English
Oh. If it is not knowledge, then just like the color of a widow's son who is beyond the scope of knowledge, it is generally impossible for any knowledge to become an object. Therefore, what is experienced so clearly is false, and what is not experienced is true. What good is there in saying this? There is none. In short, knowledge and image are merely separated by regarding them as different aspects. In reality, it is impossible to determine whether there is or is not a difference between them in any way. Because the image is merely the clear part of knowledge that recognizes individual objects, and there is no other distinction apart from that. Therefore, such an independent knowledge that is different from the entity of the image is not possible in any way. Therefore, it is very important to distinguish and carefully consider how this introduction of non-existent, non-obvious fallacy occurs. Otherwise, those who merely grasp onto selflessness and then remain without reason, ultimately saying the same condemnation to themselves, are far from the subtle and detailed Middle Way. Therefore, the characteristic of the Mind-Only school is that the image is true, so this image truth is a solid tenet. And those who hold the image to be false believe that external objects are also untrue in the mind, so they are closer to true emptiness and seem to be in accordance with the Middle Way. Therefore, even if this is placed higher in order, it will create great unreasonableness in conventional terms, so it should only be acknowledged that conventional terms are image-true. In this way, if the key point of the root is grasped, then it can be easily understood in the same way in the following refutations. Second, in the detailed explanation, it is unreasonable for there to be no image. It is unreasonable to merely cling to the image. First, it is unreasonable to analyze how objects are cognized. It is unreasonable to analyze the relationship. It is unreasonable to analyze the cause. First, it is divided into two types: general and specific. First. Like this, in what thing does something not exist? In that case, it is not possible to know it. For non-pleasant things, pleasure, etc., and for white things, non-white is also the same. It is said. Like this, in the case of dividing into object and object-possessor, if something does not exist in a certain object, then the knowledge of the object-possessor cannot know that the thing that does not exist in that object of its own power. For example, it is impossible to cognize non-pleasant suffering as pleasure, and to cognize pleasure as suffering through the word "etc." Similarly, for white objects, it is impossible to cognize them as non-white black.
Chinese
如是不容许，如是总的显示后。第二，在分别上，实际上知是不合理的，仅仅假立也不容许知。第一，对于此相，知的意义，实际上不合理，因为远离知的自性之故，如虚空之花等。如是说，于此，以知觉知对境的方式，不是实际的知，就是假立的方式知，不可能超出这两种方式。实际的知，是与识的物质自性相违的自性，于任何对境的相上，显现且生起觉知，称为实际的觉知。如意义论者所许，对境如瓶子等，即使没有实际觉知，也由外境的力量，生起与彼相似的显现的知，而假立为觉知对境。但在无相的宗派，这二者都不可能。首先，像这样，对于明显体验到的蓝黄等的相，认为“这是这个”，而明显觉知和知的意义实际上是不合理的。因为实际的知，必须以与知的自性相同的方式来知。在你的宗派里，承认相不是知，因为远离知的自性，所以无论如何也不可能实际体验到。例如，就像不可能明显体验到虚空之花和石女之子等的颜色一样。第二，仅仅假立也不可能体验到，因为对于不存在的事物没有能力。安立也是不容许的，如马角一样。不存在的事物，对于生起自显现的知，是不可能有能力的。如果任何法存在，即使不认为是实际体验到也可以，因为相是创造者的对境，具有生起自性显现的知的能力，所以知与事物相似地生起，可以说看到或知晓了那个对境。但是，对于不存在的事物，因为没有生起自显现的知的能力，所以仅仅假立为体验或知晓这个和那个是不容许的，例如马角一样。也就是说，马的角没有生起它自己显现的知的能力，所以对于它的相是这样的，执持自相的知，即使在名言中也是不可能的。与那个例子相同，如果相也不存在，那么对于那个相，说这是蓝色或黄色等，生起自性显现的知
English
As it is not permissible, thus generally shown. Secondly, in the specifics, actual knowing is not reasonable, and even mere imputation of knowing is not permissible. First, regarding this aspect, the meaning of knowing, is not actually reasonable, because it is separate from the nature of knowing, like a sky flower, etc. It is said that in this case, the way knowledge knows an object cannot exceed either actual knowing or imputed knowing. Actual knowing is the nature that is the opposite of the material nature of consciousness, and when clarity and awareness arise in the aspect of any object, it is called actual awareness. According to the proponents of object theory, even if an object like a vase is not actually known, a knowledge arises that appears similar to it due to the power of the external object, and this is labeled as knowing the object. However, in the non-image school, neither of these is possible. First, in this way, for the clearly experienced aspects of blue, yellow, etc., it is not actually reasonable to manifestly recognize and know, saying, "This is this." Because actual knowing must know in a way that is one with the nature of knowing. In your system, you assert that the aspect is not knowledge, and because it is separate from the nature of knowledge, it is never possible to actually experience it. For example, just as it is impossible to clearly experience the color of a sky flower or the child of a barren woman. Secondly, it is not possible to experience even by mere imputation, because there is no power in what does not exist. Imputation is also not permissible, like a horse's horn. What does not exist does not have the power to generate self-appearing knowledge. If any dharma exists, it may be acceptable even if it is not considered actually experienced, because the aspect is the object of the creator, having the power to generate knowledge of self-appearance, so when knowledge arises similar to the object, it is permissible to say that the object is seen or known. However, for what does not exist, because there is no power to generate self-appearing knowledge, it is not permissible to merely impute experiencing or knowing this and that, like a horse's horn. That is, a horse's horn does not have the power to generate knowledge of its own appearance, so a knowledge that grasps its own characteristic, saying, "Its aspect is like this," is not possible even in conventional terms. Similarly, if the aspect does not exist, then for that aspect, saying, "This is blue or yellow, etc.," the knowledge of self-appearance
Chinese
不能容许有产生的能力。对于唯识宗的虚假相来说，虽然不承认通过假设来体验外境，即外境是独立存在的，而意识只是体验到与外境相似的相状，但在这里，无论以真实还是假设的方式，都不可能体验到外境，如果没有其他的体验方式，那么为了避免相的体验的意识完全不存在的过失，所以才这样加以限制。第二，关联不合理。因为那存在必定被觉知，识与关联有什么？无我，那的自性，不是从那产生。如是说。对于所有体验的对境，都必须有关联，不可能在没有关联的情况下觉知。因为青色、黄色等相存在，并且有境的意识必定觉知到，这种不可避免的显现，按照你的观点，识与关联有什么？那是不合理的。那是因为什么呢？像这样，你们认为相是没有自性的，而认为意识是存在的。因此，成为意识自性的关联是不合理的。如果成为一个自性，那么必然会像相一样没有意识，或者像意识一样存在相。而且，也不是从意识产生的，因为不存在的事物不能成为任何法的果。即使允许是从意识产生的，因为有先后，也会有不能同时认知等无尽的过失。仅仅通过从那产生的关联，在没有体验对境的情况下，需要在一般情况下对这些进行分析，但在这里，由于是虚假相，所以不应该承认是从那产生的，因此不需要在这里进行分析。因此，即使体验相，也必须承认没有关联，这是非常严重的矛盾。对此，将不舍弃其他法的法称为关联。外道所说的结合关联、聚合关联等，没有确定明确的区分的普遍范畴的最终界限。尊者法称说：因为任何法都被同一或不同所遍及。因此，第一种是自性同一关联，不同关联是从那产生的关联，确定为两种。也就是说，在作为基础的瓶子等事物上，从排除常有的角度来说是不常有，从排除未作的角度来说是已作，从排除无实有的角度来说是
English
It is not permissible to have the ability to produce. For the mere-consciousness proponents of false appearances, although they do not accept experiencing through imputation, i.e., that external objects exist independently and consciousness only experiences appearances similar to external objects, here, it is impossible to experience external objects in any way, whether real or imputed. If there is no other way of experiencing, then in order to avoid the fault of the complete non-existence of consciousness that experiences appearances, this is restricted. Second, the connection is not reasonable. Because that exists, it must be perceived. What connection is there with consciousness? Selflessness, that's own nature, is not produced from that. It is said. For all objects that are experienced, there must be a connection, and it is impossible to perceive without a connection. Because the appearances of blue, yellow, etc., exist, and the consciousness of the subject inevitably perceives them, this unavoidable manifestation, according to your view, what connection is there with consciousness? That is not reasonable. Why is that? Like this, you believe that appearances are without self-nature, and you believe that consciousness exists. Therefore, the connection that becomes the self-nature of consciousness is unreasonable. If it becomes one self-nature, then inevitably there will be no consciousness like appearances, or there will be appearances like consciousness. Moreover, it is not produced from consciousness, because non-existent things cannot become the result of any dharma. Even if it is allowed to be produced from consciousness, because there is before and after, there will be endless faults such as not being able to cognize simultaneously. Only through the connection of being produced from that, in the case of not experiencing the object, these need to be analyzed in general, but here, since it is a false appearance, it should not be admitted that it is produced from that, so there is no need to analyze it here. Therefore, even if appearances are experienced, it must be admitted that there is no connection, which is a very serious contradiction. To this, the dharma that does not abandon other dharmas is called connection. The outsiders' combination connection, aggregation connection, etc., have not determined the final limit of the general category of clear distinctions. The venerable Dharmakirti said: Because any dharma is pervaded by either the same or different. Therefore, the first is the self-same connection, and the different connection is the connection produced from that, which is determined to be two types. That is, on things like the vase that is the basis, from the perspective of excluding permanence, it is impermanent, from the perspective of excluding the unmade, it is made, from the perspective of excluding the non-existent,
Chinese
所谓的“体性”，是指通过他体遮遣而排除反面的增益，各个部分都具有能够通过各自的名称来理解的能力，而其他事物无法理解，因此在名言识境中被分别安立。然而，在意义上，仅仅是瓶子的体性是相同的，因此将有为和无常安立在瓶子上，作为一种单一的本体关系。在它体遮遣的识境中，这是由于区分和归纳的缘故，但在意义上，由于是单一的本体，因此不可能存在自体与自体的关系，就像指尖无法抓住自己一样。它的产生是因果关系的方式，其中有近取因和俱生因两种。其他论典中，也有以六因四缘等方式产生果的说法，也应了解。一般来说，原因有五种等说法，但实际上可以归纳为安立之因和生起之因两种。凡是缺少它就不会产生结果的事物，就被称为原因。顺便说一下，关于相违，两个事物互相成为损害者和被损害者，持续的能力相同，不能共存的，被称为俱不并存相违。像蓝色和非蓝色这样的相违，是无实事，一定是互相排斥的两种相违。第一种，像光明和黑暗一样，是意义上的相违；像执着于我和了悟无我一样，是意识上的相违。互相排斥的相违有两种：实体相违和间接相违。第一种是两者实际上互相矛盾，如常和无常。第二种是两者实际上不是互相矛盾的，但其中一个的反面是另一个的遍，因此两者不可能同时存在，如有为和常。例如，常的遍是不有为。关于这一点，深入理解相违关系非常重要。但因为害怕文字繁琐而省略了，而且相违关系必须遍及所有的论证。所以，这里只是简单地说明一下。第三，观察原因：如果无原因，那么凭借什么，这偶尔的生起会成为可能？如果具有原因，那么凭借什么，会从他者的控制中解脱出来？如是说。如果问蓝色、黄色等现象是否有原因，那么只能承认两者中的一种。对于现象来说，有