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Self and knowledge being identical, there is no relation between the two save that of identity (j#anatmanoh sambandhasyaiva abhavat). Citsukha defines falsity (mithyatva) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause’. He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts?. Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower (drk), and the objects which are cognized (drsya). Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-contact; for in the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. A reference to subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) cannot explain it, since the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplain- able. Arguing as to the impossibility of properly explaining the subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) in knowledge, Citsukha says that it cannot be held that the subject-object relation means that knowledge produces some change in the object (visaya) and that the knower produces such a change. For what may be the nature of such a change? If it be described as jf#dtata, or the character of being known, how can such a character be by my knowledge at the present moment generated as a positive quality in an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can be produced even in past objects, then there would be no fixed law according to which such qualities should be produced. Nor can such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a re- ference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with our knowledge of things. For in picking up a piece of silver that we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it the dross contained in the silver, and hence the fact of the physical u sarvesam api bhavandm asrayatvena sammate pratiyogitvam atyantabhavam prati mrsatmata. Cit-sukhi, p. 309. Some of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhustdana’s Advaita- siddhi, a work composed much later than the Cit-sukhi. 2 amsinah svamSsa-gatyantabhavasya pratiyoginah amsitudd itardmsiva... vimatah patah etat-tantu-nisthatyantabhava-pratiyogi avayavitvat patantaravat. Cit-sukhi, pp. 40, 41. x1] Citsukha’s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 153 drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object of my knowledge, and hence the subject-object relation of know- ledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition. The internal mental states of volition and the emotions associated with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with the object of knowledge. If, however, it is urged that objectivity consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in conscious- ness, the question arises, what does this appearing in consciousness mean? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the object is contained in it; for, consciousness being internal and the object external, the object cannot be contained in it. It cannot be a mere undefined relatedness; for in that case the object may as well be considered subject and the subject, object. If objectivity be defined as that which can induce knowledge, then even the senses, the light and other accessories which help the rise of knowledge may as well be regarded as objects. Object cannot be defined as that to which knowledge owes its particular form; for, knowledge being identical with its form, all that helps the rise of knowledge, the senses, light, etc., may as well be regarded as objects. So, in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature of the subject-object relation, he will be disappointed. Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (ajfdana) as a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise of true knowledge!. Nescience is different from the conception of positivity as well as of negativity, yet it is called only positive because of the fact that it is not negative”. Ignorance or nescience is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of know- ledge; and so it is said that the rise of right knowledge of any object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with reference to that object and that this ignorance is something different from what one would understand by negation of right knowledge®. Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance becomes apparent when we say that ‘‘ We do not know whether what you say is true.” Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that 1 anadi-bhava-ripam yad-vijhanena viliyate tad ajfianam iti prajna-laksanam sampracaksate andaditve sati bhava-ritpam viyjfiana-nirasyam ajnanam ti laksanam tha vivaksitam. Cit-sukhi, p. 57. 2 bhavabhava-vilaksanasya ajfanasya abhava-vilaksanatva-matrena bhavatvo- pacarat. Ibid. 3 vigitam Deva-datta-nistha-pramana-jnanam Devadatta-nistha-pramabhava- tiriktanadernivarttakam pramanatvad Yajfadattddigata-pramana-jnanavad ity anumanam, Ibid. p. 58. 154 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. what is said is known, but it is not known whether what is said is valid!. Here also there is a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact, which is not the same as mere absence of knowledge. Such an ignorance, however, is not experienced through sense-contact or sense-processes, but directly by the self-revealing consciousness— the saksin. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object there is ignorance (ajfana), and the object, as qualified by such an ignorance, is experienced as being unknown. All things are the objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as known or as unknown?. Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as a state in which we did not know anything (na kimcid-avedisam) is also referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dream- less state. One of the chief tenets of Vedanta’ epistemology lies in the supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience. The opposite view is that of Prabhakara, that the false is never presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong construction imposed upon experience by the mind, which fails to note the actual want of association between two things which are falsely associated as one. According to this theory all illusion consists of a false association or a false relationing of two things which are not presented in experience as related. This false asso- ciation is not due to an active operation of the mind, but to a failure to note that no such association was actually presented in experience (asamsargagraha). According to Prabhakara, the great Mimamsa authority, the false is never presented in experience, nor is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong construction of the mind, but merely to a failure to note certain distinctions presented in experience. On account of such a failure things which are distinct are not observed as distinct, and hence things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one, and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. But here there is no false presentation in experience. Whatever is known is true; falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting differences. Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation 1 tvadukte ’rthe pramana-jnanam mama nasti ity asya visista-visaya-jfidnasya pramatvat. Cit-sukhi, p. 59. 2 asman-mate ajitdnasya saksi-siddhataya pramanabodhyatvat, pramana-jfidno- dayat prak-kale ajnianam tad-visesito’rthah saksi-siddhah ajfata ity anuvada gocarah ..-Sarvam vastu jidtataya ajnatataya va saksi-caitanyasya visayah. Ibid. p. 60. x1] Citsukha’s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 155 can never explain all cases of false apprehension. Take the pro- position, “There are false apprehensions and false presentations”; if this proposition is admitted to be correct, then Prabhakara’s contention is false; if it is admitted to be false, then here is a false proposition, the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note differences. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to a failure to note differences, then it would be hard to find out any true proposition or true experience. On the analogy of our false experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false, and therefore all inferences would be doubtful. All cases of real and true association could be explained as being due to a failure to note differences. There could be no case in which one could assure himself that he was dealing with a real association and not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (asamsarga- graha). Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect that all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to a mere non-apprehension of difference, since it is quite reasonable to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce false appearance!. Thus in the case of the illusory perception of conch-shell as silver it is the conch-shell that appears as a piece of silver. But what is the nature of the presentation that forms the object (alambana) of false perception?