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The objector’s argu- ment that, since things pass by the same name, they must be persistent is invalid; for it is well known that even in ordinary per- ception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment, and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 185 the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as momentary. (h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities. It is objected by the Naiyayikas and others that, if things are momentary, then the theory of karma would fail; for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits reaped by another? How, again, can it be understood that a momen- tary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. How, again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Santaraksita and Kamalasila say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious agent; the formula (dharma-samketa) for all production is, ‘this happening, that happens”; ‘‘this being produced, that is pro- duced.” It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage, and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. To this the reply of Santaraksita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal 186 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production}. The view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (saha- bhiitam karyam) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce the effect before it is itself produced ; again, it cannot produce after it is itself produced ; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the cause; but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (vyapara), as separate and distinct from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification of cause”. If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the effect, then that would require another opera- tion, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be ad- mitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that a thing is smelled after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. It must also be remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence as the definition of cause, but invariable and necessary ante- cedence*®. Again, no difficulty need be experienced in perception, if the objects are admitted to be momentary; for ideas may be considered to have forms akin to the objects, or to be formless, but revealing the objects. In either case the ideas are produced by their causes, and the momentariness or permanence of objects has nothing to do with their determination’. There are in reality no agent and no enjoyer, but only the series of passing mental pheno- mena. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding states by the previous ones. The objection of Uddyotakara, that, if the mind is momentary, it cannot be modified (vasana) by deeds (karma), is invalid; for, in the Buddhist view, this modification 1 The Vaibhasikas are spoken of by Santaraksita as holding the view that the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is. produced by the destroyed cause. * idam eva hi karyasya kadrandpeksa yat tad-anantara-bhavitvam. Tattva- samgraha, p. 177. na hi vayam Gnantarya-matram karya-karana-bhavadhigati-nibandhanam ee yasyaivanantaram yad bhavati tat tasya karanam isyate. Ibid. p. 180. a 4 Santaraksita and Kamalasila are Buddhists who style themselves nivakara- vynana-vadin. x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 187 (vasand@) means nothing more than the production of a new mental state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver who remembers and recognizes; it is only when ina particular series of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible. The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage means nothing more than the production of painful states due to ignorance (avidya@) and other mental causes, and that liberation also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge. (1) Refutation of the Nyaya Vaisesika Categories. Santaraksita and Kamalagila attempt to refute the categories of substance (dravya) with its subdivisions, quality (guna), action (karma), generality, or class concepts (saémdanya), specific pecu- liarities (visesa), relation of inherence (samavaya), and the conno- tation and denotation of words (Sabdartha). This refutation may briefly be set out here. Speaking against the eternity of atoms, they hold that, since no special excellence can be produced in eternal entities, no conditions or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature of the atoms; thus, the atoms being always the same in nature, all objects should be produced from them either at once, or not at all. The mere fact that no cause of atoms is known is no ground for thinking that they are causeless. Again, substance, as different from characters and qualities, is never perceived. The refutation of wholes (avayavi), which has already been effected, also goes against the acceptance of substantive wholes, and so the four substances. earth, water, air and fire, which are ordinarily re- garded as substantive—wholes made up of atoms—also stand refuted. Again, it is not easy to prove the existence of separate and independent time and space entities; for spatial and temporal determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due, like other facts of experience, to their specific causes. The Buddhists of course accept the existence of manas as an instrument separate from the sense-organs, but they do not admit its existence as an ‘eternal and single entity. The refutation of substances implies the refutation of gunas, 188 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. which are supposed to be dependent on substances. If the sub- stances do not exist, there can also be no relation of inherence, in which relation the gunas are supposed to exist in substances. ‘There is, again, no meaning in acknowledging colours, etc., as different from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. The per- ception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental modifications associated with particular cognitions. There is no reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities. In a similar manner Santaraksita and Kamalasila proceed with the refutation of the other Nydya qualities. Proceeding with the refutation of action (karma), they hold that, if all things are admitted to be momentary, then action cannot be attributed to them; for action, involving as it does successive separation of parts and association of contact-points, implies many moments for its execution. If things are admitted to be persistent or eternal, then also movement cannot be explained. If things are admitted to be always moving, then they will be in motion while they are perceived to be at rest, which is impossible. If things are at rest by nature, there cannot be any vibratory movement in them. The main principle involved in the refutation of gunas and karmas consists in the fact that the gunas and karmas are regarded by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data cognized. It is wrong, in their view, to analyse the sense-data as substances having qualities and motion as different categories in- hering in them. Whatever may be the substance, that is also the quality which is supposed to be inhering in it, as also the motion which it is supposed to execute.