English
In view of the above it may be suggested that Anandajfiana is following the same line of interpretation of the relation of ajfana to Brahman which was upheld by Vacaspati and Anandabodha. Anandajiiana’s position as an interpreter of Sankara’s philosophy is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Sankara and also from the references made to him by later writers. Mr Tripathi collects the names of some of these writers, as Prajfianananda, Sesa Sarngadhara, Vadivagigvara, Vadindra, Ramananda Sarasvati, Sadananda Kagmiraka (A.D. 1547), Krsnananda (a.D. 1650), Mahegvara Tirtha (A.D. 1650) and others. Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivarana (a.D. 1200). The Prakatartha-vivarana (as the writer himself calls it in the colophon of the work—prarabhyate vivaranam prakatartham etat) is an important commentary still in manuscript on Sankara’s commentary on the Brahma-siitra, which the present writer had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Librarian, Mr T.R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition. The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as Prakatar or to the author of the Prakatartha (prakatartha-kara), and not to the author’s personal name?. This work has been referred to by Anandajfiana, of the thirteenth century (Mundaka, p. 32; Kena, p. 23; Ananda- Srama editions A.D. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth 1 Aduitiyam atma-tattvam, tatra ca anddy anirvdcyam ekam ajnanam ananta- bheda-pratibhana-nidanam, tatas cdnekartha-kalusitam Gtma-tativam baddham ivanubhityamanam, vedanta-vakyottha-tattva-saksatkara-parakrta-sakaryajnanam muktam iva bhati; paramarthato na bandho na muktir iti sakaryajnana-nivrtty- upalaksitam paripiirnam atma-tattvam eva parama-purusartha-ripam sidhyati. Tarka-samgraha, p. 141. 2 'The colophon of the work runs as follows: jnatvapt yasya bahu-kdlam acintanena vyakhyatum aksamataya paritapi cetah tasyopatapa-harandya mayeha bhasye prarabhyate vivaranam prakatartham etat. MS. No. I, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras. x1] Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivarana 197 century. He certainly preceded Ramadvaya, the author of the Vedanta-kaumudi, who not only refers to the Prakatartha, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the argument of this work!. The author of the latter holds that the indefinable maya in association with pure consciousness (cin- matra-sambandhini) is the mother of all existence (bhita-prakrti). Through the reflection of pure consciousness in maya is produced Isvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahma, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahma that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the maya. Maya or ajfana is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (ajfanam nabhava upadanatvan mrdvat). But, being of the nature of veiling (avaranatvat) and being destructible through right knowledge (prakasa-heyatvat), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions?. The well- known Vedantic term svaprak@sa is defined in the Prakatartha as iliumination without the cognition of its own idea (sva-samvin- nawrapeksena sphuranam). The self is to be regarded as self- revealing ; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self would beinexplicable*. The author of the Prakatartha then criticizes the Kumirila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyay4-Vaisesika and Prabhakara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (@tma-samavayi visaya-prakaso jnanam), and the Bhaskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind or manas is a substance with a preponderance of sattva, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this manas which, being helped by the moral destiny (adrstadi-sahakrtam), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the 1 Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, p. 99. 2 a@varanatvat prakdsa-heyatvad va tamovat-svariipena pramdna-yogyatve py abhava-vydurtti-bhrama-karanatvadi-dharma-visistasya pramanikatvam na viru- dhyate. MS. p. 12. ; 3 atma sva-prakasas tato ’nyatha’nupapadyamanatve sati prakdsamanatvan na ya evam na sa evam yathaé kumbhah. Prakatartha MS. 198 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. revelation of an object (manah-parinamah samvid-vyanjakojnanam)'. In the case of inference, however, the transformation of manas takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the manas there, beingin direct touch with the reason or the knga, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the manas that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed?. The author of the Prakatartha accepted the distinction between maya and ajfana as conditioning [svara and jiva. Vimuktatman (a.p. 1200). Vimuktatman, a disciple of Avyayatman Bhagavat Pijyapada, wrote his Ista-siddhi probably not later than the early years of the thirteenth century. He is quoted and referred to by Madhustidana in his Advaita-siddhi and by Ramadvaya in his Vedanta-kaumudi of the fourteenth century. It was commented upon by Jianottama, the teacher of Citsukha, and this commentary is called Ista- siddhi-vyakhya or Ista-siddhi-vivarana. For reasons stated else- where Jfianottama could not have flourished later than the latter half of the thirteenth century. Vimuktatman wrote also another work, called Pramana-vrtti-nirnaya, to which he refers in his Ista-siddhi (MS. p. 72). The work has not yet been published, and the manuscript from the Adyar Library, which is a transcript copy of a manuscript of the Naduvil Matham, Cochin State, and which has been available to the present writer, is very fragmentary in many parts; so much so, that it is often extremely difficult to follow properly the meaning of the discussions. The work is divided into eight chapters, and is devoted in a very large part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the Vedanta school and in the other schools of philosophy. This work is to be regarded as one of the four traditional Szddhis, such as the Brahma-siddhi by Mandana, the Naiskarmya-siddhi by Suregvara, 1 MS. p. 54. 4 upalabdha-sambandhartha karena parinatam mano *navabhasa-vyaurtti-matraphalam, na tu samvid-vyanjakam lingadi-samvid-vyavadhana-pratibandhat. MS. p. 54. It is easy to see how Dharmarajadhvarindra elaborated his Vedantic theory of perception and inference with these and other data worked out by his pre- decessors. x1] Vimuktadtman 199 the Ista-siddhi by Vimuktatman and the Advaita-siddhi by Madhusiidana. Hitherto only the Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Advaita-siddhi have been published. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be published soon in Madras; but as yet the present writer is not aware of any venture regarding this important work. The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made by the author, in which he offers his adoration to that birthless, incognizable, infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of self- joy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance has been painted. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness (anubhitr). Nothing can be beginningless and eternal, except pure consciousness. The atoms are often regarded as beginningless ; but, since they have colours and other sense-properties, they are like other objects of nature, and they have parts also, as without them no combination of atoms would be possible. Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginning- less, and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said to be so. The difference between consciousness and other objects is this, that, while the latter can be described as the ‘‘this” or the object, the former is clearly not such. But, though this difference is generally accepted, dialectical reasoning shows that the two are not intrinsically different. There cannot logically be any difference between the perceiving principle (drk) and the perceived (drsya); for the former is -unperceived (adrsyatvat). No difference can be realized between a perceived and an un- perceived entity; for all difference relates two cognized entities. But it may be argued that, though the perceiver may not be cognized, yet he is self-luminous, and therefore the notion of difference ought to be manifested. A reply to this objection involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If difference were of the nature of the entities that differed, then difference should not be dependent on a reference to another (na svariipa-drstih prati-yogy-apeksa). The difference has thus to be regarded as a characteristic (dharma) different from the nature of the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process like colours, tastes, etc.!