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x1] Ramddvaya 207 sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (adrsta) to stir up the antahkarana, and, as a result thereof, the antahkarana or mind is transformed into a particular state called urtit. The pure consciousness underlying the antahkarana was lying dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transfor- mation of the antahkarana into a urtti, the consciousness brightens up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it. The vrtti thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to the object on which the vrtti is superimposed, and, as a result thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the vurtti transformation. Now, since the vrtti joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object, these two are joined up (samslesa-pratyaya) and this results in the cognition “‘this object is known by me’”’; and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness, as limited by the antahkarana as trans- formed into the vrtti, and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated. In the Veddanta-paribhasa we hear of three consciousnesses (caitanya), the pramatr-caitanya (the con- sciousness conditioned by the antahkarana), the pramana-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the urtti of the antahkarana), and the wisaya-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). According to this perception (pratyaksa) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jiana- gata-pratyaksatva) or from the point of view of the object, both being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective, of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the pramana-caitanya from the visaya-caitanya through spatial super- imposition of the vrtti on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object (visaya-gata-pratyaksatva) is defined as the non-distinction of the object from the pramatr-caitanya or the perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana. This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by antahkarana (ghatader antahkaranava- cchinna-caitanyabhedah), is open to the serious objection that really ‘the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned 208 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. by the antahkarana—antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya) but with the cognition (pramana-caitanya or vrtti-caitanya); for the cognition or the urtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and the object is in immediate contact with the vrtti and not with the perceiver (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya). That this is so is also admitted by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, son of Ramakrsna Adhvarin, in his Sikha-mani commentary on the Vedanta-paribhasa'. But he tries to justify Dharmaraja Adhvarindra by pointing out that he was forced to define visaya-gata-pratyaksatva as non-distinction of the object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakasatman’s Vivarana and also in other traditional works on Vedanta?. This however seems to be an error. For the passage of the Vzvarana to which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view?. It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or sense-knowledge (samvid)*. That other traditional Vedantic inter- preters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual process given by Ramadvaya. Ramadvaya says, as has just been pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the vrttt, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject- predicate form “this is known by me.” The object is thus illuminated by the vrttz, and it is not directly with the subjéct, but with the vrtti, that the object is united. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book, one should feel ‘I am the book,” and not “I perceive the book ”; in reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process + yad vd yogyatve sati visaya-caitanyabhinna-pramana-caitanya-visayatvam ghatader visayasya pratyaksatvam tathapi visayasydparoksatvam samvida- bhedat iti vivarane tatra tatra ca sampradayikaih pramatrabhedasyaiva visaya- pratyaksa-laksanatuenabhidhandd evam uktam. Sikhad-mani on Vedanta-pari- bhasa, p. 75, Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press. 2 Ibid. * Tasmad avyavadhanena samvid-upadhitayaparoksatad visayasya. Pajica- padtka-vivarana, p. 50, Benares, 1892. * It should be noted here that samvid means cognitional idea or sense- knowledge and not the perceiver (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya), as the author of the Sikhdmani says. Thus Akhandananda in his Tativa-dipana commentary explains the word samvid as samvic-chabdena indriyartha-samprayoga-ja-jnanasya vivaksitatvat. Tattva-dipana, p. 194, Benares, 1902. x1] Rdamddvaya 209 there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion of a relation of identity resulting in the notion ‘‘I am the book”?. This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are both but impositions of avidya on one distinctionless pure con- sciousness ; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject- object experience. The difference of the Vedantic view of perception, as expounded in the Pafica-padika-vivarana, from the Buddhist idealism (vijfana-vada) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the ideas or percepts, the Vedanta accepted the independent mani- festation of the objects in perception in the external world?. There is thus a distinction between visional percept and the object; but there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyavadhanena samvid-upadhita aparoksata visayasya—Vivarana, p. 50). The object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness, whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or inference (prameyam karmatvena aparoksam pramatr-pramiti punar aparokse eva kevalam na karmataya)?. Theviews of the Vedanta-kaumudi, however, cannot be regarded as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the ex- position of the subject in Padmapada’s Pafica-padika and Praka- $atman’s Pafica-padika-vivarana. The development of the whole theory of perception may be attributed to the Pafica-padika- vivarana, since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects are veiled by avidya; that, as the antahkarana is transformed into states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the underlying consciousness ; and that through the spatial contact with the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antah- karana transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely 1 Vedanta-paribhasd, pp. 76, 77. 2 na ca vinanabhedad eva aparoksyam avabhdasate bahistvasyapi rajatader .Gparoksyat. Pafica-padikd-vivarana, p. 50. 3 Pafica-padikd, p. 17, Benares, 1891. DII 14 210 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. of the antahkarana transformations (called vrtti in the Vedénta- kaumudi, and Vedanta-paribhasé and pure consciousness); to the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the antah- karana (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the antahkarana modification (or vrtt7), there would be nothing to explain the duality in perception (e.g. “I perceive the book,” and not “I am the book,” and it is only the latter form that could be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Praka- satman’s reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness with the antahkarana-consciousness (subject) is effected through the modification or the vrtti of the antahkarana and, since the antahkarana is one with its vrtti, the vurtti operation is rightly attributed to the antahkarana as its agent, and this is illuminated by the consciousness underlying the antahkarana resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination of object to which the operation of the urttz is directed in spatial superimposition—the difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or the condition of the vrtt: with reference to the subject and the object!. This is exactly the interpretation of the Vedanta-kaumudi, and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the Vedanta-paribhasa are largely different therefrom and are in all probability inexact.