English
If it lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ, then difference would be identical with the nature of the things that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ, then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a relation between “‘difference”’ and the things that differ, and this might require another connection, and that another, and so we should have a vicious endless series. He says that “difference” may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view. Firstly, ‘‘difference” is supposed to be of the nature of things. But a “‘difference”’ which is of the nature of the things which differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any difference without referring to the things from which there is difference. If by “‘book”’ we mean its difference from table, then the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning in speaking of “difference” as being the thing, when such differ- ences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If “‘difference”’ be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book, is realized as being different from a table—the nature of the difference may here be described as being “‘the quality of being distinguished from a table”; but ‘‘the quality of being distin- guished ” would have no meaning or locus standi, unless “‘ the table” were also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with “the quality of being distinguished from,” then this will in- variably include “‘the table” also within the essence of the book, as “the table” is a constituent of the complex quality ‘‘to be dis- tinguished from,” which necessarily means ‘‘to be distinguished from a table.” So on this view also “the table” and all other things which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the very essence of all things—a conclusion which contradicts the very concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they are understood or perceived. The'notion of “‘ difference” is itself different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different xt] Vedanta Dialectic of Sriharsa 13i from the notion that “the book differs from the table.”” For under- standing the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should understand previously its difference from a table. Moreover, even though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead to.our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is through similarity or resemblance between two things—say be- tween a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go)—that a man can recognize an animal as a wild cow; but yet, when he so con- siders an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of differ- ence may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference. It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of difference. In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as “‘ mental negation” or “‘otherness”’ (anyonyabhava), this “‘otherness”’ (say of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with the table is denied. Sriharsa here raises the objection that, if the identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the hare’s horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaning- less. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table); for there is in these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharma) by virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be distinguished from each other, since the Naiyayika, against whom Sriharsa’s arguments are directed, does not admit that class-con- cepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical: but in that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would _ involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the book), since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having 9-2 132 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case re- garding negation as otherness (anyonyabhava). Again, if difference is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya), then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another, and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the backward series would be meaningless and all things would be identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing characters are themselves different from the objects which possess them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time. If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier terms of difference can only be established by the establishment of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference un- necessary!. It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate unity taught in the Upanisad texts. Sriharsa does not deny that we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their * prathama-bhedasvikara-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahdrader dvitiya-bhedad eva siddheh prathama-bhedo vyarthah sydd eva, dvitiya-bhedadi-prayojanasya trttya-bhedadinaiva siddheh so pi vyarthah syat. Vidyd-sdgari on Khandana- khanda-khadya, p. 206. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914. x1] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 133 ultimate validity, since he considers them to be due to avidya or nescience alone}, The chief method of Sriharsa’s dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (cakraka), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a knower is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an inde- pendent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this rela- tivity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories. Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts. Sriharsa first takes for his criticism the definitions of right cognition. Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the direct apprehension of the real nature of things, he first urges that such a definition is faulty, since, if one accidentally guesses rightly certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived, or makes a right inference from faulty data or by fallacious methods, though the awareness may be right, it cannot be called right cognition?. It is urged that cognition, in order to be valid, must be produced through unerring instruments; here, however, is a case of chance guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by unerring instruments of senses. Nor can correspondence of the cognition with its object (yatharthanubhavah prama) be regarded as a proper definition of right cognition. Such correspondence can be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of the object itself or similarity to the object.