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Sankhapani in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the antahkarana or durbhanam and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified: na tu sphatikopame cetast indriya-prandli-samkrantanam arthanam tatraiva samkrantena atma-caitanyena sambaddhanam tad-drsyatvam ghatisyate. Adyar MS. p. 75. It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapada, Prakasdtman, as developed later on by Dharmarajadhvarindra, which held that the mind (antahkarana) becomes superimposed onexternal objects in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Samkhya doctrine of cic-chayapatti in perception, which was somehow forced into Sankara’s loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. The fact that Mandana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of Sankara and may, on the other hand, be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary inter- pretation of Padmapada. But probably the reply of that school would be that, though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (czt). 2 tatha hi darpana-tala-stham Gtmanam vibhaktam tvatmanah pratyeti; cites tu vibhaktam asamsrstam taya cetyata iti dur-avagamyam. Ibid. ie 3 Jbid. p.9. It may not be out of place here to point out that Anandabodha’s argument in his Nydya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyd, - which has been treated in a later section of this chapter, is based on this argument of Mandana. go The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. sistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of avidya with the jivas arises as follows: the jivas are essentially identical with Brahman, and the diversity of jivas is due to imagination (kalpana) ; but this imagination cannot be of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (tasya vidyatmanah kal- pana-sinyatvat) ; it cannot be the imagination of the jivas, since the jivas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination*. Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly, that the word maya implies what is inconsistent; had it been a consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not maya*. Secondly, it may be said that from avidya come the jivas and from the jivas comes the avidya, and that this cycle is begin- ningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the jivas or of the avidya?. This view is held by those who think that avidya@ is not the material cause of the world: these are technically called avidyopadana-bheda-vadins. It is through this avidya that the jivas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this avidyd is natural to the jivas, since the jivas themselves are the products of avidya*. And it is through listening to the Vedantic texts, right thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the avidya@ is destroyed; it was through this avidya that the jivas were separated from Brahman; with its destruction they attain Brahma- hood?®. In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Sankhapani the commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative condition®. He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously e itaretarasraya prasangat kalpanadhino hi jiva vibhagah, jivasraya kalpana. Ibid. p. ro. anupapadyamanarthaiva hi maya; upapadyamanarthatve vathartha-bhavan na maya syat. Ibid. 3 anaditvan netaretarasrayatua- -dosah. Ibid. * nahi jivesu nisarga-ja vidyasti, avidyaiva hi naisargiki, agantukya vidyadyah pravilayah. Ibid. pp. 11-12. ° avidyayaiva tu brahmano jivo vibhaktah, tan-nivrttau brahma-svariipam eva bhavati, yatha ghatadi-bhede tad-akasam parisuddham paramakasam eva bhavati. Ibid. § duhkha nivrttir va tad-visistatmopalabdhir vd sukham astu, sarvatha sukham nama na dharmantaram asti. Adyar MS, of the Sankhapani commentary, p. 18. 2 x1] Mandana gi and not as negation of each other. A man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simul- taneously (sukha-duhkhe yugapaj janyete). Again, according to the scriptures there 1s unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g. in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure}. Sankhapani then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (visaya- praptim vind kama eva duhkham atah tan-nivrttir eva sukham bhavigyatt) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them?. An objection to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural, but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential condition’. Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to these objections Sankhapani points out that, even if a thing is much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of enjoying the pleasurable experience; for the desires are not wholly extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain. So it is to be admitted that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its existence even before the desires are sublated*+. If negation of desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food through bilious attacks is to be called happiness®. So it is to be admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an 1 Ibid. pp. 20, 21. * Ibid. p. 22. : , 3 sahajo hi ragah sarva-pumsam asti sa tu visaya-visesena avir-bhavati. Ibid. p- 23. 4 atah kama-nivrtteh prag-bhavi sukhu-vastu-bhitam estavyam. Ibid. p. 27. 5 Tbid. p. 25. 92 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedantic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss?. Sankara in his commentary on the Brahma-sitra and in his commentaries on some of the Upanisads and the Mandikya- karika had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians, Sriharsa, Anandajfiana and Citsukha, of the Sankara school, are well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. But among the disciples of Sankara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of the Sankaraschool, Anandabodha, Sriharsa, Anandajfiana, Citsukha, Nrsimhasrama and others, was Mandana. Mandana’s great dia- lectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of difference (bheda) in the Tarka-kanda chapter of his Brahma-siddht. The argument arose as follows: the category of difference (bheda) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upanisad texts should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of “difference.” Against such a view-point Mandana undertakes to prove that ‘difference,’ whether as a quality or character- istic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception (pratyaksa)?. He starts by saying that perception yields three possible alternatives, viz. (1) that it manifests a positive object, (2) that it presents differences from other objects, (3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects’. In the third alternative there may again be three other alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from others, (ii) first the pre- sentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference, (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object*. If by perception differences 1 yadi duhkha-bhavah sukham syat tatah syad evam bhavantare tu sukhe duhkhabhave ca tatha syad eva. Ibid. p. 161. * This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to the end of the second chapter. 8 tatra pratyakse trayah kalpah, vastu-svariipa-siddhih vastv-antarasya vya- vacchedah ubhayam va. Brahma-siddhi, i. ' * ubhayasminn api traividhyam, yaugapadyam, vyavaccheda-pirvako vidhih, vidhi-piirvako vyavacchedah. Ibid.