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But Sriharsa says that there is room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses, namely, that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. It may be that there are smokes which are not caused by fire. How can one be sure that all smokes are caused by fire? There may be differences in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us, and so there is always room for the supposition that any particular smoke may not be caused by fire, and such doubts would make inference impossibie. Udayana had however contended that, if you entertain the doubt, with regard to a future case, that it is possible that there may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong, then the possibility of such a doubt (savika@) must be supported by inference, and the admission of this would involve the admission of inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate, there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be enter- tained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with practical life. Doubts which make our daily life impossible are illegitimate. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger, and, if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day when he is hungry he should take food or not, then life would be impossible!. Sriharsa, however, replies to this contention by twisting the words of Udayana’s own karika, in which he says that, so long as there is doubt, inference is invalid ; if there is no doubt, this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been made manifest, and until such invalidity is found there will always be doubts. Hence the argument of possibilities (tarka) can never remove doubts?. Sriharsa also objects to the definition of ‘invariable concomi- tance” as a natural relation (svabhavikah sambandhah). He rejects the term “natural relation” and says that invariable concomitance # ganka ced anumasty eva na cec chanka tatastaram vyaghatavadhir asanka tarkah sankavadhir matah. Kusumajfijali, 11, 7. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1912. vyaghato yadi sankasti na cec chanka@ tatastaram vyaghatavadhir asanka tarkah sankavadhth kutah. Khandana-khanda-khadya, p. 693. 142 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. would not be justifiable in any of its possible meanings, such as (i) depending on the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhava- srita), (ii) produced by the nature of the related (sambandhi-sva- bhava-janya), (iii) not different from the nature constituting the re- latedness, since, as these would be too wide and would apply even to those things which are not invariable concomitants, e.g. all that is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. Though in some cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle, not all earthen objects can be so scratched. He further refutes the defini- tion of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon conditional circumstances (upadhi). Without entering into the details of Sriharsa’s argument it may be pointed out that it rests very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations can- not be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be determined without a previous determination of the conditionality of relations. Sriharsa’s brief refutation of analogy, implication and testimony, as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of inference, are not of much importance from a philosophical point of view, and need not be detailed here. Turning now to Sriharsa’s refutation of the Nyaya categories, we note that he begins with the refutation of “being” or positivity (bhavatva). He says that being cannot be defined as being existent in itself, since non-being is also existent in itself; we can with as much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing; both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives of the verb “‘exists.”” Again, each existing thing being unique in itself, there is no common quality, such as “‘existence”’ or ‘‘ being,” which is possessed by them all. Again, “‘being” is as much a negation of ‘“‘non-being” as ‘“‘non-being” of “‘being”’; hence ““being”’ cannot be defined as that which is not a negation of anything. Negation is a mere form of speech, and both being and non-being may be expressed in a negative form. Turning to the category of non-being (abhava), Sriharsa says that it cannot be defined as negation of anything; for being may as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of being (bhavabhavayor dvayor api paraspara-pratiksepatmakatvat). Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being; for not all non-being is opposed to all being (e.g. in ‘‘ there is no jug x1] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 143 on the ground” the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in respect of which the jug is denied); if non-being opposes some existent things, then that does not differentiate negation; for there are many existent things which are opposed to one another (e.g. the.horse and the bull). In refuting the Nyaya definition of substance (dravya) as that which is the support of qualities, Sriharsa says that even qualities appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. we speak of two or three colours, of a colour being deep or light, mixed or primary —and colour is regarded as quality). If it is urged that this is a mistake, then the appearance of the so-called substances as being endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous. Again, what is meant by defining substance as the support (asraya) of qualities? Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of quality (gunatva), the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a substance is that in which the qualities inhere. But what would be the meaning here of the particle “in”? How would one dis- tinguish the false appearance, to a jaundiced eye, of yellowness in a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the conch-shell is realized, there can be no difference between the one case and the other. Again, substance cannot be defined as the inhering or the material cause (samavayi-karana), since it is not possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not; for number is counted as a quality, and colour also is counted as a quality, and yet one specifies colours by numbers, as one, two, or many colours. Furthermore, the Nyaya definition of quality as that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible; for the defini- tion involves the concept of quality, which is sought to be defined. Moreover, as pointed out above, even qualities, such as colours, have numeral qualities; for we speak of one, two or many colours. It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand, and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such appearances are to be rejected as false. If colours are known as qualities in consideration of other reasons, then these, being en- _dowed with numeral qualities, could not for that very reason be called qualities; for qualities belong according to definition only to 144 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. substances. Even the numerals themselves are endowed with the quality of separateness. So there would not be a single instance that the Naiyayika could point to as an example of quality. Speaking of relations, Sriharsa points out that, if relation is to be conceived as something subsisting in a thing, then its meaning is unintelligible. The meaning of relation as “in” or “‘herein” is not at all clear; for the notion of something being a container (adhara) is dependent on the notion of the concept of “in” or “herein,” and that concept again depends on the notion of a container, and there is no other notion which can explain either of the concepts independently. The container cannot be supposed to be an inhering cause; for in that case such examples as “‘there is a grape in this vessel” or “the absence of horns in a hare” would be unexplainable. He then takes a number of possible meanings which can be given to the notion of a container; but these, not being philosophically important, are omitted here. He also deals with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) of knowledge. In refuting the definition of cause Sriharsa says that cause cannot be defined as immediate antecedence ; for immediate antece- dence can be ascribed only to the causal operation, which is always an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. If, on the theory that what (e.g. the causal operation) belongs to a thing (e.g. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands between it (cause) and that which follows it (effect), the causal operation be not regarded as a separate and independent factor, then even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with the cause and therefore cause. But, if it is urged that, since the cause of the cause is not an operation, it cannot be regarded as being one with the cause, one may well ask the opponent to define the meaning of operation. If the opponent should define it as that factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect, then the accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions, such as the natural laws, space, and so forth, without which an effect cannot be produced, are also to be regarded as operation, which is impossible.