Chinese
总而言之，如果显现是识，那必须是识。如果不了解，自己也无法体验，抓住这唯一要点，就能从俱生缘起等成百上千的理路中得出结论。因此，本论中说：“自己成立的是什么？”仅此而已，因此在此进行阐述。这样一来，自之识的明觉仅仅是进入各自不同的方向，对于没有堕落的，作为习气之所依的阿赖耶识进行安立。那也是本体无记，仅仅是境之义的识，刹那刹那生起。眷属是触等一切遍行五者，所缘不明显。认为所缘是广大的器情世界。如果分类，有异熟分和种子分两种。那些本体、眷属、所缘等是那样的理由也是，抓住没有堕落到进入各自不同的方向的识，仅仅是明觉本体的要点，就能轻易了解阿赖耶的一切差别。如果另外解释阿赖耶，说所缘和本体是这样的，即使考察很久也很难抓住要点。那些详细的分类要从其他论典中了解。像那样阿赖耶识如同大海，如波浪般，具有生灭七识聚及其眷属的能力或习气。总之，在阿赖耶上安立能生自果未来的东西，那未成熟时，以种子的方式存在。成熟时，显现为身体、处所、受用等各种各样。即使没有境，也因串习的习气而体验各种各样的显现，如同梦中的识和不净等串习的意念一样。对于此，如果不认为显现是心，那还可以。如果认为显现是心，那就必须承认阿赖耶。因为进入识的那些各自不同的方向，从那一个个来说，内外的事物、处所、身体、受用一切都不能作为一切的基础，而且各种各样的显现仅仅是心，因此那个心必须是境识身体一切的基础，因此心不会超越明觉。为了简略叙述那些宗派，如是
English
In short, if appearance is consciousness, then it must be consciousness. If one does not understand, one cannot experience it oneself. Grasping this single key point, one can conclude from hundreds of reasonings such as co-emergent origination. Therefore, in this treatise, it is said, "What is established by oneself?" This is all, so it will be explained here. Thus, the mere clarity and awareness of one's own consciousness, without falling into separate directions of entering consciousnesses, is designated as the ālaya-vijñāna, which serves as the basis for habitual tendencies. Its essence is unspecified, merely the consciousness of the meaning of objects, arising momentarily. Its retinue consists of approximately the five omnipresent mental factors such as contact. Its object is unclear. It is believed to focus on the vast container and contents of the world. If divided, there are two aspects: the aspect of maturation and the aspect of seeds. The reason why those essences, retinues, objects, etc., are as such is also that if one grasps the key point of taking consciousness, which has not fallen into separate directions of entering consciousnesses, as merely the essence of clarity and awareness, one can easily understand all the distinctions of the ālaya. If one explains the ālaya separately, saying that the object and essence are like this, it is difficult to grasp the key point even after examining it for eons. Detailed classifications of these should be learned from other treatises. Such an ālaya-vijñāna, like a great ocean, has the power or habitual tendencies for the seven aggregates, along with their retinues, to arise and cease like waves. In short, what is established on the ālaya is the ability to produce its future result. When it is not yet mature, it remains in the form of seeds. When it matures, it appears as various bodies, places, enjoyments, etc. Even without an object, one experiences various appearances due to the habitual tendencies of familiarity, just like the consciousness in dreams and the familiar thoughts of ugliness, etc. Regarding this, unless one does not consider appearance to be mind, it is acceptable. If one considers appearance to be mind, then one must definitely acknowledge the ālaya. Because those entering consciousnesses are inclined towards separate directions, each of them cannot serve as the basis for all internal and external things, places, bodies, and enjoyments. Moreover, various appearances are merely mind, so that mind must be the basis for all object-consciousness and bodies. Therefore, mind does not transcend mere clarity and awareness. Intending to briefly state those systems, as
Chinese
从无始以来就存在的自心相续中，由于对实有的执着习气完全成熟，所显现的化现的境像等相，此显现也是。虽然在能感受者和所感受的境二者之间，完全没有丝毫的隔阂而成立，但却显现为境和有境一般，这是由于心迷惑或错乱而显现本不存在之物，是幻化的自性。同样，如同梦境、乾闼婆城、火焰轮、化现、水月等，唯识宗就是这样认为的。第二，观察此理，观察这些的过失和功德，以及遮破过失的部分。第一，这些是善的，然而这些的实有是真实的吗？或者是不经观察的唯一，欣然承认，这是需要思考的。像这样的宗派，是通过名言的理证而成立的，是遣除执着于能取所取为异体的恶见之清净对治。并且，由于具备《楞伽经》等正确教证，所以是善的或好的。然而，显现为各种形象的识，这些事物的实有是真实的吗？或者是不经观察，仅仅随顺名言的安立方式，就欣然承认其为令人愉悦的自性，这种方式是需要思考或观察的。对此，唯识宗的人认为，不是不经观察，仅仅随顺显现的名言安立方式，而是在胜义谛上，也认为识是以自性成立的，因此认为是真实的。因此，第二，遮破过失的部分，即遮破识的真实成立，分为识为真实的宗派和识为虚假的宗派两种遮破。第一种又分为鸡蛋分半、识的数量相等、多样无二的宗派三种遮破。第一种又分为揭示相违和说明不能消除相违两种。第一，如果识是真实的，那么就会变成众多，或者变成一个，由于具有相违，所以必然会各自转变。如上所述，在观察无论是仅仅在名言上，还是在胜义上都承认的情况下，如果说在胜义谛上识也是存在的，那么，在揭示唯识宗共同承许的所破时，虽然心在胜义中成立似乎相同，但这些显现的形象在心中
English
From the beginningless stream of one's own mind, due to the complete ripening of various habitual imprints of clinging to reality, the appearances of manifested objects, etc., this appearance is also. Although there is not the slightest separation between the perceiver and the perceived object, it appears as if there are objects and subjects. This is because the mind is deluded or confused, and things appear that do not exist, which is the nature of illusion. Similarly, like dreams, gandharva cities, fire wheels, manifestations, and water moons, the Mind-Only school believes this. Second, examining this reasoning involves examining the faults and merits of these, and refuting the faulty aspects. First, these are virtuous, but are the realities of these things truly real? Or is it simply accepted without examination, which is something to consider. Such a system is established through reasoning based on conventions and is a pure antidote that dispels the evil views of clinging to the duality of grasper and grasped. Furthermore, since it possesses valid scriptures such as the Lankavatara Sutra, it is virtuous or good. However, are the realities of these appearances that appear in various forms truly real? Or is it simply accepted without examination, merely following the way of establishing conventions, as being of a pleasing nature, which is something to consider or examine. In this regard, the Mind-Only proponents believe that it is not without examination, merely following the way of establishing conventions based on appearances, but also in the ultimate truth, they believe that consciousness is established by its own nature, and therefore they consider it to be real. Therefore, second, refuting the faulty aspects, which is refuting the true establishment of consciousness, is divided into two refutations: the school that consciousness is true and the school that consciousness is false. The first is further divided into three refutations: the half-egg school, the school that consciousness has equal numbers, and the school that diversity is non-dual. The first is further divided into two: showing contradictions and explaining the inability to resolve contradictions. First, if consciousness is truly real, then it will become many, or it will become one. Since it has contradictions, it will inevitably change separately. As mentioned above, when examining whether it is accepted only in name or also in the ultimate sense, if it is said that consciousness also exists in the ultimate truth, then, when revealing the object of negation that is commonly accepted by the Mind-Only school, although the mind seems to be established in the ultimate truth, these appearing forms in the mind
Chinese
承认显现为真实的，以及不承认其在心中为真实的，这两种是虚假的，除了这两种之外，不可能有其他的理解方式。在显现为真实之中，对于显现和意识两者在数量上的多少，产生了三种观点，这与经部宗相似。经部宗承认作为显现产生者的外境是独立存在的，而唯识宗则认为显现的景象本身就是所缘境，除此之外，不承认有独立的外境存在，这仅仅是它们之间的区别。因此，这三种观点的见解，就像之前在经部宗的章节中所说的那样，所以在此不需要单独说明。这三种观点中，像鸡蛋破裂一半的观点是不合理的。如果心和显现是一体的，那么不应该只显现无分单一的显现，因为显现有多种多样，所以显现的意识也应该变成多种。或者，如果像认为意识是一个那样，那么那些显现也应该变成一个，不应该显现为多种。如果不是这样，那么一个不是多个，另一个不是多个，这两者是矛盾的，所以不可避免地必须变成各自独立的，因此承认是一个也没有意义。对于显现的各种形态，一般而言，无可否认的是，它们不是单独的一个，而是显现为多种多样，而且反驳者自己也承认这一点。然而，他们认为意识是真实的。如果真实，那么必须真实地成为一个或多个。而多个的真实也必须依赖于一个真实而存在。因此，如果存在真实，那么不可能超越一个真实，这是一般的规律。所以，在这里，一般而言，仅仅因为显现是多个，就足以否定一个真实的意识。不需要区分同时或异时的差别来进行否定。即使一个意识在异时中认识到一个显现，由于前后的显现不是同一个，所以执持这两者的意识，一个真实也无法成立。在此，为了从根本上否定刹那意识的一个真实，就像在经部宗的章节中所说的那样，已经表明即使在名言中，单独的显现也是不合理的。也就是说，有部宗认为，在外境的杂色事物上，青色、黄色等同时存在，但心识是依次产生的，这种观点已经被驳斥了。而在这里，由于不承认外境，所以是阿赖耶识的习气成熟。
English
There are two ways of acknowledging appearances: acknowledging them as truly existent, and acknowledging them as not truly existent in the mind, which are false. There is no other way of understanding besides these two. Within acknowledging appearances as truly existent, there are three different views on the quantity of appearances and consciousness, which are similar to the Sautrāntika school. The Sautrāntikas acknowledge that external objects, which are the producers of appearances, exist separately. However, the Cittamatrins consider the appearing image itself as the object, and do not acknowledge any separate external object beyond that. This is the only difference between them. Therefore, the views of these three are as explained in the section on the Sautrāntikas, so there is no need to mention them separately here. Among these three views, the view of the "half-egg" is not reasonable. If mind and appearance are one, then it is not reasonable for only an indivisible, single appearance to appear. Since appearances are diverse, the consciousness of appearances should also become multiple. Alternatively, if one considers consciousness to be one, then those appearances should also become one, and it is not reasonable for them to appear as multiple. If it does not become like that, then one is not multiple and the other is not multiple, these two are contradictory, so they must inevitably become separate. Therefore, acknowledging them as one is meaningless. Regarding the various forms of appearances, in general, it is undeniable that they do not appear as a single one, but as multiple and diverse, and the opponent himself acknowledges this. However, they consider consciousness to be true. If it is true, then it must be true as either one or many. And the truth of the many must also depend on the truth of the one. Therefore, if there is truth, it is impossible to go beyond one truth, which is the general rule. So, here, in general, it is sufficient to deny the one true consciousness simply because appearances are multiple. It is not necessary to distinguish between simultaneous or successive differences to negate it. Even if one consciousness knows one appearance in succession, since the earlier and later appearances are not the same, the consciousness that holds these two cannot establish one truth. In this case, to fundamentally deny the one truth of momentary consciousness, as explained in the section on the Sautrāntikas, it has already been shown that even in conventional terms, individual appearances are unreasonable. That is, the Vaibhāṣikas believe that on the variegated external object, blue, yellow, etc., exist simultaneously, but the mind arises sequentially. This view has already been refuted. And here, since external objects are not acknowledged, it is the ripening of the propensities of the ālaya.