English
It is contradictory to dependent origination. If it arises from a single cause, it does not need to rely on other conditions. If it is a permanent cause, it does not need to rely on anything because it is separate from action. If it arises from dissimilar causes, it does not need to rely on its own causes and conditions. If it arises from opposing causes, it does not need to rely on aggregation. Arising from self, other, or both is also contradictory to dependent origination, because the self does not rely on itself; it is contradictory for the self to act on itself; if the self is not established, then neither the object of reliance nor the act of reliance can be established; if it is established, then there is no need to rely. For the other, if it is not established, then neither the object of reliance nor the act of reliance can be established, and it is unreasonable for the other; if it is established, then there is no need to rely, and if one relies, it is too extreme. Arising from both is also contradictory to reliance because it is touched by both faults. Therefore, in the Sutra of Śālu Ljangpa, it is said: That which arises from the cause of the seed is not made by itself at the time of arising, not made by others, not made by both, not made by Īśvara, not transformed by time, not arisen from atoms, not from nature (265b) arisen, not arisen from essence, not arisen from no cause, and so on. Secondly, as an antidote to all wrong views, and the two reasons for that. The first is: Because things arise dependently, these thoughts cannot be examined. Therefore, this reasoning of dependent origination cuts through all nets of wrong views. Thus, merely explaining dependent origination as 'this arising, that arises' not only reverses the thoughts of arising from no cause, etc., but also this reasoning of dependent origination as 'this arising, that arises' cuts through all nets of extreme clinging to wrong views, because the statement that things 'arise depending on this' only establishes the appearance of experiences such as arising, ceasing, cause, and effect without examination. Other than that, thoughts of clinging to two such as permanence, annihilation, existence, non-existence, etc., cannot be examined not only in the ultimate sense but also in the conventional sense. Therefore, even if things are contradictory, they are not accepted by nature, because dependent origination of 'this arising, that arises' is established. In the Sixty Stanza Reasoning it says: That which arises depending on this and that, does not arise as its own essence, its own.
Chinese
何者自性未生，彼如何能名之为生？如是说。论中说：何为缘起法，即说彼为空性。彼为假名之所依，彼即是中道。如是说。经部中说：何者由缘所生，彼即非生。于彼无有生之自性。何者依赖于缘，彼即说为空性。何者知晓空性，彼即是谨慎者。如是说。因此，仅仅宣说无自性，并不会导致其相续中产生邪见。（266a）如此一来，缘起的世俗生灭诸法，在世间无可否认地广为人知。对于未经观察，仅仅是令人愉悦的显现，若能如实不颠倒地了知二谛，那么那些智慧广大无边，超越世间者，便能依循观察与不观察，为了救度世间而于了义中观的经典中，善说二谛之建立。除此之外，执着实有者无法成立此等观点，因此，缘起是所有邪见的对治，是断定空性离戏的殊胜理路，是所有经典所诠释的真实义，是二谛双运的中道，是所有圣者所行之阶梯与道路。一切智者也说，谁见缘起，谁就见法，等等，并说见三宝和四谛等。论师也在中观论集、理聚和赞集中，仅仅通过宣说缘起的方式来赞叹薄伽梵，并通过缘起的法理来确定能诠经典和所诠知识。二是，若诸法有自性则会变异，然实事如何无有已善观察。若无实事则此等不生，譬如无薪则无火。我他、常断等分别念，若诸法皆有实事则会生起（266b），如是已宣说之理，实事如何无有自性已
English
That which is unborn in its own nature, how can it be called birth? Thus it is said. In the treatise, it says: Whatever is dependent arising, that is explained as emptiness. That is a designation made by cause, that itself is the Middle Way. Thus it is said. In the sutra section, it says: Whatever is born from conditions, that is unborn. It does not have the nature of birth. Whatever depends on conditions is said to be empty. Whoever knows emptiness is mindful. Thus it is said. Therefore, merely asserting the absence of inherent existence will not cause wrong views to arise in one's mindstream. (266a) Thus, all the knowable phenomena of conventional arising and ceasing, are undeniably known in the world. For those who realize the two truths without inversion, in this mere appearance that is pleasing to the mind when unexamined, those with boundless wisdom who transcend the world, based on examination and non-examination, the establishment of the two truths is well explained in the definitive meaning Madhyamaka scriptures for the sake of liberating the world. Other than that, those who cling to things as real cannot establish such views, therefore, dependent arising is the antidote to all wrong views, and the supreme reasoning that establishes emptiness free from elaboration. It is the suchness that is the subject matter of all scriptures, the Middle Way of the union of the two truths, and the ground and path traversed by all noble beings. The Omniscient One also said, whoever sees dependent arising, sees the Dharma, and so on, and said that one sees the Three Jewels and the Four Truths, etc. The teacher also praised the Bhagavan in all the Madhyamaka collections, the collections of reasoning, and the collections of praise, solely through the way of explaining dependent arising, and established the expressing scriptures and the expressed knowledge through the Dharma of dependent arising. Secondly, if phenomena had substance, they would change, but how things are without substance has already been well examined. If there is no substance, these do not arise, just as there is no fire without fuel. The thoughts of self and other, permanence and annihilation, etc., if all phenomena had substance, they would arise (266b), as has been explained, how things are without inherent existence has already been
Chinese
已經完全考察，如同聖者沒有看到那樣去看，對於看到極微小的東西也不存在的人來說，對於色等事物的概念就不會產生。例如，就像沒有柴火就沒有火一樣。第三，有兩種：一是智慧的果實，二是顯示智慧的產生是來自慈悲的原因。第一是：凡夫俗子都被概念所束縛，不作概念的瑜伽士就能解脫，凡是顛倒的概念，智者都說是分別的果實。因此，沒有領悟自性空性的凡夫俗子，就被自己的分別念所束縛。而那些領悟了這一點的聖者，對於任何戲論都不作概念的瑜伽士就能獲得解脫，因此，凡是完全顛倒的執著概念，智者都說是論典中分別的果實。因此，如是說：如果事物本性存在，那麽見空有什麽功德？因爲以概念見到而束縛，所以此處就是遮止它。這樣說，那麽消除了什麽呢？世尊和進入大地的佛子以及弟子們的一切中觀宗的經典中所說的道理，都是爲了遣除從無始以來顛倒執著的概念，所以遣除一個概念並不是爲了生起另一個特殊的概念。例如，遣除事物不空的存在的概念，並不是爲了生起事物不存在的空性不存在的概念。如果這樣認爲，那麽那本身也是沒有進入對境之實相的束縛。論師說：此處是遮止有，並不是完全執著無，說不是黑色，並不是說就是白色。就像這樣。對於空性的道理，有些邪見者認爲不想要有無任何一方，那樣就會變成什麽都沒有的斷見。如果因爲不想要有無任何一方就成了斷見，那麽不想要有無任何一方
English
Having been fully examined, seeing as if the noble ones have not seen, for those who see that even the smallest thing does not exist, these concepts of things like form do not arise. For example, it is like there is no fire without firewood. Thirdly, there are two: the actual fruit of discernment, and the explanation that the act of discernment arises from the cause of compassion. The first is: Ordinary beings are bound by concepts, non-conceptual yogis will be liberated, whatever concepts are reversed, the wise say are the fruit of discernment. Therefore, ordinary beings who have not understood the emptiness of self-nature are bound by their own concepts. And those noble ones who have realized this, non-conceptual yogis who do not conceptualize any elaboration will be liberated, therefore, whatever clinging concepts are completely reversed, the wise say are the fruit of discernment in the treatises. Therefore, as it is said: If things inherently exist, what is the benefit of seeing emptiness? Because seeing with concepts binds, it is this that is prevented here. If it is taught like that, then what is eliminated? All the reasoning spoken in the vast Madhyamaka scriptures of the Bhagavan and the bodhisattvas who have entered the great bhumi, including their disciples, is spoken for the sake of reversing only the concepts that have been wrongly conceived since beginningless time, so reversing one concept does not create another special concept. For example, reversing the concept of the existence of things that are not empty does not create the concept of the non-existence of emptiness of things that do not exist. If you think like that, then that itself is also a bondage that has not entered the reality of the object. The teacher said: Here, existence is prevented, not completely grasping non-existence, saying it is not black, not saying it is white. It's like that. Some with wrong views on the principle of emptiness say that not wanting either existence or non-existence will turn into a nihilistic view of nothingness. If it is a nihilistic view because you do not want either existence or non-existence, then not wanting either existence or non-existence
Chinese
之故。恒常存在之见，以及不变不坏之见，岂不也同样会发生？如果认为破斥了存在，就是视为了不存在，那么，为何破斥了不存在，就不能视为存在呢？因为理由相同。因此，导师（龙树菩萨）说：以如实之正知，不欲有与无，因此若成无有者，为何不成为有？若以破斥有，实则此乃极力建立无，如是破斥无有已，为何不建立为有？如是所说。因此，非有非无亦非有无，亦非二者之自性，从四边解脱者，唯有中观者能知。等等之义。东宗喀巴大师说：一切法都以名言量成立来思量，所以在世俗中不是没有，自性上不是有，但在名言上存在，所以能成立为有，在胜义上没有，所以不能成立为没有，因此它是以基而成立的法而存在，并且在圣者的观照中，也是以二取灭除的方式而存在。如此说。觉囊派大师说：一切胜义都不是没有，一切世俗都不是有。如此说。如此讲解的那些人，是将经论颠倒解释，以佛陀教法的精髓——中观宗的经典甘露之海，掺杂了四种边见的巨大毒水，因为在他们的观点中，唯有：非有非无亦非有无，亦非二者之自性，从四边解脱者，唯有中观者能知。如此而已。这样一来，二谛所摄的一切法的实相，就会变成不是离戏，因为在二谛中，各自都以有无或者常断的边见，将事物视为实有的牢固堡垒，难以摧毁。想要守护中观宗珍宝的人，那些具有积累和净化的能力者，怎能对这种宗派置之不理呢？按照那些宗派的观点，轮回和涅槃的一切名言都不会成立，因为自性上存在就无法改变，不存在则远离作用和作者。
English
Therefore, wouldn't the view of permanence, existence, immutability, and indestructibility also arise? If you think that by refuting existence, it is regarded as non-existence, then why can't refuting non-existence be regarded as existence? Because the reason is the same. Therefore, the teacher (Nāgārjuna) said: 'With accurate and complete knowledge, one does not desire existence or non-existence. Therefore, if it becomes non-existent, why doesn't it become existent? If existence is refuted, then in reality, this is strongly establishing non-existence. Likewise, having refuted non-existence, why not establish it as existence?' Thus it is said. Therefore, it is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor is it the nature of both. Those who are liberated from the four extremes, only the Madhyamikas understand. Regarding the meaning of these and other verses, the great Tsongkhapa said: 'All phenomena are considered to be established by conventional valid cognition, so they are not non-existent in the relative truth. They are not existent by their own nature, but they exist in conventional terms, so they can be established as existent. They are non-existent in the ultimate truth, so they cannot be established as non-existent. Therefore, they exist as phenomena established by a basis. And even in the vision of the noble ones, they exist in a way that the appearance of duality is extinguished.' Thus he speaks. The great Jonangpa said: 'All ultimate truths are not non-existent, and all relative truths are not existent.' Thus they speak. Those who explain in this way are interpreting the scriptures in a reversed manner, and they are contaminating the essence of the Buddha's teachings, the nectar-like ocean of Madhyamaka scriptures, with four great rivers of poisonous extreme views. Because in their view, it is only: 'Neither existent nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor is it the nature of both. Those who are liberated from the four extremes, only the Madhyamikas understand.' That's all. In this way, the reality of all phenomena included in the two truths will become non-free from elaboration, because in both truths, the strong fortress of viewing things as real with the extremes of existence and non-existence or permanence and annihilation is difficult to destroy. Those who want to protect the precious and wonderful teachings of the Madhyamaka, those who have the power of accumulation and purification, how can they remain indifferent to this kind of system? According to those systems, all the terms of samsara and nirvana will not be established, because if it exists by its own nature, it cannot be changed, and if it does not exist, it is separate from action and agent.