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Both Padmapada and Prakagatman in the Pafica-padika@ and Pajica-padika-vivarana had distinguished the self from the ego as self-revelation or self-illumi- (Nydaya-kandati). In addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siitra-bhdsya ‘of Sankara, called Bhasya-bhava-prakasika, Vivarana- tatparya-dipikd, a commentary on the Pramdna-mala of Anandabodha, a com- mentary on Mandana’s Brahma-siddhi, called Abhipraya-prakasika, and an index to the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sitra, called Adhikarana-mafjart. His teacher Jfianottama wrote two works on Vedanta, called Nya@ya-sudha and }fdna- siddhi; but he seems to have been a different person from the Jhanottama who wrote a commentary on Suregvara’s Naiskarmya-siddhi; for the latter was a householder (as he styles himself with a householder’s title, misra), and an inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country, while the former was an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauda, as Citsukha describes him in his colophon to his Tattva-pradipikda. He is also said to have written the Brahma- stuti, Visnu-purdna-tika, Sad-darsana-samgraha-vrtti, Adhikarana-sangati (awork explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the Brahma-sitra) and a com- mentary on the Naiskarmya-siddhi, called the Naiskarmya-siddhi-tikad or the Bhava-tattva-prakasika. His pupil Sukhaprakaga wrote a work on the topics of the Brahma-sitra, called Adhikarana-ratna-mala. 1 Thus Pandita Harinatha Sarma in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tattva- pradiptkd or Cit-sukhispeaks of this work as advatta-siddhanta-raksako ‘py advaita- siddhanta-prakasako vyutpadakaé ca. x1] Citsukha’s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 149 nation (svayam-prakasa). Thus Prakasatman says that consciousness (samvrd) is self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to any other self-revealing cause!. It is on account of this natural self-revelation of consciousness that its objects also appear as self- revealing. Padmapada also says the same thing, when he states that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness ; when this consciousness appears in connection with other objects and manifests them, it is called experience (anubhava), and, when it is by itself, it is called the self or dtman*. But Citsukha was probably the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self- revelation. Citsukha defines it as that which is entitled to be called immediate (aparoksa-vyavahara-yogya), though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatve ’pi)*. It may be objected that desires, feelings, etc. also are not objects of any cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate, and hence the definition might as well apply to them; for the object of cognition has a separate objective existence, and by a mind-object contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object, and thereby the one consciousness, which was apparently split up into two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the cognizer, is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of the subjective form on the objective form, and the object-form is revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. But in the case of our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the same way as external objects are cognized. According to Vedanta epistemology these subjective experiences of will, emotions, etc. are different mental constituents, forms or states, which, being directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing conscious- ness, become experienced. These subjective states are therefore not cognized in the same way as external objects. But, since the 1 samvedanam tu svayam-prakdsa eva na prakasantara-hetuh. Patca-padtka- vivarana, p. 52. , 2 tasmad anubhavah sajatiya-prakasantara-nirapeksah prakasamana eva visaye prakasadi-vyavahara-nimittam bhavitum arhati avyavadhanena visaye prakasa- di-vyavahara-nimittatvat. Ibid. 3 tasmat cit-svabhava evatma tena tena prameya-bhedenaupadhiyamano ’nubha- vabhidhanivakam labhate avivaksitopadhir atmadi-sabdaih. Panica-padikd, p. 19. : € avedyatve saty aparoksa-vyavahara-yogyatvam svayam-prakasa-laksanam. Cit-sukhi, p. 9. ; 150 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. experience of these states is possible only through a process of illusory imposition, they are not entitled to be called immediatet. So, though they appear as immediate, they have no proper yogyata, or, in other words, they are not entitled to be called immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but illusory impositions on the self-revealing consciousness, and hence they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate. There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self- revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition ; for on the Vedanta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be called immediate, and hence the phrase avedyatve (not being an object of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing feature of the self-revealing consciousness; the epithet “‘imme-_ diate’ is therefore also unnecessary. Tosuch an objection Citsukha’s reply is that the experience of external objects is only in the last stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate and illusory, and, since in all our ordinary stages of experience the experience of world-objects is immediate, the epithet avedyatva successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called im- mediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing con- sciousness only by being objects of cognition. In the field of ordinary experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to be called immediate no less than the self-revealing conscious- ness, and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they can be distinguished from the self-revealing consciousness. The main argument in favour of the admission of the category of independent self-revealing consciousness is that, unless an in- dependent self-revealing consciousness is admitted, there would be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cog- nition; for, if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness has to be further subjected to another process before it can be understood, then that also might require another process, and that another, and so there would be an unending series. Moreover, that the pure experience is self-revealing is proved by the very fact of the experience itself; for no one doubts his own ex- perience or stands in need of any further corroboration or con- firmation as to whether he experienced or not. It may be objected 1 avedyatve *pi naparoksa-vyavahara-yogyatd tesam, adhyastatayaiva tesém siddheh. Cit-sukhi, p. 10. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915. x1] Citsukha’s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 151 that it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of anything (anu-vyavasdya), and in such a case the self-revealing consciousness may become further cognized. Citsukha’s reply to this is that, when one perceives a jug, there is the mental activity, then a cessation of that activity, then a further starting of new activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug, or rather I know that I know the jug—and hence such a cognition cannot be said to be directly and immediately cognizing the first awareness, which could not have stayed through so many moments!. Again, since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves produce the self-revelation of knowledge, if knowledge were not admitted as self-revealing, the whole world would be blind and there would be no self-revelation. When one knows that he knows a book or a jug, it is the cognized object that is known and not the awareness that is cognized; there can be no awareness of awareness, but only of the cognized object?. If the previous aware- ness could be made the object of subsequent awareness, then this would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being known by the self (svasyapi suena vedyatvapatat)—a theory which would accord not with the Vedanta idealism, but with the Buddhistic. It is true, no doubt, that the pure self-revealing con- sciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state; but its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has no form or object, and hence, though it may be focussed by a mental state, yet it stands on a different footing from the objects illuminated by it. The next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness (@tmanah samvid- riipatva). This is, of course, no new contribution by Citsukha, since this view had been maintained in the Upanisads and repeated by Sankara, Padmapada, Prakasatman and others. Citsukha says that, like knowledge, the self also is immediately revealed or experienced without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition, and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one doubts about his own self; for the self always stands directly and 1 ghata-jnanodaya-samaye manasi kriya tato vibhagas tatah pirva-samyoga-vi- nasas tata uttara-samyogotpattis tato jnanantaram iti aneka-ksana-vilambena utpa- dyamanasya jhanasya aparoksataya purva-jnana-grahakatvanupapatteh. Cit- . sukhi, p. 17. ; al & vidito ghata ity atra anuvyavasdyena ghatasyaiva viditatvam avasiyate na tu vitteh. Ibid. p. 18. 152 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. immediately self-revealed.