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1923, mentions this point as well as the point concerning avidya-niurtti in Mandana’s view as admission of negation. 86 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. person. But, if Vidyaranya, who knows so much about the views of Mandana, had identified them in the Sankara-dig-vijaya, that might lead one to pause. Now Mr Hiriyanna seems to have removed this difficulty for us by his short note in 7.R.A.S. 1924, where he points out that Vidyaranya in his Varttika-sara refers to the author of the Brahma-siddhi as a different authority from the author of the Varttika, viz. Suresvara. Now, if Vidyaranya, the author of the V arttika-sara, knew that Mandana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suregvara, he could not have identified them in his Sankara-dig-vijaya. This naturally leads one to suspect that the Vidyaranya who was the author of the Vzvarana-prameya- samgraha and the Va@rttika-sara was not the same Vidyaranya as the author of Sankara-dig-vijaya. Another consideration also leads one to think that Vidyaranya (the author of the Vivarana- prameya-samgraha) could not have written the Sankara-dig-vijaya. Anandatman had two disciples, Anubhavananda and Sankara- nanda. Anubhavananda had as his disciple Amalananda, and Sankarananda had Vidyaranya as his disciple. So Amalananda may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyaranya. Now Amalananda had another teacher in Sukhaprakasga, who had Citsukha as his teacher. Thus Citsukha may be taken to be a contemporary of the grand teacher ( parama-guru), Anandatman, of Vidyaranya. If this was the case, he could not have written in his Sankara-dig-vijaya (x1ir. 5) that Citsukha, who lived several centuries after Padmapada, was a disciple of Padmapada. It may therefore be safely asserted that the author of the Sankara-dig-vijaya was not the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. Now, if this is so, our reliance on the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha cannot be considered to be risky and unsafe. But on p. 92 of the Vivarana-prameya- samgraha a passage from the Varttika of Suresvara (Iv. 8) is attributed to Visvaripa Acarya. It may therefore be concluded that Mandana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suregvara, unless we suppose that Mandana was not only a Mimamsa writer, but also a Vedanta writer of great repute and that his conversion by Sankara meant only that he changed some of his Vedantic views and accepted those of Sankara, and it was at this stage that he was called Suresvara. On this theory his Brahma-siddhi was probably written before his conversion to Sankara’s views. It seems likely that this theory may be correct, and that the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the x1] Mandana 87 Brahma-siddhi; for the passage of the Brahma-siddhi quoted by Vacaspati in his Nyaya-kanika is quoted in a manner which suggests that in all probability the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the Brahma-siddhi. It may also be concluded that in all probability Visvariipa was the same person as Sureévara, though on this subject no references of value are known to the present writer other than by the author of the Vivarana-prameya- samgraha. Mandana (aD. 800). Mandana Misra’s Brahma-siddhi with the commentary of San- khapani is available in manuscript, and Mahamahopadhyaya Kup- pusvami Sastri of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahama- hopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri the present writer had an oppor- tunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Sankhapani’s commentary!. The Brahma-siddhi is in four chapters, Brahma-kanda, Tarka-kanda, Niyoga-kanda, and Siddhi- kanda, in the form of verses (kartka) and long annotations (zrtti). That Mandana must have been a contemporary of Sankara is evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who flourished before Sankara, such as Sabara, Kumiarila or Vyasa, the author of the Yoga-sitra-bhasya, and makes profuse references to the Upanisad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished after Sankara?. Vacaspati also wrote a commentary, called Tattva- samiksa, on Mandana’s Brahma-siddhi; but unfortunately this text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been 1 Citsukha, the pupil of Jaanottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called Abhipraya-prakasika, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the beginning, is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. No. 3853. Anandapiirna also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siddhi, called Bhava-suddhi. 2 Mandana’s other works are Bhavanda-viveka, Vidhi-viveka, Vibhrama-viveka and Sphota-siddhi. Of these the Vidhi-viveka was commented upon by Vacaspati Misra in his Nydya-kanikd, and the Sphota-siddhi was commented upon by the son of Bhavadasa, who had also written a commentary, called Tattva-vibhavana, on Vacaspati Misra’s Tattva-bindu. ‘The commentary on the Sphota-siddhi is called Gopalika. Mandana’s Vibhrama-viveka is a small work devoted to the dis- cussion of the four theories of illusion (khyatz), dtma-khyGtt, asat-khyati, anyatha- khyati and akhyati. Up till now only his Bhavand-viveka and Vidhi-viveka have been published. 88 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. discovered. In the Brahma-kanda chapter Mandana discusses the nature of Brahman; in the Tarka-kanda he tries to prove that we cannot perceive “‘difference” through perception and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upanisad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference. In the third chapter, the Niyoga-kanda, he tries to refute the Mimamsa view that the Upanisad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mimamsa principle of interpretation, that all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This is by far the longest chapter of the book. The fourth chapter, the Siddhi-kanda, is the shortest: Mandana says here that the Upanisad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the avidya of jiva. In the Brahma-kanda the most important Vedantic concepts are explained by Mandana according to his own view. He first introduces the problem of the subject (drastr) and the object (drsya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained. For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject, then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality!. Proceeding further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been made to bring about this subject-object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (antahkarana); but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure un- changeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects; if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the antahkarana, then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there is only an appearance of perception. If objects are not perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate 1 ekatva evayam drastr-drsya-bhavo ’vakalpate, drastur eva cid-dtmanah tatha tatha viparinamad vivartanad va; nadnatve tu vivikta-svabhadvayor asamsrsta- paraspara-svariipayor asambaddhayoh kidrso drastr-drsya-bhavah. Kuppusvami Sastri’s edition of Brahma-siddhi, p.'7. (In the press.) x1] Mandana 89 and independent existence from the self!. Just as the very same man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (cit); for in that case it would be impossible to relate the two?. According to Mandana avidydis called maya, or false appearance, because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhava) of Brahman nor different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called avidya; if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience (na vyavahara-bijam) such as avidyad has; it has thus to be admitted that avidyd is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacaniya)?. According to Mandana avidyd belongs to the individual souls (jiva). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view; but he thinks that, avidya being itself an inconsistent category, there is no wonder that its relation with jiva should also be incon- 1 ekantahkarana-samkrantdv asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, citeh suddhatvad aparinamdad aprati-samkramac ca; drsya buddhih citi-sannidhes chayaya vivartata iti ced atha keyam tac chayata? a-tad-aGtmanah tad-avabhasah; na tarhi paramarthato drsyam drsyate, paramarthatas ca drsyamanam drastr-vyatiriktam asti iti dur- bhanam. Ibid.