Chinese
既然已经成立了杂色景象的显现必须同时具有蓝色等，那么仅凭它是多种显现就足够了。因此，唯识宗鸡蛋一半理论的这个观点，认为杂色景象的所取相也仅仅是一个杂色，这是一个特点。在那里，不是一个的过失将立即被阐述。一般来说，名言中尚且不成立，更何况胜义谛呢？就像已经死在母亲子宫里的人，出生时不需要杀一样。第二，提出过失，并显示这个过失也同样适用于承认外境的观点。第一，永远无法避免这个矛盾的原因：如果显现不是各异的，那么运动和不运动等等，一个运动，所有都运动等等，将成为必然，难以回答。如是说，上面刚说完的对识相的过失，对于声称识是真实成立，并且认为一个识相由一个识来认识的观点来说，是不可避免的。像这样，如果将它们众多的显现不是各异的，而是总合为一个本体来承认的话，那么运动和不运动，以及被颜色改变和未被颜色改变等等，一个，其余所有也必须变成运动或不运动等等。总之，对于一个显现所见到的，对于其他所有也必然见到，因为已经承认了自己的显现不是各异的，所以现在不能说不是那样，有些运动而有些不运动的差别。因此，这个必然的结论难以回答。同样，对于杂色的显现，如果不是仅仅假立一个，而是真实的一个，因为是唯一无分，所以如果其中的白色部分被颜色改变，其他部分也必然被改变等等，如果必须见到那样，谁也不能承认是那样。如果显现是各异的，那么上述的必然结论是不可避免的。现在再也不需要任何帮助了。第二，对于外境的道理也是如此。如果显现不分离，那么一个的法性，所有也都会进入，无法避免。如是说，这样的必然结论，仅仅适用于不承认外境的唯识宗所承认的显现。
English
Since it has been established that the appearance of variegated perception must simultaneously have blue, etc., it is sufficient that it is merely multiple appearances. Therefore, this view of the Mind-Only school, the half-egg, considers that the apprehended aspect of the variegated appearance is also just one variegation, which is a distinction. There, the fault of not being one will be explained immediately. In general, if it is not established even in conventional terms, what need is there to mention ultimate truth? It is like not needing to kill someone who has already died in the mother's womb when they are born. Secondly, to present the consequence and to show that the fault is equally applicable to those who accept external objects. First, the reason why that contradiction can never be avoided: If the appearances are not different, then moving and not moving, etc., one moving, all moving, etc., would necessarily follow, and it would be difficult to answer. It is said that the fault just mentioned above regarding the cognitive aspect inevitably applies to the view that asserts that consciousness is truly established and that one aspect is known by one consciousness. Like this, if those many appearances are not different, but are combined and accepted as one entity, then moving and not moving, and being changed by color and not being changed, etc., by one, all the remaining ones must also become moving or not moving, etc. In short, whatever is seen in one appearance must also be seen in all others, because it has already been admitted that one's own appearances are not different, so now it cannot be said that it is not so, that some are moving and some are not moving. Therefore, this inevitable conclusion is difficult to answer. Similarly, if the variegated appearance is not merely nominally one, but is truly one, because it is uniquely indivisible, then if one of its parts, such as the white part, is changed by color, the other parts must also be changed, etc. If it must be seen that way, no one can admit that it is so. If the appearances are different, then the above inevitable conclusion is unavoidable. Now, there is no need for any further assistance. Secondly, regarding the nature of external objects as well. If the appearances are not separate, then all the qualities of one will also enter into all, and there is no way to avoid it. It is said that such an inevitable conclusion applies only to the appearance accepted by the Mind-Only school, which does not accept external objects.
Chinese
而且，认为名言所认可的外境实有不成立，并非是指不容许外境实有。对于心以外的他物，外境的体性或者事物，如果唯识宗承认其具有多种形相且不离自性，即承认有相。因为他们认为诸形相是一体的，所以，作为形相之因的外境诸法，也都会成为其中任何一个部分的法性，所有其他部分也都会包含在内，这个过失是无法避免的。如果诸形相与外境相同，那么为什么外境不能像形相一样是单一的呢？例如，如果给杂色外境中的白色部分涂上颜色，那么其他蓝色等部分也必须具有相同的颜色。如是等等。因此，普遍理解这些形相不可能是一个实有，这一点非常重要。虽然执着于多为一可能会产生各种增益，但从理性的角度来看，一个实有不可能显现为不同。对于被假立为一个的事物，这样做是可以接受的。同样，对于多个实有，不能将其视为一个；对于被假立为多个的事物，可以将其假立为一个。通过区分实有和假立，并相信假立之名言是合理的，这一点在所有开头、结尾和中间的章节中都是最重要的。第二，驳斥识的数目与形相数目相等的观点。如果按照形相的数目，承认识的数目也相等，那么就会变得像微尘一样，这个辩论很难反驳。如是说。在此，一些早期的唯识宗论师认为，在同一时间会产生许多同类的识，这在名言上也是不合理的。按照自宗，虽然会产生与形相数目相等的许多识，但不会变成同类，因此不会同时产生许多同类的识。关于区分概念和非概念的作用，如前所述。因此，自宗的这种不共许的观点，在假立名言上没有任何不合理之处，这种观点对于中观宗来说是庄严的。然而，对于唯识宗来说，如果按照形相的数目，也承认识的数目是多个，那么他们自己的识的真实成立也是无法成立的。因为在显现为多个的时候，在多个之中
English
Moreover, it is not that the assertion that external objects, which are accepted by names, do not exist is to disallow the existence of external objects. Regarding objects other than the mind, the nature or entities of external objects, if the Mind-Only school acknowledges that they possess various forms and are inseparable from their own nature, that is, they acknowledge having aspects. Because they consider the forms to be one, therefore, the external objects that are the cause of the forms will also become the dharma of any one part of them, and all other parts will also be included, and this fault cannot be avoided. If the forms are the same as the external objects, then why can't the external objects be as singular as the forms? For example, if you paint a color on the white part of a variegated external object, then the other blue parts must also have the same color. And so on. Therefore, it is very important to generally understand that these forms cannot be a single reality. Although clinging to many as one may produce various superimpositions, from a rational point of view, a single reality cannot appear as different. It is acceptable to do so for something that is nominally established as one. Similarly, for multiple realities, one cannot regard them as one; for things that are nominally established as multiple, one can nominally establish them as one. By distinguishing between reality and nominality, and believing that the names of nominality are reasonable, this is the most important in all the beginning, ending, and middle chapters. Second, refuting the view that the number of consciousnesses is equal to the number of forms. If according to the number of forms, one admits that the number of consciousnesses is also equal, then it will become like dust particles, and this debate is difficult to refute. Thus it is said. Here, some early Mind-Only school teachers believed that many consciousnesses of the same kind would arise at the same time, which is unreasonable even in names. According to one's own system, although many consciousnesses equal to the number of forms arise, they do not become of the same kind, so many consciousnesses of the same kind do not arise simultaneously. Regarding distinguishing the functions of conceptual and non-conceptual, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, this uncommon acceptance of one's own system has no unreasonableness in nominal names, and this view is beautiful for the Madhyamaka school. However, for the Mind-Only school, if according to the number of forms, they also admit that the number of consciousnesses is multiple, then the true establishment of their own consciousnesses cannot be established. Because when appearing as multiple, among the multiple
Chinese
对于任何一个事物，都有显现为具有边、中、方位的多种形态，例如，对微粒的观察方式如何，它就仅仅变成那样。虽然观察作用于微粒，但并不作用于意识等等，因为没有回答的机会。由于这两者在显现方式上没有差别，因此很难反驳这个论点，确实无法反驳。因此，按照自宗的观点，虽然认为有多种多样的识，但多种仅仅是假立的，并不能阻止显现为多种形态，它仅仅是依赖关系。例如，一个瓶子也有多个部分，部分又有多个微粒，微粒上没有任何真实的“一”，但可以毫无欺骗、无可否认地安立显现假立的作用等等，所有浩瀚的所知也都是如此。其中，对于抓住杂色的多种形态中的蓝色，即使是其中一个，在中间部分显现的形态，如果与无间隔地环绕显现的各个方位部分相对的只是一个面，那么在方位部分显现的形态就会变成一个；如果各个面是分开的，那么中间形态的自性就会变成多个识。如果不执著于无间隔的同类微粒，就会错误地认为粗大之物是一个整体；对于没有无间隔地体验多种颜色的蓝色等认知，就会错误地认为是一种形态，这有什么区别呢？有些人认为无间隔显现的蓝色等事物的自性是极微，另一些人则仅仅认为它是认知的本质，但没有人能够认为显现为具有方位部分的各个方位是一个，因此，进入考察的过失是相同的，无法避免。无论是同类还是不同类，这种考察都适用于所有无间隔显现的事物显现形态。第三，破斥多种非二元性，包括确立反驳的宗义，以及论证其合理性。首先：如果多种是一，那是什么，是裸体派的观点吗？多种不是一的自性，就像多种珍宝等。如是说，有些人认为，就像宝珠一样，仅仅一个识就能抓住多种事物的体性。如果多种形态存在，但它们都是一个识的自性，那么...
English
For any single thing, there are many ways in which it appears, with aspects of edge, center, and direction. For example, however one examines a particle, it only becomes that way. Although the examination acts on the particle, it does not act on consciousness, etc., because there is no opportunity to answer. Since there is no difference in the way these two appear, it is difficult to refute this argument, indeed it cannot be refuted. Therefore, according to our own system, although it is held that there are many kinds of consciousness, the many are merely imputed, and it does not prevent the appearance of many forms; it is merely a dependent relation. For example, even a single pot has many parts, and the parts have many particles. Although there is no single truth in the particles, one can establish the unimpaired and undeniable function of appearance and imputation, and all the vast objects of knowledge are the same. Among them, regarding the many forms of grasping the variegated, such as blue, even if it is one, if the aspect that appears in the central part is one face directed to each of the directional parts that appear to surround it without interval, then all the aspects that appear in the directional parts would become one; and if the faces are separate, then the nature of the central aspect would become many consciousnesses. If one does not grasp the many homogeneous particles without interval, one mistakenly believes that the gross object is a single mass; and what is the difference between mistakenly believing that the cognition of blue, etc., which has not been experienced as many without interval, is a single form? Some assert that the nature of blue, etc., which appears without interval, is the nature of atoms, while others merely consider it to be the essence of cognition, but no one can assert that the various directions that appear with directional parts are one, so the fault of entering into examination is the same and cannot be avoided. Whether it is homogeneous or heterogeneous, this examination applies to all appearances of things that appear without interval. Third, refuting the non-duality of the manifold, including establishing the proposition of refutation and proving its validity. First: If the manifold is one, then what is it, is it the view of the Naked Ascetics? The manifold is not the nature of one, like various jewels, etc. It is said that some people think that, like a jewel, only one consciousness can grasp the nature of the manifold. If many forms exist, but they are all the nature of one consciousness, then...
Chinese
说一切都是一，这是说众多为一。因为没有衣服，所以被称为“天空的衣服”，这是裸体派的教义吗？如果多种事物是因为有多种而存在，那怎么能成为一呢？因此，多种事物并非真实地具有单一的自性。例如，黄金、白银、珊瑚、绿松石等各种珍宝，以及“等”字所包括的，存在于各种心续中的识的自性，也是如此。裸体派和他们（指对方）在将多种视为一这一点上是相似的。同样，秘密派也说一切都是识的自性，但他们不承认只有一个识，而是承认八识聚。而且，这八识聚存在于每个众生的心续中，并且是刹那生灭的。秘密派则认为只有一个常恒的识，它不以不同的方式存在于一切众生之中。这只是一个区别。因此，这个驳斥被认为是共同的。也可以将这个辩论陈述为具有两个部分的论证：凡是显现为多种的，就必然不是唯一真实的。例如，各种珍宝等。这个识也是多种的。因此。（这是论证）这个理由是观察到自性相违。也就是说，将与单一自性相违的多种事物作为理由来陈述。这个例子是针对裸体派的。对于唯识宗来说，由于珍宝尚未被证实，所以应该陈述为“如同存在于各种心续中的识”。格玛拉希拉（莲花戒）这样说过。然而，就显现的方式而言，陈述各种珍宝也没有矛盾。第二种解释是：如果多种事物具有单一的自性，那么多种事物显现为多种本质，以及被遮蔽和未被遮蔽等等，这些差异又将如何存在呢？如果一切多种事物的相都是单一本质的自性，那么像这样自性不相同，显现为多种本质，有的被遮蔽，有的未被遮蔽，有的生起，有的灭去等等，总之，这些不相同或差异的显现又将如何存在呢？例如，如果珍宝瑟智等也像多种差异的本质混合为一，那么差异的部分又怎么能被观察到呢？在无害的认知面前，差异