English
His polemic is against the Nyaya, which holds that 1 Anandapirna in his commentary on the Khandana-khanda-l:hadya, called Khandana-phakkikd, explains Kanyakubjesvara as Kasiraja, i.e. King of Kasi or Benares. 2 None of these however are available. 8 Sriharsa at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it ex- tremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says: grantha-granthir tha kvacit kvacid api nyasi prayatnan maya prajnammanya-mana hathena pathitimasmin khalah Rhelatu, sraddharaddha-guruh slathikrta-drdha-granthih samasadayat tv etat-tarkarasormmi-majjana sukhesv Gsanjanam sajjanah. Khandana-khanda-khadya, p. 1341. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914. Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various people, e.g. Khandana-mandana by Paramananda, Khandana-mandana by Bhavanatha, Didhiti by Raghunatha Siromani, Prakasa by Vardhamana, Vidya- bharani by Vidyabharana, Vidyd-sagari by Vidyasagara, Khandana-tikad by Padmanabha Pandita, Ananda-vardhana by Sankara Misra, Sri-darpana by Subhankara, Khandana-mahd-tarka by Caritrasimha, Khandana-khandana by Pragalbha Misra, Sisya-hitaisint by Padmanabha, Khandana-kuthara by Goku- lanatha Upadhyaya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiya- yikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vacaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal, called Khandanoddhara. xt] Vedanta Dialectic of Sriharsa 127 whatever is known has a well-defined real existence, and Sriharsa’s main point is to prove that all that is known is indefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative existence based on practical modes of acceptance, customs and conventions. But, though his chief polemic is against the Nyaya, yet, since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like those of Nagarjuna, they could be used, with modifications, no less effectively against any other system. Those who criticize with the object of establishing positive definitions would object only to certain definitions or views of other schools; but both Sriharsa and the nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such, and therefore his dialectic would be valid against all views and definitions of other systems}. He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being the objects of any further act of knowledge. The difference of the Vedanta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this, that the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable, not even excepting cognitions (vifidna) ; while the Vedanta makes an excep- tion of cognitions and holds that all the world, excepting knowledge or awareness, is indefinable either as existent or non-existent (sad-asadbhyam vilaksanam) and is unreal*. This indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences (meya- svabhavanugaminyam anirvacaniyata), and no amount of in- genuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature or existence. Sriharsa undertakes to show that all definitions of things or categories put forward by the Nyaya writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyayika; and, if no definition can stand or be supported, it necessarily follows that there can be no definitions, or, in other words, that no definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences 1 Sriharsa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nagarjuna and says: “‘tathad hi yadi darsanesu siinya-vadanirvacaniya-paksayor asrayanam tada tavad amisdam nir-badhaiva sarva-pathinata,’ etc. Khandana-khanda- khadya, pp. 229-230, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914. 2 By the idealistic Buddhists Srihars2 here means the idealism of the Lankdavatara, from which he quotes the following verse: buddhya vivicyamananam svabhavo navadharyate ato nirabhilapyas te nissvabhdavas ca desitah. Lankavatara-siitra, p. 287, Otani University Press, 1923. 128 The Satkara School of Vedanta [cH. of it are indefinable. So the Vedantist can say that the unreality of the world is proved. It is useless for any one to attempt to find out what is true by resorting to arguments; for the arguments can be proved to be false even by the canons on which they are based. If anyone, however, says that the arguments of Sriharsa are open to the same objection and are not true, then that would only establish his own contention. For Sriharsa does not believe in the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any assumption ‘of their reality or unreality. It can be contended that it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality of the arguments. But such reality cannot be established without first employing the pramdnas or valid means of proof; and the employment of the pramdnas would require further arguments, and these further employment of the pramdanas and so on until we have vicious infinite regress. If, however, the very arguments employed in accordance with the canons of the opponents to destroy their definitions be regarded as false, this would mean that the opponents reject their own canons, so that the Vedantic argu- ments in refuting their position would be effective. The Vedanta is here interested only in destroying the definitions and positions of the opponents; and so, unless the opponents are successful in defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedanta, the Vedanta point of view is not refuted. So the manifold world of our experience is indefinable, and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real. Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate oneness Sriharsa says that the very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists, since, if the idea were not realized, no one could think of asking fora proof of it. Now, if it is admitted that the idea of absolute oneness is realized (pratita), then the question arises whether such realization is right knowledge (prama) or error (aprama). If it is a right idea, then, whatever may have produced it, this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. If such an idea is false, one cannot legitimately ask the Vedantist to adduce any proofs to demonstrate what is false. It may be urged that, though the Naiyayika considers it false, it is regarded by the Vedantist as true and hence the Vedantist may be called upon to prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he came to have his idea was true. This, however, the Vedantist would readily deny ; for, even though the idea of the absolute oneness may xq] Vedanta Dialectic of Sriharsa 129 be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill; but yet, if one infers the existence of such a fire from fog appearing as smoke, then such an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedantist says that the Upanisadic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness of reality. The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upanisad texts, cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of “many.” For our perception deals with individual things of the moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past, present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the Upanisads. Again, as Sriharsa says, in our perception of the things of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects themselves. The self-revelation of knowledge also fails to show its difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature of the perceived objects themselves as svariipa-bheda, or difference as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced—if that were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way Sriharsa tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger, proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our pro- gressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one identical reality (as is asserted in the Upanisads). If perception cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upanisads. In _our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always im- pressed with the concept of difference; but Sriharsa says that the DII 9 130 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things. Again, the concept of “‘difference”’ can hardly be defined.