Chinese
认为这是所说之义，从而有遮止法与有法之自性的相违之理二者，以及遮止差别的相违之理二者，这四者依次是：声音，有法，是常，因为是所作之故。以及，胜解认为虚空，有法，是常，因为是非所作之故。以及，眼等，有法，具有非集合之境，能成办他义，因为是集合与积聚之故。以及，眼等具有非集合之境，有法，能成办他义，因为是集合与积聚之故，等等。他们这样认为。这些是不合理的，如果遮止有法之自性，则不成 पक्षधर्म（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思：ཕྱོགས་ཆོས། ，pakṣadharma， पक्षधर्म， पक्षधर्म， पक्षधर्म， पक्षधर्म，品法），不成品法，则不合理成为相违之理。其他三个例子也是不合理的，因为这些仅仅是从表达意愿的角度来区分的，而不是从法与有法的遮止方式来区分的。第二，如果从表达意愿的角度来区分相违之理，则有四种：有些是直接表达相违的相违之理，有些是通过表达的语气而变成相违的相违之理，有些是表达法的相违之理，有些是表达有法的相违之理，共有四种。第一种是：无常的声音，有法，是常，因为是所作之故。第二种是：常法，有法，是能生果者，因为是空无次第与同时之作用能力之故。第三种和第四种是：之前所说的后两者。第三，如果说与 यथार्थ （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思：ཡང་དག། ，yathārtha，यथार्थ，yathārtha，真实）也相同，因为作用小所以行舍，正如之前在 यथार्थ （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思：ཡང་དག། ，yathārtha，यथार्थ，yathārtha，真实）的十种分类时已经说过了。第三，驳斥认为其他
English
Considering this to be the meaning of what was said, there are two contradictory reasons that prevent the self-nature of dharma and the possessor of dharma, and two contradictory reasons that prevent differences, these four are in order: sound, the possessor of dharma, is permanent, because it is made. And, Shengjie considers space, the possessor of dharma, is permanent, because it is unmade. And, eyes, etc., the possessor of dharma, has a non-aggregate object and can accomplish other's benefit, because it is an aggregate and accumulation. And, eyes, etc., possessing a non-aggregate object, the possessor of dharma, can accomplish other's benefit, because it is an aggregate and accumulation, and so on. They think so. These are unreasonable, if the self-nature of the possessor of dharma is prevented, then पक्षधर्म（Tibetan, Sanskrit Devanagari, Sanskrit Romanization, Chinese literal meaning: ཕྱོགས་ཆོས། , pakṣadharma, पक्षधर्म, pakṣadharma, property of the subject）will not be established, and if the property of the subject is not established, then it is unreasonable to become a contradictory reason. The other three examples are also unreasonable, because these are only distinguished from the perspective of expressing intention, but not from the perspective of preventing dharma and the possessor of dharma. Second, if contradictory reasons are distinguished from the perspective of expressing intention, there are four types: some are contradictory reasons that directly express contradiction, some are contradictory reasons that become contradictory through the tone of expression, some are contradictory reasons that express dharma, and some are contradictory reasons that express the possessor of dharma, there are four types. The first type is: impermanent sound, the possessor of dharma, is permanent, because it is made. The second type is: permanent dharma, the possessor of dharma, is the producer of fruit, because it is empty of the ability to function sequentially and simultaneously. The third and fourth types are: the latter two mentioned earlier. Third, if it is said to be the same as यथार्थ （Tibetan, Sanskrit Devanagari, Sanskrit Romanization, Chinese literal meaning: ཡང་དག། , yathārtha, यथार्थ, yathārtha, reality）, because the function is small, so it is abandoned, as has been said before in the case of the ten categories of यथार्थ （Tibetan, Sanskrit Devanagari, Sanskrit Romanization, Chinese literal meaning: ཡང་དག། , yathārtha, यथार्थ, yathārtha, reality）. Third, refuting the view that there are other
Chinese
似成立与成立二者。 প্রথমটি是，似不成立之相。 第二个有，所立成立决定，遮遣决定，于二者不定与三者中。 第一是真实，第二是相违，第三是不定之因故。 第二是，作为因的四者，也有四种能力，即，不成立于法之上，也不能生起犹豫。 不定生犹豫，相违生不欲之决定，真实生欲之决定之故。 智者之顶饰说：于品无力生犹豫，生不欲欲之决定。 如是说之故。 第二由彼所证之所立，是从理藏中此时所说，然为使论典平等，为他利而说。 依于二联系之因，隐蔽可量于法上证悟，是现量故，当知似因诸，是遮过失之支分。 此为总结之偈颂。 自利现量已说竟。 他利现量说 第二他利现量中，经部与释论中，他利之语与，他利所立与，品法之因三者次第而说，然此处理藏中，他利所立于因之下说，随彼而说有三，所立说，能立语说，品法之因说。 第一有五，体性，异名，语义，分类，各自之义。 第一是，大体所立于因果之方面作则为果，于能诠所诠之方面作则为所诠，于处所处所依之方面作则为处所，于因与有因之方面作则有因作为所立等诸多，其中此处因之所立之体性，依于因而当度量者也。 第二是，所立，随度量者，因之能力境，有因，品，立宗诸是名之异名也。 第三是，由因所知故为所立，依于因而当度量故为随度量，因之能力安
English
There are two types of establishment: apparent establishment and actual establishment. The first is like an unestablished sign. The second has three aspects: certainty of establishing the object to be established, certainty of refuting, and uncertainty in both. Among these three, the first is valid, the second is contradictory, and the third is an uncertain reason. Secondly, the four that are presented as signs also have four powers: the unestablished cannot even generate doubt about the subject. The uncertain generates doubt, the contradictory generates certainty of the undesirable, and the valid generates certainty of the desirable. As the jewel on the crown of the wise ones said: "Powerless in the পক্ষ (pakṣa，梵文， पक्ष，pakṣa，side, the subject of an inference) generates doubt, and generates certainty of the undesirable and desirable." Therefore, the object to be established that is realized by the second is explained in the Treasure of Reasoning in this context, but it will be explained for the benefit of others in order to equalize the treatises of exposition. From the reason that relies on the two relations, the hidden measurable is realized on the subject. Since it is inference, know that all the fallacious reasons are branches of cutting off errors. This is the summarizing verse. The inference for oneself has been explained. Explanation of Inference for Others Secondly, in the inference for others, in the Sutra and the Commentary on Valid Cognition, the speech for others, the object to be established for others, and the reason of the subject-property are explained in sequence. However, here in the Treasure of Reasoning, the object to be established for others is explained under the reason, and following that, there are three explanations: explanation of the object to be established, explanation of the statement of proof, and explanation of the reason of the subject-property. The first has five aspects: definition, synonyms, meaning of the term, classification, and individual meanings. The first is: in general, the object to be established is considered as the result in terms of cause and effect, as the signified in terms of sign and signified, as the object in terms of object and object-possessor, and as the possessor of the sign in terms of sign and sign-possessor, etc. Among these many, here is the definition of the object to be established by the sign: that which is to be inferred based on the sign. The second is: object to be established, to be inferred, the scope of the sign's power, sign-possessor, পক্ষ (pakṣa，梵文， पक्ष，pakṣa，side, the subject of an inference), and proposition are synonyms. The third is: since it is understood from the sign, it is the object to be established; since it is to be inferred based on the sign, it is to be inferred; the power of the sign rests
Chinese
因为是能依的处所，所以是能依处。因为是所立的能立，所以是有法。因为被立宗者作为宗，所以是宗。因为立宗者立誓，所以是立誓。第四是：真实的所立和似所立。第五，各自的意义分为二，第一，真实的所立的定义是：古代先辈们认为是无已成、无遣除，并且是想要推测的对境的法和有法之集合意义。无已成是指能生起比量的立宗者未成立。无遣除是指未被量所遣除之义。想要推测的对境是指能生起比量的立宗者认为是想要了解的对境。也有人认为：是依靠真实的因所要推测的法和有法之集合意义。
English
Because it is the place of the dependent, it is the dependent place. Because it is the established proof, it is the property. Because it is taken as the subject by the proponent, it is the subject. Because the proponent makes a vow, it is the vow. The fourth is: the true to be proven and the seeming to be proven. Fifth, the meaning of each is divided into two, the first, the definition of the true to be proven is: the ancient predecessors considered it to be the collection meaning of the dharma and the property that is without establishment, without removal, and is the object of wanting to infer. Without establishment means that the proponent who can generate inference has not established it. Without removal means the meaning of not being removed by valid cognition. The object of wanting to infer means that the proponent who can generate inference considers it to be the object of wanting to understand. Some also believe that it is the collection meaning of the dharma and the property that is to be inferred based on the true reason. Classification: divided into four categories, divided into three categories, and divided into two categories, three types. The first type is: both the dharma and the property are established, both are refuted, refuting the dharma while establishing the property, refuting the property while establishing the dharma, the four are in order: the collection meaning of sound and impermanence, the collection meaning of the absence of a pot and non-existence, the collection meaning of space and non-existence, the collection meaning of the absence of a pot and knowable things, etc. The second type is: both the dharma and the property are existent, both are non-existent, the property is existent while the dharma is non-existent, the three are in order: the collection meaning of smoke and fire, the collection meaning of general characteristics and measurable things, the collection meaning of aggregates and selflessness, etc. For the seeming, it is also possible to distinguish that the property is non-existent while the dharma is existent. The third is divided into two types: the true to be proven for oneself and the true to be proven for others. The definition of the first type: the collection meaning of the dharma and the property to be inferred based on the true reason in the case of oneself. For example, when establishing that there is fire in the presence of smoke, smoke is sudden, when it becomes a true reason, the collection meaning of smoke and fire, etc. The second type, the difference in the definitions stated in the two treatises. Analyze whether the basis is appearance or imputation. And the detailed explanation of the definition stated in the Compendium of Topics, three types. The first type is: The Treasure of Reasoning says: The Sutra says that it has five characteristics, wanting to establish is the door of reason. As the Sutra says: The essence is only its own nature, and
Chinese
如是说“显与未遣除之所显”。其义，有者认为，本体义等五法圆满，是为利他所证真实之相，此不应理。因其不具所显之义故。若所显与有法不相关联，则“认为”之语，能断除例证不成之所证为真实，故“唯”字无有别断与总断之必要。故而，以本体义等五法圆满之方式所显者，乃经部所诠显之利他所证真实之相。于理门中，谓凡所应证，即是已立为应许，未为相违义所遣除者，亦是宗。其义，有者说，论敌智者所承诺之所立之法与有法之集合义，此不应理。因未遣除是真实宣说，此不圆满故。否则，眼等为自利者，是有法，应是所诠，以彼相故。故论敌智者意谓，凡所立欲求之法与有法之集合义，未为量所遣除者，即是彼论之义。彼亦以“所应证”之语，显示总集之本体义。“已立为应许”之语，显示总集之欲求与自性之义。未遣除是真实存在。唯字于此不必言说，因与所显不相关联，故“认为”之语，能断除例证不成之所证。于总集中，为断除例证不成之所证，故必须说“唯”。总集之欲求与所显相关联，故于未来能引导，因此将变为应许，而此于未来可成为所证之例证不成者亦有故。若谓说所显无有必要，若不说彼，则唯亦不必说，故有语简之功德。对此，有者说，为迎合外道自宗之所立之相，因理者认为所应证之所显，是所立之相，故与自宗所许之相一致。