English
After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition (prama) Sriharsa tries to show that it is impossible to define the idea of instruments (karana) or their operative action (vyapara) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramana). Sriharsa attempts to show that instrumentality as an agent cannot be separately conceived as having an independent existence, since it is difficult to determine its separate existence. It would be a long tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by Sriharsa, and for our present purposes it is enough to know that Sriharsa refuted the concept of ‘‘instrumentality” as a separate agent, both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit grammar. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings which could be attributed to the concept of ‘“‘karana,” or instru- ment, and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily justified?. In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an instrument of right knowledge. Perception is defined in the Nyaya as cognition which arises through the contact of a particular sense with its object; but it is impossible to know whether any cognition has originated from sense-contact, since the fact of the production 1 Among many other definitions Sriharsa also refutes the definition of karana as given by Uddyotakara— yadvdn eva karoti tat karanam.” Khandana, p. 506. 138 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived or known by any other means. Since in perception the senses are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other hand with the external objects, Sriharsa urges by a series of argu- ments that, unless the specific object with which the sense is in contact is mentioned in each case, it would be difficult to formulate a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only the revelation of the external object and not the self, which is as much in contact with the sense as is the object. Again, the specifi- cation of the object in the case of each perception would make it particular, and this would defeat the purposes of definition, which can only apply to universal concepts. Arguing against a possible definition of perception as immediateness, Sriharsa supposes that, if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its per- manent attribute, then, in order that this quality may be cognized, there ought to be another attribute, and this would presuppose another attribute, and so there would be an infinite regress; and, if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further attribute is necessary, then this involves the omission of the preced- ing determining attributes, until the possibility of the perception is also negatived. If this immediateness be explained as a cognition produced by the instrumentality of the sense-organs, this again is unintelligible; for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incom- prehensible. Sriharsa takes a number of alternative definitions of perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same way, mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the definitions. Citsukha Acadrya, a commentator on Sriharsa’s Khandana- khanda-khadya, offers a refutation of the definition of perception in a much more condensed form. He points out that the definition of perception by Aksapada as an uncontradicted cognition arising out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. How can we know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating cir- cumstances, since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no contradiction, and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously and independently, and the collocating circumstances would con- tain many elements which are unperceivable. It is also impossible to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted. Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can x1] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 139 produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (pravrtti-samarthya) ; for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part of the perceiver who is deceived by it. Mere achievement of the result is no test for the rightness of the cognition; for a man may see the lustre of a gem and think it to be a gem and really get the gem, yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of the gem as the gem was erroneous!. In the case of the perception of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of those objects, and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of the cognitions. Passing over the more or less verbal arguments of Sriharsa in refutation of the definitions of inference (anumana) as linga-para- marsa or the realization of the presence in the minor term (paksa, e.g. the mountain) of a reason or probans (liga, e.g. smoke) which is always concomitant with the major term (sadhya, e.g. fire), or as invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the major term (sadhya, e.g. fire), and its other slightly modified varieties, I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance (vyaptt), which is at the root of the notion of inference. It is urged that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required in vyapti cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance of all the individuals involved in a class be known, which is impossible. The Naiyayika holds that the mind by a sort of mental contact with class-concepts or universals, called saémanya- pratyasatti, may affirm of all individuals of a class without actually experiencing all the individuals. It is in this way that, perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in a large number of cases, one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept “smoke” when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. Sriharsa argues in refutation of such an interpretation that, if all individual smoke may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-con- cepts, then by a mental contact with the class-concept “knowable”’ we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as well. A thing is knowable only as an individual with its specific qualities as such, and therefore to know a thing as a knowable would involve the knowledge of all such specific qualities; for the : 1 drsyate hi mani-prabhayam mani-buddhya pravartamanasya mani-prapteh pravrtti-samarthyam na cavyabhicaritvam. Tattva-pradipika, p. 218. Nirnaya- Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915. 140 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. class-concept “‘knowable” would involve all individuals which have a specific knowable character. It may be urged that knowability is one single character, and that things may be otherwise completely different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely know- able. To this Sriharsa answers that the class-concept “‘knowable” would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters would be involved within the meaning of the term “knowable.” Again, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible to have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals, how can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance, then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation of such concomitance. But such mistakes are committed and corrected by later experience, and there is no way in which one can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment. Again, if this invariable concomitance be defined as avinabhava, which means that when one is absent the other is also absent, such a definition is faulty; for it may apply to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. Thus there is no real concomitance be- tween ‘‘earth”’ and ‘‘possibility of being cut”; yet in @kasa there is absence of earth and also the absence of “ possibility of being cut.” If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of the other, it must be proved that universally in all instances of the absence of the one, e.g. the fire, there is also the absence of the other, e.g. the smoke. But it is as difficult to ascertain such uni- versal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance. Again, if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence of the middle term, the reason or the probans, where the major term or the probandum is also absent, then also it may be said that it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by sense- knowledge or by any other means. Now tarka or eliminatory consideration in judging of possi- bilities cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomi- tance; for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance, and such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdepend- ence. The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that, if invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied, then x1] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 141 there are strong arguments (tarka) against such a denial (badhakas tarkah), namely, that, if smoke is not regarded as concomitant with fire, then smoke would either exist without any cause or not exist at all, which is impossible.