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If it is identical, there is no meaning in its -introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between 174 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite (anavastha). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied; for, according to the sat-karya-vada theory, that know- ledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the obscuration of knowledge; for, if there is obscuration, that also must be ever-existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the teachings of Samkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent, and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there could be no emancipation. Santaraksita and Kamalagila then urge that, though the above refutation of the sat-karya-vada ought naturally to prove the a-sat- ka@rya-vada (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine, yet a few words may be said in reply to the Samkhya refuta- tion of a-sat-karya-vada. Thus the argument that that which is non- existent has no form (nairiipya) and therefore cannot be produced is false ; for the operation of production represents itself the character of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkaryavadins think that out of the same three gunas different kinds of effects may be pro- duced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (karana-Sakti-pratiniyamat), different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be found in the pre-existence of effects ; for, in reality, it is on account of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately funda- mental. The name a-sat-ka@rya-vada, however, is a misnomer; for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into being. Production in reality means nothing more than the charac- teristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a previous and a succeeding point of time?. The meaning of a-sat- karya-vada is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately * na hy asan-ndma kifcid asti yad utpattim aviset, kintu kalpaniko ’yam vyava- haro yad asad utpadyata iti yavat. Tattva-samgraha-panjika, p. 33. ; ® vastinam pirvapara-koti-sinya-ksana-matravasthayi svabhava eva utpadah uty ucyate. Ibid. x1] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalasila 175 after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment of the causal operation, it would have been perceived ; it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the causal operation. Refuting the other Samkhya doctrines, Santaraksita and Kamalasila point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (Sakti), then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied; for it is the potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. Again, the Samkhyists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously im- possible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects them- selves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are re- garded as being made up of three gunas, there is no reason for admitting one eternal prakrti as the source of them all. If causes are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non- eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced from one earth, so all objects are produced from one prakrti; but this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are produced not out of one lump of earth, but from different lumps. Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the prakrti of the Samkhyists. 176 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. (b) Criticism of Isvara. One of the chief arguments of the Naiyayika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms and shapes of the different objects in the world.cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. To this Santaraksita and Kamalasila reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object, seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not see it, they are wrong; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely different kinds of entities from tactile sense-data, and it is meaning- less to say that it is the same object or whole which has both the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say - yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data; the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense- data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description; there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (pratibandha). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong; x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 177 for there is no state of arrest in nature; all things in the world are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide His operations, and that another, and that another, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator, then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He wishes, then it may be replied that, since God’s will is regarded as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production holds good. Moreover, since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory. Now, if He and His will be always present, and yet at the moment of the production of any particular phenomenon all other pheno- mena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argu- ment’s sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argu- ment for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator. The arguments urged in refutation of prakrti and Isvara would also apply against the Patafijala-Samkhya, which admits the joint causality of Ivara and prakrti; for here also, prakrti and Isvara being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous pro- duction of all effects.