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But this view also is not correct, since it is difficult to admit “difference” as an entity different from the 1 tasmat kathaficit bhinno jnadnantara-gamyo riipa-rasadivad bhedo *bhyupeyah. Adyar Ista-siddhi MS. p. 5. 200 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. differing entities; for such a difference would involve another dif- ference by which it is known, and that another and that another, we should have an infinite regress ; and the same objection applies to the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how “difference” or mutual negation between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized; for it is impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this “‘ difference,’ or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one of its alternating poles, could be perceived?. Moreover, the self- luminous perceiving power is always present, and it is impossible that it could be negated—a condition without which neither difference nor negation could be possible. Moreover, if it is admitted that such a difference is cognized, then that very fact proves that it is not a characteristic of the perceiving self. If this difference is admitted to be self-luminous, then it would not await a reference to another, which is a condition for all notions of difference or mutual negation. Therefore, “‘ difference” or “‘mutual negation” cannot be established, either as the essence of the perceiving self or as its characteristics; and as there is no other way in which this difference can be conceived, it is clear that there is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics. Again, negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable thing; but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception, and its non-perception would be impossible. Admitting for the sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated, how could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the self there could be no perception, as it is itself of the nature of perception. So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self cannot be anything but illusion. Thus the perceiving self and the perceived (drk and drsya) cannot be differentiated from each other. The difficulty, however, arises that, if the perceiving self and the perceived were identical, then the infinite limitations and differences that are characteristic of the perceived would also be character- istic of the perceiver; and there are the further objections to such a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience. It may be argued that the two are identical, since they are both s evam ca sati na drg-drsyayor bhedo drastum sakyah napy anyonyabhavah na hi drsah svayam drsteh prati-yogy-apeksa-drsty-antara-dréyam ripantaram svam samasti svayam drstitva-hanat. MS. p. 6. x1] Vimuktadtman 201 experienced simultaneously (sahopalambha-niyamat) ; but the reply is that, as two are experienced and not one, they cannot be regarded as identical, for in the very experience of the two their difference is also manifested!. In spite of such obvious contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the identity of the perceiver and the perceived?. The maxim of identity of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous perception cannot be regarded as true; for, firstly, the perceiver is never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous, secondly, the perceiver is always self-revealing, but not so the perceived, and, thirdly, though the “‘perceived” cannot be re- vealed without the perceiver, the latter is always self-revealed. There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the perceived. When a perceived object A is illuminated in con- sciousness, the other objects B, C, D, etc. are not illuminated, and, when the perceived object B is illuminated, A is not illuminated, but the consciousness (samvid) is always self-illuminated; so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular content would always have stood self-revealed®. Moreover, each particular cognition (e.g. awareness of blue) is momentary and self-revealed and, as such, cannot be the object of any other cog- nition ; and, if any particular awareness could be the object of any other awareness, then it would not be awareness, but a mere object, like a jug or a book. There is thus an intrinsic difference between awareness and the object, and so the perceiver, as pure awareness, cannot be identified with its object*. It has already been pointed out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as different, and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as identical. There is another alternative, viz. that they may be both identical and different (which is the bhedabheda view of Bhaskara and Ramanuja and others), and Vimuktatman tries to show that this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the 1 abhede saha-bhanadyogad dvayor hi saha-bhanam na ekasyaiva na hi drsaiva drk saha bhatiti bhavatapy ucyate, napi drsyenaiva dréyam saha bhatiti kintu drg-drsyayoh saha bhanam ucyate atas tayor bhedo bhaty eva. MS. p. 25. 2 tasmat sarva-vyavahara-lopa-prasangan na bhedo drg-drsyaoh. Ibid. 3 kim vidyud-visesitata nama samvidah svariipam uta samvedyasya, yadi samvidah sapi bhaty eva samvid-bhanat samvedya-svariipam cet tada bhanadn na samvido bhanam. Ibid. p. 27. 4 asamvedyaiva samvit samvedyam casamvid eva, atah samvedyasya ghata- sukhadeh samvidas cabheda-gandho ’pi na pramanavan. Ibid. p. 31. 202 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different. The upholder of the bhedabheda view is supposed to say that, though the perceiver and the perceived cannot, as such, be regarded as identical, yet they may be regarded as one in their nature as Brahman. But in reply to this it may be urged that, if they are both one and identical with Brahman, there would be no difference between them. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman is in another form, then also the question arises whether their forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in which they are identical with Brahman ; and no one is aware of any form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms as such, and therefore it cannot be admitted that in spite of their difference they have any form in which they are one and identical. If again it is objected that it is quite possible that an identical entity should have two different forms, then also the question arises whether these forms are one, different or both identical with that entity and different. In the first alternative the forms would not be different; in the second they would not be one with the entity. Moreover, if any part of the entity be identical with any par- ticular form, it cannot also be identical with other forms; for then these different forms would not be different from one another; and, if again the forms are identical with the entity, how can one distinguish the entity (ripin) from the forms (riipa)? In the third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical with one particular form of it and different from other forms, or whether it is both identical with the same form and different. In the first case each form would have two forms, and these again other two forms in which they are identical and different, and these other two forms, and so on, and we should have infinite regress: and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation between the entity and its forms. For these and similar reasons it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman. If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor both different and identical with the perceiver, what then is its status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception and pure bliss, and, if it is neither identical nor different nor both identical with the manifold world and different, the manifold world must necessarily be unsubstantial (avastu) ; for, if it had any substantiality, it might have been related in one of the above three x1] Vimuktadtman 203 ways of relation. But, if it is unsubstantial, then none of the above objections would apply. But it may again be objected that, if the world were unsubstantial, then both our common experience and our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. To this Vimuktatman’s reply is that, since the world is admitted to be made up of maya (maya-nirmitatvabhyupagamat), and since the effects of maya canot be regarded either as substantial or as un- substantial, none of the above objections would be applicable to this view. Since the manifold world is not asubstance, its admission cannot disturb the monistic view, and, since it is not unsubstantial, the facts of experience may also be justified!. As an instance of such an appearance which is neither vastu (substance): nor avastu, one may refer to dream-appearances, which are not regarded as unreal because of their nature as neither substance nor not- substance, but because they are contradicted in experience.