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x1] Mandana 93 from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object and its differences, then it has to be admitted that “difference” is presented in perception ; but, if it can be proved that only positive objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any pre- sentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case the verdict of the Upanisads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now follows the argument. Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects, e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated, and both these are positive in their notion. The negation of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be inter- preted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied), or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can be imagined only as a mental idea’. If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two?. In the case of the discovery of one’s own illusion, such as ‘‘this is not silver, but conch-shell,” only the latter knowledge is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was 1 kutascin nimittad buddhau labdha-riipanam bahir nisedhah kriyate. Brahma-siddhi, 11. = kramah samgacchate yuktya naika-vijnana-karmanoh : na sannihita-jam tac ca tadanyamarsi jayate. Ibid. 11. Karikd 3. 94 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. only when the presented object was perceived as “‘this before” that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch- shell. There is no negative concept without there first being a positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept'. This is therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences?. Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions, yet, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition, it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also have its difference from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anya- vyavacchedah)?. Against such a view Mandana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time; but, if the very perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and, since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities. There is again a view that things are by their very nature different from one another (prakrtyaiva bhinna bhavah), and thus, when by perception an object is experienced, its difference from other objects is also grasped by that very act. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences; firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference, and hence there would be no difference among them; secondly, as 1 piirva-vijfidna-vihite rajatadau “‘idam”? iti ca sannihitartha-samanye nisedho vidhi-piirva eva, suktikd-siddhis tu virodhi-nisedha-purva ucyate; vidhi-pirvata ca myamena nisedhasyocyate, na vidher nisedha-pirvakata nisidhyate. Brahma- siddhi, 11. Karika 3. 2 na ca tatra eka-jnanasya kramavad-vyaparata ubhaya-ripasya utpatteh. Ibid. 3 nilasya nirvikalpaka-darsanasya yat samarthyam niyataika-kdranatvam tena anddi-vasana-vasat pratibhasitam janitam idam nedam iti vikalpo bhavabha- va-vyavahdram pravartayati...satyam jnadna-dvayam idam savikalpakam tu nirvikalpakam tayor mila-bhitam tat pratyaksam tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anya- vyavaccheda iti briima iti. Sankhapani’s commentary, ibid. x1] Mandana 95 “difference” has no form, the objects themselves would be formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation ; fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept, no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many}. In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (parapeksam vastuno bheda-svabhavah natmapeksam), but not in relation to itself. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things which have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence; all relationing is mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things, and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things?. If relationing with other things constituted their essence, then each thing would depend on others—they would depend on one another for their existence (ctaretarasraya-prasangat). In reply to this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition; but, if this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes; for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed. In reply to this it is urged by the objector that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. Mandana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function of this oppositional relation (apeksa); for it does not produce the object, which is produced by its own causes, and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated with the other objects (nanapeksa-pratiyoginam bhedah pratiyate). Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation; it is only when there is an oppositional re- lation between objects already experienced that difference manifests is na bhedo vastuno ripam tad-abhava-prasangatah ariipena ca bhinnatvam vastuno navakalpate. Brahma-siddhi, 11. 5. 2 napeksa nama kascid vastu-dharmo yena vastunit vyavasthapyeran, na khalu sva-hetu-prapitodayesu sva-bhava-vyavasthitesu vastusu sva-bhdva-sthitaye vastv- antarapeksa yujyate. Ibid. 11. 6, vrtti. 96 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds of those who perceive and conceive}. But it is further objected to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive. To this Mandana’s reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion of production ; that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence. In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions, then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But Mandana’s reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in name; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedanta view it is held that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object, the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them is not valid. Again, the difficulty in the case of the Buddhist is in its own way none the less; for according to him all appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain the similarities of effects that we notice?