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There Pragastapada defines guna as that which inheres in a substance, is associated with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality * tatraiva atyantabhave’tivyapteh; sopi hi gunavattvatyantabhavas tasyadhi- karanam svasya svasminnavrtteh. Cit-sukhi, p. 176. * asminnapi vakra-laksane gunadisu api samkhyd-prthaktva-gunayoh pratiteh katham nativyaptih. Ibid. p. 177. 8 .jatim abhyupagacchata tajjati-vyanjakam kimcid-avasyam abhyupeyam na ca tannirupanam susakam. Ibid. p. 178. * dravyam dravyam iti anugata-pratyayah pramdnam iti cenna suvarnam- upalabhya mrttikam-upalabhyamanasya laukikasya tad evedam dravyam iti pratyaya-bhavat pariksakanam canugata-pratyaye vipratipatteh. Ibid. p. 179. x1] Dialectic of Nagarjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 163 and which has no motion (niskriya)!. But the definition of a quality cannot involve the phrase “‘ without a quality”; for quality is still to be defined. Again, unless the guna is properly defined, its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase “which has no motion” is meaningless. The class-concept of quality, again, can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look at the question, it is impossible to define qualities. It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, how- ever, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criti- cizing the definitions given by the Naiyayikas. But it may be well to point out here that, though Sriharsa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyaya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedanta. Sankara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyaya and other systems in his commentary on the Vedanta-sitras, 11. 11. The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic. The dialectic of Sriharsa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, which supposed that all that was knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as their existence and nature are all involved in maya. The only reality is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nagarjuna, and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyaya defini- tions) Sriharsa’s method was a continuation of Nagarjuna’s, and an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyaya-Vaisesika. But the most important part of Nagarjuna’s method was de- liberately ignored by Sriharsa and his followers, who made no attempt to refute Nagarjuna’s conclusions. Nagarjuna’s main thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in 1 ripddinam gunadnam sarvesam gunatvabhisambandho dravydsritatvam ’ nirgunatvam niskriyatvam. Prasastapada-bhadsya, p. 94, The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895. II-2 164 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences; and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible’ as well, they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Nagarjuna was followed by Aryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nagarjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddha- ghosa of the fourth century a.D. does not refer to them. During the Gupta empire, in the fifth century a.D., Asanga and Vasubandhu flourished. In the sixth century a.D the relativist philosophy of Nagarjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapalita, of Valabhi in Surat, and of Bhavya, or Bhavaviveka, of Orissa. The school of Bhavya was called Madhyamika-Sautrantika on account of his supplementing Nagarjuna’s arguments with special argu- ments of his own. At this time the Yogicara school of Mahayana monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness (vijfana) all logical arguments were futile. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency?. It seems very probable that Sriharsa was inspired by these Yogacara authors, and their relativist allies from Nagarjuna to Bhavya, and Candrakirti, the master commentator on Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika-karika. Buddha- palita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhavaviveka sought to estab- lish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candrakirti finally supported Buddhapalita’s scheme as against the scheme of Bhava- viveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was this Madhyamika scheme of Candrakirti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism. In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nagarjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy is regarded as being production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding stuff or through the conglomeration (sa@magri) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. But Nagarjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. Buddhapalita holds that things cannot arise 1 The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, pp. 66-67. Published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927. x1] Dialectic of Nagarjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 16s of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no meaning in their being produced; if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would eternally continue to be produced. Bhavaviveka, criticizing Buddhapilita, says that the refutation of Buddhapalita should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other factors. But Candrakirti objects to this criticism of Bhavaviveka and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Samkhyists, who hold that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to give any new argument to refute the Samkhya sat-karya-vada view ; it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Samkhya view. Thus Aryadeva says that the Madhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality and unreality!. This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Sriharsa. Sriharsa says that the Vedantists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various cate- gories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedanta view could be attacked. The Vedanta, however, is free to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nagarjuna writes in his Vigraha-vydavartani thus: When I have these (of my own to prove), I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving); But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent). If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things, I could then make an affirmation or a denial Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred). But these (separate) things do not exist for me. Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis?. A sad asat sad-asac ceti yasya pakso na vidyate upalambhas cirenapi tasya vaktum na sakyate. Madhyamika-vrtii, p. 16. Z! anyat pratitya yadi nama paro ’bhavisyat jayeta tarhi bahulah sikhino ’ndhakarah sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvatas ca tulyam paratvam akhile janake "pi yasmat. Ibid. p. 36. 166 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. Candrakirti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for the Madhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support. They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their afirma- tions contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So the Madhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the opponents’ theses and methods, but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter-theses, since the Madhyamikas have no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits; no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents. Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign factors or causes; for, were it so, there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing, e.g. dark- ness from light?. And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of them both.