English
Just as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it nor a constituent of the picture, and just as the picture cannot be regarded as being a modification of the canvas in the same way as a jug is a modification of clay, or as a change of quality, like the redness in ripe mangoes, and just as the canvas was there before the painting, and just as it would remain even if the painting were washed away, whereas the painting would not be there without the canvas, so the pure consciousness also is related to this world- appearance, which is but a painting of maya on it?. Maya is unspeakable and indescribable (anzrvacaniya), not as different from both being and non-being, but as involving the characters of both being and non-being. It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (avidya-sakt1) which is the material cause of all objects of perception otherwise called matter (sarva-jadopadana- bhita). But, just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even to their very roots, so Brahma-knowledge, which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes, destroys the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to 1 prapancasya vastutvabhavan nadvaita-hdonih avastutvabhavac capratyaksady- apramanyam apy-ukta-dosabhavat. MS. p. 64. A 2 yatha citrasya bhittih saksat nopadanam ndpi sahajam citram tasyah napy- avasthantaram myda iva ghatadih napi gunantaragamah amrasyeva raktatadih na casyah janmadis citrat prag irdham ca bhavat, yady apt bhittim vind citram na bhati tathapi na sa citram vind bhati tty evam-Gdy-anubhiitir bhitti-jagac-citrayor yajyam. Ibid. p. 73. 204 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. shine in its own radiance. The functions of the pramanas, which are all mere processes of ignorance, ajfdna or avidyd, consist only in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self- luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent akasa or space; the pramanas have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling ajfana?. So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last rem- nants of ajfdna, after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual knowledge, being the last vestige of ajfana, also ceases of itself. This cessation of ajfana is as unspeakable as ajidna itself. Unlike Mandana, Vimuktatman does not consider avidya to be merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but all their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is supposed to be related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality beyond all relations. Vimuktatman devotes a large part of his work to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (khyatz), and more particularly to the criticism of anyathakhyati. ‘These contain many new and important points; but, as the essential features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume, it is not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktatman, which do not involve any new point of view in Vedantic inter- pretation. He also deals with some of the principal Vedantic topics of discussion, such as the nature of bondage, emancipation, and the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life with the monistic doctrine of the Vedanta; but, as there are not here any strikingly new modes of approach, these may be left out in the present work. Ramadvaya (a,D. 1300). Ramadvaya, a pupil of Advayasrama, wrote an important work, called Vedanta-kaumudi, in four chapters, in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedantic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Sankara’s commentary on the first four topics of the Brahma-siitra. The work has not yet been published; but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government 1 MS. p. 137: 2 Ibid. p. 143. x1] Ramddvaya 205 Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. Ramadvaya also wrote a commentary on his Vedanta-kaumudi, called Vedanta-kaumudi-vyakhyana, a manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now. The date of the writing of the copy of the Veddnta-kaumudi-vyakhyana is given by the copyist Sesanrsimha as A.D. 1512. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century. Ramadvaya in the course of his discussions refers to many noted authors on Nyadya and Vedanta, none of whom are later than the thirteenth century. Vimuktaétman, author of the Ista-siddhi, has been placed by the present author in the early half of the thirteenth century; but Ramadvaya always refers to him approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also in his Veddanta-kaumudi-vyakhyana (MS. p. 14) refers to Janardana, which is Anandajfiana’s name as a householder; but Janardana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems therefore probable that Ramadvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century. In the enunciation of the Vedantic theory of perception and inference Ramadvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the Prakatartha; for, though he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration!. Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable avidya and appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition, so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help it in its work. Such a conditioning factor is found in 1 See Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47. 2 Ramadvaya refers here to the daharddhikarana of Sankara’s commentary on the Brahma-sitra, presumably to 1. 3, 19, where Sankara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (jiva) and Brahman. Here Sankara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both outside and inside the circle of Upanisadic interpreters, which regard individual _souls as real (apare tu vadinah paramarthikam eva jaivam riipam tti manyante asmadtyaé ca kecit). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of 206 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. manas, which is of the stuff of pure sativa: on the occasion of sense-object contact this manas, being propelled by the moral destiny (adrstadi-ksubdham), transforms itself into the form of a long ray reaching to the object itself1. The pure consciousness, as conditioned or limited by the antahkarana (antahkaranavacchinnam caitanyam), does by such a process remove its veil of avidyd, (though in its limited condition as individual soul this avidya formed its own body), and the object also being in ‘contact with it is mani- fested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject and the object, having taken place in the same process (vrttz) there, are joined together in the same cognition as “‘this object is known by me” (vrtter ubhayasamlagnatvac ca tad-abhivyakta-caitanya- sy@pi tathatvena mayedam viditam iti samslesa-pratyayah) ; and, as its other effect, the consciousness limited by the antahkarana, transformed into the form of the process (vrttz) of right knowledge (prama), appears as the cognizer (urtti-laksana-pramasrayantah- karanavacchinnas tat-pramatetyapi vyapadisyate)*. 'The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as the object (karma-karakabhivyaktam ca tat prakasatmanda phala- vyapadesa-bhak). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the uvrtti transformation of the antahkarana; but, as it is illusorily identified with the antahkarana (antahkarana-caitanyayor atkyadhyasat), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also identified with the vrtt: transformation of the antahkarana, and, as the urtti becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting the vrtt: it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact of an illumination of the object (evam vurtti-vyanjakam api tapta- yah-pinda-nyayena tad-ekatam ivaptam vrttivad-visaya-prakatyat- mana sampadyate)*. ‘The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to Ramadvaya may thus be described. The the self as the only reality which through avidya manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as paramesvara, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. Paramesvara, the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which, like a magician, appears as many through avidyd. There is no consciousness other than this (eka eva paramesvarah kittastha-nityo vijfana-dhatur avidyaya- mayaya maydvuivad anekadhda vibhavyate nanyo vijfiana-dhdatur asti). _ _* This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakatartha, as may be inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the Vedanta- kaumudi and the Prakatartha borrowed it from the Pafica-padikd-vivarana. * Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, p. 36. * Ibid ipaav.