English
Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of Buddhist argument is that, though the perception of class-natures may be supposed to be due to some cause, yet it is wrong to assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class. For, howsoever we may try to explain it, it is difficult to see how one thing can remain constantly the same, though all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific qualities, e.g. cooking in the cook, then also it may be objected that, since the operation of cooking is different in each case, there is no one character ‘‘cooking” by virtue of which the class-nature of cook is admissible. Moreover, a cook is called a cook even when x1] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajnaéna 189 he is not cooking. Considerations like these should lead any thinking person to deny the existence of eternal class-natures. Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (visesa) it is held that, if yogins can perceive the ultimate specific qualities as dif- ferent from one another, they might equally perceive the atoms to be different from one another; if the atoms cannot be perceived as different except through some other properties, then the same may be required of the specific properties themselves. Regarding the refutation of samavaya, or relation of inherence, the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent samavaya relation, though all the individuals in which this relation may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. It is a false supposition that the relation of inherence, such as that of the cloth in the thread, is ever felt to be, as if the one (e.g. the cloth) was existing in the other (threads), as the Naiyayikas suppose. Dialectic of Safkara and Anandajfiana. It is well known that Sankaracarya in his commentary on the Brahma-siitra, U1. ii 11-17, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. His first thesis is that the production of an effect different in nature from the cause, as in the case of the production of the impure world from pure Brahman, can be justified on the analogy of even the critics of the Vedanta, the Vaisesikas. The Vaisesikas hold that in the production of the dvy-anuka (containing two atoms) from the paramdnu (single atom) and of the catur-anuka (containing four atoms) from the dvy-anuka, all other qualities of the paramanu and the dvy-anuka are transferred to the dvy-anuka and catur-anuka respectively, excepting the specific measures of parimandalya (specific atomic measure) and anu-hrasva (specific measure of the dyads), which are peculiar to paramanu and dvy- anuka respectively. Thus, though all other qualities of paramanus pass over to dvy-anukas produced by their combination, yet the specific parimandalya measure of the paramanus does not pass to the dvy-anukas, which are of the anu-hrasva parimana. So also, though all the qualities of dvy-anukas would pass on to the catur- anukas made out of their combination, yet their own specific anu-hrasva parimana would not pass on to the catur-anukas, which are possessed of their own measure, viz. the mahat parimana, uncaused by the parimana of the dvy-anukas. 'This shows that the 190 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. Vaigesikas believe that the parimandalya measure (parimana) of the paramanus may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the duy-anukas, and so the anu-hrasva measure of the dvy-anukas may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the catur-anukas, viz. the mahat parimana. On this analogy it may be contended that the Vaisesikas have nothing to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz. the impure world) from an altogether different cause, the pure Brahman. If it is urged that the measure of the paramanu cannot pass on to the dvy-anuka only because its passage is rendered im- possible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the anu-hrasva parimana), then a similar reply may be given in the case of the difference between the world and Brahman. Moreover, since, according to the Vaisesika theory, all products remain for a moment without qualities, there is no reason why, when the dvy-anuka was produced, the parimandalya measure should not pass on to it. At that moment, since the parimandalya measure did not pass on to it as did the other qualities, it follows, not that the passing of the parimandalya measure is opposed by the other parimana, but that it naturally did not pass on to it. Again, it cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities (guna) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances. Sankara’s second thesis is that the Vaigesika view that atoms combine is wrong, because, since the atoms are partless, and since combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come in contact, there cannot be any combination of atoms. More- over, since before creation there is no one who can make an effort, and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort, and since the selves, being unconscious at that time, cannot them- selves make any effort, it is impossible to account for the activity without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible. So the atoms cannot combine, for want of the effort needed for such a contact. Sankara’s third point is that the relation of samavaya upheld by the Vaigesikas cannot be admitted; for, if to unite two different objects the relation of samavdaya is needed, then samavaya, being itself different from them, would require another samavaya to connect itself with them, and that another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum. If the relation of contact requires a further relation of samavaya to connect it with the objects in contact, there is no reason why samavaya should not require some other relation x1] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajiténa 191 in its turn. Again, if the atoms are regarded as always operative and combining, then there can be no dissolution (pralaya), and, if they are always disintegrating, then creation would be impossible. Again, since the atoms possess the qualities of colour, etc., they must be the product of some simpler causes, just as other objects having qualities are made up of simpler entities. Moreover, it is not right to suppose that, since we have the idea of non-eternality, this must imply eternality and that therefore the atoms must be eternal; for, even though it implies the existence of eternality, it does not imply that the atoms should be eternal, since there is such an eternal thing as Brahman. Again, the fact that the cause of the destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they are eternal; for mere ignorance of the ways of destruction does not imply eternality. Again, the Vaisesikas are wrong in speaking of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other categories depend on substance for their existence or manifesta- tion. A substance and its quality do not appear to be as different as two substances. A substance appears black or white, and this implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance (dravyatmakata gunasya). It cannot, moreover, be urged that the dependence of other categories on substance consists in their in- separableness (ayuta-siddhatva) from it. This inseparableness can- not be inseparableness of space ; for, when threads constitute as their product a piece of cloth, then the threads and the cloth cannot be regarded as having the same space, yet, being cause and effect, they are to be regarded as ayuta-siddha, or inseparable; and yet the whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. If inseparableness means inseparableness of time, then the two horns of a bull, which exist at the same time, should also be regarded as inseparable; and, if inseparableness means inseparableness of char- acter or sameness of character, then quality cannot be regarded as being different from substance. Again, since the cause exists prior to the effect, it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the cause, and yet it is asserted by the Vaisesikas that their relation is one of samavaya, since they are inseparable in their nature. Sankara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaisesikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that 192 - The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. result from some of the important Vaisesika theories. It is easy to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticism of Sriharsa in his Khandana-khanda-khadya, where he uses all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyaya logicians. It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others, but it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical or perceptual knowledge as a whole. It does not touch any specific metaphysical views, but it denies the power of perception and inference to give us right knowledge, and it supposes that it achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyaya modes of definition of perception and inference are faulty and self-contradictory. Citsukha’s attempts are more positive; for he criticizes not only the Nyaya categories of logic, but also the categories of Vaisesika metaphysics, and makes some positive and important statements, too, about the Vedanta doctrine itself.