执着形象是不合理的。第一，从分析对象如何被认知是不合理的。从分析关系是不合理的。从分析原因是不合理的。第一，分为一般和特殊两种。第一。像这样，在什么事物中不存在什么东西？在这种情况下，不可能知道它。对于非快乐的事物，快乐等等，以及对于白色事物，非白色也是如此。如是说。像这样，在分为对象和有对象两种的情况下，如果某个对象中不存在某个事物，那么有对象的知识也不可能知道其自身力量的对象中不存在的事物。例如，不可能将非快乐的痛苦认知为快乐，以及通过“等等”一词将快乐认知为痛苦。同样，对于白色的对象，也不可能认知为非白色的黑色。