English
The whole course of the development of Vedanta doctrine in the hands of these Vedanta teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that, since the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained by the pure changeless Brahman, an indefinable stuff, the maya, has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world. Prakagananda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedanta from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (drsti). The central doctrine of Prakagananda has already been briefly described in chapter x, section 15, of volume I of the present work, and his analysis of the nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a preceding section of the present chapter. Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman, he says that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded as strictly correct; for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation of cause and effect; since there is nothing else but Brahman, it cannot, under the circumstances, be called a cause. Nescience (avidya), again, cannot be called a cause of the world ; for causality is based upon the false notion of duality, which is itself the out- come of nescience. The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside the scope of the Vedanta (karya-karana-vadasya vedanta-bahir- bhitatvat). When in reply to the question, ‘what is the cause of 222 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. the world?” it is said that nescience (ajfana—literally, want of knowledge) is the cause, the respondent simply wants to obviate the awkward silence. The nature of this nescience cannot, however, be proved by any of the pramanas; for it is like darkness and the pramanas or the valid ways of cognition are like light, and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light. Nescience is that which cannot be known except through something else, by its relation to something else, and it is inexplicable in itself, yet beginningless and positive. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it as it is in itself. Nescience is proved by one’s own consciousness : so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. Yet it is destroyed when the identity of the self with the immediately presented Brahman is realized. The destruction of nescience cannot mean its cessation together with its products, as Prakasatman holds in the Vivarana; for such a definition would not apply, whether taken simply or jointly. Prakasananda, therefore, defines it as the conviction, following the realization of the underlying ground, that the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist. This view is different from the anyatha-khyati view, that the sur- mised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which it was imposed; for here, when the underlying ground is imme- diately intuited, the false appearance absolutely vanishes, and it is felt that it was not there, it is not anywhere, and it will not be anywhere; and it is this conviction that is technically called badha. The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on which it appears (pratipannopadhau nisedha-pratiyogitvam). This negation of all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms; in one form it is negation and in another form this negation, being in- cluded within “‘all else except Brahman,” is itself an illusory imposition, and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and negated by its former form. Thus it would be wrong to argue that, since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman, it would not itself be negated, and hence it would be a dual principle existing side by side with Brahmant?. True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge in such a way 1 Brahmany adhyasyamdnam sarvam kdlatraye nastitiniscayasya asti riipadva- yam ekam badhatmakam aparam adhyasyamanatvam; tatra adhyas) amanatvena riipena sva-visayatvam; badhatvena visayitvam iti natmasraya ity arthah tatha ca nadvaita-ksatih. Compare also Bhamati on Adhyasa-bhasya. Nana Diksita seems to have borrowed his whole argument from the Bhamati. See his commentary on the Siddhanta-muktavali. The Pandit, 1890, p. 108. This idea, however, is not by any means a new contribution of Prakasananda. Thus Citsukha writes thesame thing in his Tattva-dipikd (also called Pratyak-tatt- x1] Prakdsananda 223 that, when the former dawns, the latter is dispelled altogether. An objection is sometimes raised that, if this be so, then the person who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily existence ; for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion must vanish when true knowledge dawns. And, if this is so, there will be no competent Vedanta teacher. To this Prakagananda replies that, even though the Vedanta teacher may be himself an illusory production, he may all the same lead any one to the true path, just as the Vedas, which are themselves but illusory products, may lead any one to the right path!. On the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (@nanda) he differs from Sarvajfiatma Muni’s view that what is meant by the statement that the self is of the nature of pure bliss is that there is entire absence of all sorrows or negation of bliss in the self. Bliss, according to Sarvajfiatma Muni, thus means the absence of the negation of bliss (an-dnanda-vyaurtti-matram aGnandatvam)?. He differs also from the view of Prakasatman that dnanda, or bliss, means the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object that we really desire. Prakasatman holds that it is the self on which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness. What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness, but that which is blissful. Prakasananda holds that this view is not correct, since the self appears not only as blissful, but also as pain- ful, and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as to call it painful. Moreover, not the object of blissfulness, which in itself is dissociated from blissfulness, is called blissful, but that which is endowed with bliss is called blissful (vsistasyaiva Gnanda- padarthatvat)*. If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self, it cannot be called blissful because it happens to be the ground on which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. So Prakasananda holds that the self is naturally of a blissful character. Prakasgananda raises the question regarding the beholder of the va-pradipika), p. 39, as follows: “‘sarvesam api bhavanam Gsrayatvena sammate pratiyogitvam atyantabhavam ‘prati mysatmata,” which is the same as prati- pannopadhau nisedha-pratiyogitvam. Compare also Veddnta-paribhasa, pp. 219 and 220, mithydtvam ca svasrayatvenabhimata-yavannisthatyantabhdva-prati - yogitvam. In later times Madhusiidana freely used this definition in his Advaita-siddhi. 2 kalpito ’pyupadesta syad yatha-sastram samadiset na cavinigamo doso ’vidyavattvena nirnayat. _ The Pandit, 1890, p. 160. 2 Samksepa-sariraka, \. 1. 174. 3 Siddhania-muktavali. The Pandit, 1890, p. 215. 224. The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. experienced duality and says that it is Brahman who has this experience of duality; but, though Brahman alone exists, yet there is no actual modification or transformation (parinama) of Brahman into all its experiences, since such a view would be open to the ob- jections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole of Brahman or a part of it, and both of them would land us in impossible consequences. The vivarta view holds that the effect has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. So vivarta really means oneness with the substance, and it virtually denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one sub- stance. The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman, which is absolutely characterless (nisprakarikayah saprakarakatvena bhavah). Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is nothing else but this self, there is no meaning in saying that the Vedanta admits the vivarta view of causation; for, strictly speaking, there is no causation at all (vivartasya bala-vyutpatti-prayojana- taya)!. If anything existed apart from self, then the Vedantic monism would be disturbed. If one looks at ma@ya in accordance with the texts of the Vedas, maya will appear to be an absolutely fictitious non-entity (tuccha), like the hare’s horn; if an attempt is made to interpret it logically, it is indefinable (anirvacaniya), though common people would always think of it as being real (vastavi)?. Prakagananda thus preaches the extreme view of the Vedanta, that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed to the world, that maya is absolutely non-existent, that our ideas have no objective substratum to which they correspond, that the self is the one and only ultimate reality, and that there is no causation or creation of the world. In this view he has often to fight with Sarvajiiatma Muni, Prakagatman, and with others who developed a more realistic conception of maya transformation ; but it was he who, developing probably on the lines of Mandana, tried for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedanta from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. In the colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedanta as t balan prati vivarto ’yam brahmanah sakalam jagat avivarititam Gnandam Gsthitah krtinah sada. The Pandit, 1890, p. 326. _ tucchanirvacaniya ca vastavi cety asau tridha jneya maya tribhir bodhaih srauta-yauktika-laukikaih. Ibid. p. 420.