English
Neither Nagarjuna nor Sriharsa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process, nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of world-experience as such. But, while Nagarjuna had no thesis of his own to uphold, Sriharsa sought to establish the validity and ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nagarjuna and Sriharsa were, however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the recon- struction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. But, while Sriharsa attacked only the definitions of the Nyaya, Nagarjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and also some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them. But the entire efforts of Sriharsa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyaya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyaya could define its categories properly. From the fact that the Nyaya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. Nagarjuna’s methods differ considerably from those of Sriharsa in this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of its own, and one could understand a concept only through another, and that again through the former or through another, and so on. The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. Nagarjuna’s criticisms are, however, largely of an a priori nature, and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 171 very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate as the criticisms of Sriharsa; but at the same time they are funda- mentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Sriharsa’s dialectic. It cannot be denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, Sriharsa’s criticisms, following an altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a discredit to his whole venture. Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila (4-D. 760) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics. (2) Criticisms of the Samkhya Parinama Doctrine. In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the Vedanta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti on Sankara and some of his followers, such as Sriharsa, Citsukha and others, was very great. It has also been pointed out that not only Nagarjuna and Candra- kirti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought, as contained in Santaraksita’s Tattva-samgraha with Kamalasila’s commentary Pafjika, is a remarkable instance of this. Santaraksita lived in the first half of the eighth century A.D., and Kamalasila was probably his junior contemporary. They refuted the views of Kambalasvatara, a follower of the Lokayata school, the Buddhist Vasumitra (a.D. 100), Dharmatrata (A.D. 100), Ghosaka (A.D. 150), Buddhadeva (a.D. 200), the Naiyayika Vatsya- yana (A.D. 300), the Mimamsist Sabarasvamin (a.D. 300), the Samkhyist Vindhyasvamin (A.D. 300), the Buddhist Safghabhadra (A.D. 350), Vasubandhu (a.D. 350), the Samkhyist Isvarakrsna (A.D. 390), the Buddhist Dinnaga (a.D. 400), the Jaina Acaryasiiri (a.D. 478), the Samkhyist Mathara Acarya (A.D. 500), the Natyayika Uddyotakara (A.D. 600), the rhetorician Bhamaha (a.D. 640), the . Buddhist Dharmakirti (A.D. 650), the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (A.D. 650), the Mimamsist Kumarila Bhatta (a.p. 680), 172 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. the Jaina Subhagupta (A.D. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (A.D. 700), the Naiyayika Aviddhakarna (A.D. 700), Sankarasvamin (A.D. 790), Pragastamati (A.D. 700), Bhavivikta (A.D. 700), the Jaina Patrasvamin (a.D. 700), Ahrika (A.D. 700), Sumati (A.D. 700), and the Mimamsist Uveyaka (A.D. 700). It is not possible here, of course, to enter into a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers by Santaraksita and Kamalasgila; yet some of the important points of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before Sankara and by which Sankara and his followers, like Sriharsa, Citsukha or Anandajfiana, were in all probability greatly in- fluenced. In criticizing the Samkhya views they say that, if the effects, the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the pradhana, why should they be produced from the pradhana? If they are identical, then the evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhana as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of parinama, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme of the Samkhya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent cause; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal trans- formation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be asked whether such qualities are different from the causal sub- stance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is undergoing transformations (parinama). If the changing qualities and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are given in favour of the sat-karya-vada (existence of the effect in the cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist 1 'These dates are collected from Dr B. Bhattacharya’s foreword to the Tattva- samgraha. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper discussions, does not take responsibility for them. x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 173 in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them, then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific character- istic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequencé of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized ; this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced, which would be against the sat-karya-vada theory. In the light of the above criticisms, since according to the sat-karya-vada theory causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Samkhya in favour of sat-karya-vada, that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible. Again, according to Samkhya, nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted, since according to the sat-karya-vada theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification of either buddhi, manas or caitanya. Again, the application of all Samkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions; but de- cisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however, it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before, but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is production of what was non-existent, and thus the sat-karya-vada theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion (niscaya) is already existent before the application of the argumen- tative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the application of those premises, the Samkhyist may be asked to define what he means by such manifestation (abhivyakti). This manifes- tation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge or the withdrawal of some obscuration to the comprehension. In the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new character (svabhavatisaya) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with it.