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On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah- pramanya) Ramadvaya does not, like Dharmarajadhvarindra, include the absence of defects (dosabhava) in the definition of svatah-pramanya. It may well be remembered that Dharmaraja Adhvarindra defines validity (pramanya) of knowledge as an aware- ness that characterizes an object as it is (tadvati tat-prakaraka- jranatvam), while self-validity (svatah-pramanya) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying saks7 consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective con- ditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects!. Ramadvaya, however, closely follows Kumiéarila’s view of the self-validity of knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which is derived from other sources*. Later knowledge of the presence of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition; but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumarila and already discussed’. In this connection Ramadvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and demerit, that they may be perceived by us‘. Vidyaranya (a.D. 1350). In addition to the Sarva-darsana-samgraha Madhava wrote two works on the Sankara Vedanta system, viz. Vivarana-prameya- samgraha and Paficadasi; and also Jivan-mukti-viveka. Of these the former is an independent study of Prakagatman’s Pafica-padika- vivarana, in which Madhava elaborates the latter’s arguments in his own way. His other work, Payicadasi, is a popular compendium in verse. Both these works attained great celebrity on account of , 1 dosabhave sati yavat-svasraya-grahaka-samagri-grahyatvam ; svdsrayo vrtti- jhanam, tad-grahakam sdksi-jfianam tendpi vrtti-jnane grhyamane tad-gata- pramanyam apt grhyate. Veddanta-paribhasa, pp. 336, 337. : * vynana-samagri-janyatve sati yat tad-anya-janyatvam tad-abhavasyaiva svatastvokty-angikarat. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 52. Jnaptavapt jnana-jnapaka-samagri-matra-jfapyatvam svatastvam. Ibid. p. 61. ° A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 372-375. * prakatyena yuktasyapi tasya na sarvair viditatvam sva-prakdsam api prakatyam kasyacid evadrsta-yogat sphurati na gunatve jndnasya kathancid artha-yogah samastiti. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 67, 68. x1] Vidyaranya 215 their clear and forcible style and diction. Vidyaranya is reputed to be the same as Madhava, brother of Sayana, the great Vedic commentator. He was a pupil of Sankarananda, who had written some works of minor importance on the Upanisads!. . Vidyaranya in his Paficadasi repeats the Vivarana view of the Vedanta, that, whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or in our dreamless condition, there is no moment when there is no consciousness; for even in dreamless sleep there must be some consciousness, as is evident from the later remembrance of the ex- perience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is thus itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind. It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. It is self- luminous and neither rises nor sets?. This self is pure bliss, because nothing is so much loved by us as our own selves. If the nature of self had been unobscured, we could not have found any enjoy- ment in sense-objects. It is only because the self is largely obscured to us that we do not rest content with self-realization and crave for other pleasures from sense-objects. Maya is the cause of this obscuration, and it is described as that power by which can be produced the manifold world-appearance. This power (Ssaktz), cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. It is, however, associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it, and it is only in association with a part of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and their modifications. All objects of the world are thus but a complex of Brahman and mayd@. The existence or being of all things is the Brahman, and all that appears identified with being is the maya part. Mayda as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of all qualities of things, their inter-relations and interactions?. He compares the world-appearance to a painting, where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman, the white paste for the inner controller (antaryamin), the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (sitratman) and the coloration for 1 Bharatitirtha and his teacher Vidyatirtha also were teachers of Vidyaranya. Vidyaranya thus seems to have had three teachers, Bharati Tirtha, Vidya Tirtha and Sankarananda. 2 nodeti nastamety eka samvid esa svayam-prabha. ‘Paticadasi, 1. '7, Basumati edition, Calcutta, 1907. 3 faktir asty aisvart kdcit sarva-vastu-niyamika. 38. ...cic-chayavesatah Sakti§ cetaneva vibhati sa. 40. Ibid, 111. 216 _ The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (virat), and all the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. It is Brahman that, being reflected through the maya, assumes the diverse forms and characters. The false appearance of individual selves is due to the false identification of subjectivity—a product of ma&ya—with the underlying pure consciousness—Brahman. Vidyaranya then goes on to describe the usual topics of the Vedanta, which have already been dealt with. The chief and important feature of Vidyaranya’s Paficadasi is the continual repetition of the well-established Vedantic prin- ciples in a clear, popular and attractive way, which is very helpful to those who wish to initiate their minds into the Vedantic ways of self-realization!. His Vivarana-prameya-samgraha is a more scholarly work; but, as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the ideas contained in Pafica-padika-vivarana, which has generally been followed as the main guide in the account of Vedanta given in this and the preceding chapter, and there being but few ideas which can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyaranya to the development of Vedantic thought, no separate account of its con- tents need be given here?. The fivan-mukti-viveka, the substance of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter x, volume I of the present work, is an ethical treatise, covering more or less the same ground as the Naiskarmya-siddhi of Sureégvara. Nrsimhasrama Muni (AD. 1500). Nrsimhasrama Muni (a.D. 1500) was a pupil of Girvanendra Sarasvati and Jagannathasrama and teacher of Narayanagrama, who wrote acommentary on his Bheda-dhikkara. He wrote many works, suchas Advaita-dipika, Advaita-panca-ratna, Advaita-bodha-dipika, Advaita-vada, Bheda-dhikkara, Vacarambhana, Vedanta-tattva- viveka, and commentaries on the Samksepa-sariraka and Pafica- 1 There are four commentaries on the Paficadasi :—Tativa-bodhini, Vriti- prabhakara by Niscaladasa Svamin, Tatparya-bodhini by Ramakrsna and another commentary by Sadananda. It is traditionally believed that the Pafica- dasi was written jointly by Vidyaranya and Bharati Tirtha. Nigcaladasa Svamin points out in his Vrtti-prabhakara that Vidyaranya was author of the first ten chapters of the Paficadasi and Bharati Tirtha of the other five. Ramakrsna, however, in the beginning of his commentary on the seventh chapter, attributes that chapter to Bharati Tirtha, and this fits in with the other tradition that the first six chapters were written by Vidyaranya and the other nine by Bhiratitirtha. ? He also wrote another work on the Vivarana, called Vivaranopanyasa, which is referred to by Appaya Diksita in his Siddhanta-lesa, p. 68—Vivaranopany ase Bharatitirtha-vacanam. xI] Nrsimhasrama Muni 217 padika-vivarana, called Tattva-bodhini and Pafica-padika-vivarana- prakasitka. Nrsimhasrama was very well reputed among his con- temporaries, but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas into the Vedanta. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and con- stitution of maya and the way in which it can be regarded as the material stuff of world-appearance. He defines the falsehood of world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it appears (pratipannopadhav abhava-pratiyogitva)'. When a piece of conch-shell appears to be silver, the silver appears to be existent and real (sat), but silver cannot be the same as being or existence (na tavad rajata-svariipam sat). So also, when we take the world- appearance as existent, the world-appearance cannot be identical with being or existence; its apparent identification with these is thus necessarily false”. So also the appearance of subjectivity or egoistic characters in the self-luminous self is false, because the two are entirely different and cannot be identified. Nrsimhagrama, however, cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience that subjectivity or egoism (ahamkara, which he also calls antah- karana or mind) is different from self, and he relies on the texts of the Upanisads to prove this point, which is of fundamental im- portance for the Vedanta thesis.