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As this unity is effected between individual subjects (consciousness limited by specific antahkaranas) and individual objects (consciousness limited by specific avidya materials constituting the objects) through the vrfiz, it can result only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects?. This has been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of ajnana-veils, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one ajnana corresponding to the illumination of one object?. But this also is not an original contribution of Ramadvaya, since it was also propounded by his predecessor Anandajfiana in his Tarka- * See Pafica-padika-vivarana, p. 70, and Tattva-dipana, pp. 256-259, Benares, 1902. * etat pramatr-caitanyabhinnatayaiva abhivyaktam tad visaya-caitanyam na pramatr-antara-catianyabhedena abhivyaktam ato na sarvesam avabhadsyatvam. Pafica-padika-vivarana, p. 71. ° yavanti jndnani tavanti sva-tantrani para-tantrayi vd ajfianani tato na dosah. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 43. : x1] Ramdadvaya 211 samgraha and by others!. The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyaya holds, noris there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation) ; the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jfdtata), as Kumarila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (visayabhivyaktir nama vijhane tad-akarollekha- matram na bahir-anga-riipasya vijhanabhivyaptih), as is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the mind (antahkarana)*. Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each 1 The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajfidna-veils; as soon as there is the urtti-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illu- minated; the next moment there is again an ajvidna-veil covering the object, and again there is the urtti-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (vrtti-vyjnidnasya sdvayavatvdc ca hradsa-dasayam dipa-jvalaya iva tamo ’ntaram mohdntaram avaritum visayam pravartate tato bhangenaiva sva-karyam karoti, tathé sarvadny api atisaighryat tu jnana-bhedavad aGvaranantaram na laksyate. Veddanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of the Vedanta-kaumudi is different from the view of the Veddnta-paribhasa, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vrtti and not different urttis removing different ajfanas (kit ca siddhante dhara- vahika-buddhi-sthale na jfiana-bhedah kintu ydavad ghata-sphuranam tdvad ghatakarantahkarana-vrttir ekaiva na tu nana vrtteh sva-virodhi-urtty-utpatti- paryantam sthayitvabhyupagamat. Vedanta-paribhasa, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 1911). 2 atah savayava-sattvatmakam antahkaranam eva anudbhiita-riipa-sparsam adrsyam asprsyam ca visayakarena parinamate. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS, copy, p. 42. 14-2 212 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. dispelling an intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects ; perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time- moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of mo- mentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the present time!. According to Ramadvaya the definition of per- ception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object-as a separate datum of per- ception; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards it only as a mode of cognitive process. Ramadvaya’s definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Ramadvaya defines right knowledge (prama) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object (yatharthanubhavah prama), and he defines the instru- ment of right knowledge as that which leads to it”. Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, with whom the two conditions of pramd or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known (anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted*. ‘The latter condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from Ramadvaya’s definition; but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction (Dharmaraja Adhvarindra’s condition) and want of wrong repre- sentation (Ramadvaya’s condition) may mean the same thing, yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact 1 na kdlah pratyaksa-gocarah...stambhdadir eva prag-abhava-nivytti-pradhvam- sGnutpatti-riipo vartamanah tad-avacchinah kalo ’pi vartamanah sa ca tatha- vidho *neka-jfidna-sddhadrana eva, na caitdvata jnadna-yaugapadyapattih siiksma- kalapeksaya krama-sambhavai, na ca siksma-kdlopadhindm apratitih karya- kramenaiva unniyamanatvat. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 20-22. ? Ibid. p. 16. 8 tatra smrti-vydurttam pramaivam anadhigatabadhitartha-visaya-jhanatvam. Vedanta-paribhasa, p. 20. . xl] Rdamdadvaya 213 that the Vedanta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the modification of the antahkarana (which is its cognitive operation) on the object, a Vedanta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of the Vedanta rests content in the view that, however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness. The definition of prama by Ramadvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yathartha- nubhava) of objects could not be-found faulty because of the fact that according to the Vedanta all dual experience of the world was false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes it had a real existence, and Ramadvaya refers to the [sta-siddhi to justify his view on this point. As to the other point, viz. that a prama must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhigata), Ramadvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion!. He says that it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before, and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced. There is therefore no justification for introducing anadhigatatva as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference between perception and inference, Ramadvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the antahkarana with the inferred object (e.g. fire). In inference the antahkarana is in touch only with the reason or the /ifiga (e.g. smoke), and through this there arises (ingadi- bala-labdhakarollekha-matrena) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference”. 1 ajfiata-jndpanam pramanam iti tad asaram. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p.18: ede 2 Ibid. p. 47. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedantic view of inference occurs in the Prakatdadrtha-vivarana, to which the Vedanta-kaumudi is in all probability indebted. 214 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.