English
It cannot be regarded as absolutely non-existent (asat), since that which is abso- lutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception, and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e.g. the tendency of a man to pick up the piece of silver, which is but a false per- ception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as existent; for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception, and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there was no silver in the past—it was only the conch-shell that appeared as silver. Therefore the false presentation, though it serves all the purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, and it is precisely this character that constitutes the indefinable nature (antrvacaniyata) of all illusions?. 1 tatha dosanadm api yathartha-jnana-pratibandhakatvam ayathartha-jnana- _janakatvam ca kim na syat. Cit-sukhi, p. 66. : 2 pratyekam sad asattvabhyam vicara-padavim na yad gahate tad anirvacyam Ghur vedanta-vedinah. Ibid. p. 79. 156 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedanta which Citsukha describes, since there is nothing new in them and they have already been described in chapter x of volume 1 of this work. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of the Nyaya categories. It will suffice, however, to give only a few of these criticisms, as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds of categories as are discussed in Sriharsa’s great work Khandana- khanda-khadya, and it would be tedious to follow the refutation of the same kinds of categories by two different writers, though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Sriharsa. Citsukha’s general approach to such refu- tations is also slightly different from that of Sriharsa. For, unlike Sriharsa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedanta, and his refutations of the Nyadya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self- revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth. Thus, in refuting time (Ra@/a), Citsukha says that time cannot be perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense, nor can it be apprehended by the mind (manas), as the mind only operates in association with the external senses. Moreover, since there are no perceptual data, it cannot be inferred. The notions of before and after, succession and simultaneity, quickness and dura- tion, cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in itself. It may be urged that, since the solar vibrations can only be associated with human bodies and worldly things, making them appear as young or old only through some other agency such as days, months, etc., such an agency, which brings about the con- nection of solar vibrations with worldly things, is called time. To this Citsukha replies that, since the sclf itself can be regarded as the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of a new category called time. Again, it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have time as their material cause; for the validity of these notions is challenged by the Vedantist. They may be regarded as the im- 1 tarant-parispanda-visesanam yuva-sthavira-sariradi-pindesu mdasadi-vicitra- buddhi-janana-dvarena tad-upahitesu paratvaparatvadi-buddhi-janakatvam na ca tair asambaddhanadm tatra buddhi-janakatvam, na ca saksat sambandho ravi- parispandanam pindair asti atah tat-sambandhakataya kascid astadravya-vilaksano dravya-visesah svikartavyah, tasya ca kala iti samjfia. (This is Vallabha’s view of time.) Nayana-prasadini commentary on Cit-sukhi, p. 321, by Pratyak-svarupa- bhagavat. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, rors. x1] Citsukha’s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 157 pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibra- tions. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate category, since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of our known data of experience. From considerations of some data relative space (dik) has to be discarded; for relative space cannot be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of ex- perience. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of relativity (apeksd-buddhi), and, given that sense of relativity, the mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements form the notion of relative space. It is therefore unnecessary to admit the existence of relative space as a separate category. In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas Citsukha says that there is no ground for admitting the Vaisesika atoms. If these atoms are to be admitted on the ground that all things are to be conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts, then the same may apply to the atoms as well. If it is urged that one must stop somewhere, that the atoms are therefore regarded as the last state, and are uniform in size and not further divisible, then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the sun is shining (called trasarenus) may equally be regarded as the last stage of divisible size. If it is contended that, since these are visible, they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as indivisible, it may be said in reply that, since the Nyaya writers admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins, visibility of the trasarenus could not be put forward as a reason why they could not be regarded as indivisible. Moreover, if the atoms were partless, how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser material forms? Again, it is not-indispensable that atoms should combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances possible ; for, like threads in a sheet, many particles may make gross appearances possible even without combining. Citsukha then re- peats Sankara’s refutation of the concept of wholes and parts, saying that, if the wholes are different from the parts, then they must be in the parts or they would not be there; if they are not in the parts, it would be difficult to maintain that the wholes were made of parts; if they are in the parts, they must be either wholly or partly in them; if they are wholly in the parts, then there would be many such wholes, or in each part the whole would be found; _ and, if they are partly in the parts, then the same difficulty of wholes and parts would appear. Again, the concept of contact (samyoga) is also inexplicable. It 158 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. cannot be defined as the coming together of any two things which are not in contact (apraptayoh praptih samyogah); for, until one knows the meaning of the concept of contact, one cannot under- stand the meaning of the phrase ‘“‘not in contact.” If it is defined as the coming together of two things which are unrelated, then contact (samyoga) would include even the relation of inherence, such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads. If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is transitory (anityah sambandhah janyatva-visesito va), then cases of beginningless contact would not be included, and even the pos- session of an article by purchase would have to be included as contact, since this relation of possession is also produced in time. It cannot be objected that “‘ possession” is not a relation, since a relation to be such must be between two things; for, if the objection were valid, the relation between substance and quality would not be a relation, since quality and substance exist together, and there are no two separate things which can be related. If the objector means that the relation must be between two terms, then there are two terms here also, namely, the article possessed and the possessor. Moreover, if contact is defined as relation which does not connect two things in their entirety (avyapya-vrttitva-visesito), then again it would be wrong, since in the case of partless entities the relation of contact cannot connect the parts, as they have no parts. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (vibhaga) on the same lines and passes over to the refutation of number, as two, three and the like. Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the existence of two, three, etc. as separate numbers, since what we per- ceive is but the one thing, and then by a sense of oscillation and mutual reference (apeksa-buddhi) we associate them together and form the notions of two, three, etc. These numbers therefore do not exist separately and independently, but are imaginatively pro- duced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of single objects. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the numbers, two, three, etc., are actually produced. We simply deal with the notions of two, three, etc. on the strength of our powers of mental association}. 1 Gropita-dvitva-trituddi-visesitaikaiva-samuccayalambana buddhir dvituvadi- Janiketi cet; na; tathabhitayda eva buddher dvituvddi-vyavahara-janakatvopapatiau dvitvady-utpadakatva-kalpana-vaiyarthyat. Nayana-prasadini, p. 300. x1] Citsukha’s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 159 Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (jati) on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by in- ference. The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept.