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, all belong to buddhi and the purusa only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi, it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are identical with purusa, then with their change the purusa also undergoes a change; and if they are different, the purusa cannot be considered to be their enjoyer. Again, if the prakrti concen- trates all its activities for the enjoyment of the purusa, how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds belong to buddhi, and if buddhi be different from purusa, why should the purusa suffer for what is done by the buddhi? If, again, the nature of purusa cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an en- joyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable. (f) The Refutation of the Upanisad View of the Self. The Upanisadic thinkers hold that it is one eternal conscious- ness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness. Against this view it is urged by Santaraksita and Kamalagila that, apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipa- tion. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge which need be attained. 182 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. (g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities. Santaraksita and Kamalagila point out that the Naiyayikas divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (krtaka) and unproduced (a-krtaka), and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. The Vatsiputriyas also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.) and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Santa- raksita and Kamalagila urge that whatever is produced is momen- tary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not de- pend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced; for, had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be false. The Naiyayika view, therefore, that produced entities depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If pro- duced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being nega- tion, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the inter- ference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruc- tion is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions?. 1 The word ksantka, which is translated as “‘momentary,” is, according to Santaraksita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dying immediately after production, is technically called ksana, and whatever has this quality is called ksanika (utpa@danantara-vinasi-svabhavo vastunah ksana ucyate, sa yasyasti sa ksanika iti. Tattva-samgraha, p. 142); ksana therefore does not mean time- moment. It means the character of dying immediately after being produced. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (ksana) cannot be called ksanika, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is, however, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the term ksanika, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license. x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasgila 183 Kumalasila and Santaraksita urge that existence (sattva) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (artha-kriya-samartha). They urge that entities can only serve a purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If any purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the © effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession; but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If, however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform actions in succession owing to its association with successive acces- sories (kraminah sahakarinah), then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect; is it by pro- ducing a special modification (atisayadhana) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged that the effect is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association ; for an association may be either of identity or of productivity (tadatmya and tad-utpatt1), and neither of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of samavaya; for this special modification, being of the nature of an additional assistance (upakara), cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (samavaya). If this special -modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an additional assistance (upakara) nor of the nature of an essence 184 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of samavaya, then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the samavaya relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the per- sisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting. Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena, that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary, Santaraksita and Kamalagila reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (ekartha- kriya-karita) and, secondly, as mutual help (parasparopakarita). Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series. The objection against the momentariness of all things on the ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same, and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same in recognition are not really the same.