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JLD015 0005.Pages 301 to 400.301Pages 301 to 400.400Pages 301 to 400..g2.0f

Chinese

说有能受用的我,是为了不堕恶趣和欢喜善趣,为了生起业果的定解。破斥了执着有独立自主的实体的所缘境,显示了没有那样的我,没有破斥执着蕴为实有的所缘境,仅仅是为了放松我见,而不是连根拔除,因此十六空等和我无人我所 以假立人我独立自主的实有不存在的道,不是断灭烦恼的。遮止人我以自性存在和遮止它以自性生起的二者,是断灭一切烦恼的道。那是“诸佛”等作者的词最初建立,也安立为“我”等三个行为的词相连的解释。现在是根本上“诸佛”等作者的词与第三个行为的词相连的语势所摄持而说,有为法刹那刹那坏灭的,见到业果的联系不合理,因此作为它的所依,数论等安立有常我。见到以相似因的理性能从前世到今世,从今世到后世流转的补特伽罗不存在,因此顺世外道也显示没有那样的我。诸佛薄伽梵们则显示我和无我任何一个都不是自性成立的。二是,如果诸佛显示我和无我二者都没有自性,那么显示什么存在呢?如果胜义中存在可说的事物,那就会显示,但是胜义中可说的事物是相违的,即不存在,那时诸佛什么也没有显示。那是因为胜义中心识行境的对境是相违的。那又是因为一切法胜义中不生不灭的法性与涅槃相同,即变得和它一样。或者说,戏论由空性而止息,如何以空性见而止息戏论呢?作为问题的回答应当说,那时脚

English

The reason for saying that there is a self that can experience is to prevent falling into bad migrations and to rejoice in good migrations, and to generate certainty about the results of actions. Refuting the object of clinging to a self-sufficient entity, it shows that there is no such self, and not refuting the object of clinging to the aggregates as real entities, is only to relax the view of self, but not to eradicate it. Therefore, the sixteen emptinesses and selflessness The paths that assume the non-existence of a self-sufficient entity do not eliminate afflictions. The scriptures that prevent both the existence of a self by its own nature and the arising of its negation by its own nature are the path that eliminates all afflictions. That is the explanation that the word of the agent such as "Buddhas" is initially established, and also established as the word of the three actions such as "I". Now, in the root, the word of the agent such as "Buddhas" is connected with the third word of action, and it is said that the impermanent moment of conditioned phenomena is destroyed, and seeing that the connection of the results of actions is unreasonable, therefore, as its basis, the Samkhyas and others establish that there is a permanent self. Seeing that there is no person who can flow from the previous life to this life, and from this life to the next life, with the reason of similar cause, therefore, the Lokayatas also show that there is no such self. The Buddhas, the Bhagavad-bhagavats, show that neither self nor non-self is established by nature. Secondly, if the Buddhas show that neither self nor non-self has its own nature, then what is shown to exist? If there is something to be said in the ultimate sense, then it will be shown, but the thing to be said in the ultimate sense is contradictory, that is, it does not exist, then the Buddhas did not show anything. That is because the object of the mind's object in the ultimate sense is contradictory. That is also because the nature of all dharmas that does not arise or cease in the ultimate sense is the same as nirvana, that is, it becomes the same as it. Or, elaboration is stopped by emptiness, how does the view of emptiness stop elaboration? As an answer to the question, it should be said that at that time, the foot