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It can be according to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes ; so, if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedantist may also in his turn explain all appearances of diversity through illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of difference in experience*. Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes. But this objection is not valid, because even the self-same thing can serve diverse purposes ; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no objection to there being a number of limited (avacchinna) qualities 1 pauruseyim apeksam na vasiv anuvartate, ato na vastu-svabhavah. Ibid. 2 atha nir-anvaya-vindsanam api kalpana-visayad abhedat karyasya tulyata hanta tarhi bhedad eva kalpand-visayat karyabheda-siddher miidha karana- bheda-kalpana. Ibid. x1] Mandana 97 or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that things are different from one another because of their divergent powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is produced from milk and not from sesamum); but divergence of powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. It is a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such a special efficiency (saémarthyatisaya) that it can be the basis of innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent appearances. Again, it is held by some that “‘difference” consists in the negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of all things in all places would make them empty. If, however, specific negations are implied with reference to determinate entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these implied negations can operate only when there are these different — entities, they depend mutually upon one another (itaretarasraya) and cannot therefore hold their own. Again, it cannot be said that the notion of ‘‘ difference” arises out of the operation of perceptual processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination of the perceptual process); for there is no proof whatsoever that ‘difference,’ as apart from- mutual negation, can be definitely experienced. Again, if unity of all things as “existents” (sat) was not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms itself into various notions of difference. In this connection Mandana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also 1 pratyekam anubiddhatvad abhedena mrsa matah bhedo yatha taranganam bhedad bhedah kalavatah. Brahma-siddhi, 11. Karika 31. DII 7 98 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways. But it is not necessary to enter into these details. The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this, that he shows that it is inconceivable and dia- lectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception’. In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi, called the Nzyoga- kanda, Mandana refutes the Mimamsa view that the Vedantic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mimamsa canon of interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth chapter, called the Siddhi-kanda, Mandana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upanisad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its mani- festation is due to the ignorance (avidyd) of the individual souls (jiva). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upanisad texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by ordinary experience, that the Upanisads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained. ‘ SureSvara (A.D. 800). Suresvara’s chief works are the Naiskarmya-siddhi and Brhad- aranyakopamsad-bhasya-varttika. The Naiskarmya-siddhi has at least five commentaries, such as the Bhdva-tattva-prakasika by Citsukha, which is based on Jhanottama’s Candrika. This Candrika is thus the earliest commentary on the Naiskarmya-siddhi. It is difficult to determine Jianottama’s date. In the concluding verses of this commentary the two names Satyabodha and Jfianottama occur; and Mr Hiriyanna points out in his introduction to the Naiskarmya- siddhi that these two names also occur in the Sarvajfia-pitha of Con- jeeveram, to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil, - ekasyaivastu mahima yan naneva prakasate laghavan na tu bhinnanam yac cakasaty abhinnavat. Brahma-siddhi, 11. Kariké 32. x1] Suresvara 99 and according to the list of teachers of that Matha Jfianottama was the fourth from Sankara. This would place Jéanottama at a very early date; if, however, the concluding verses are not his, but in- serted by someone else, then of course they give no clue to his date except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha, since Citsukha’s commentary was based on Jiianottama’s commentary Candrika. Another commentary is the Vidyd-surabhi of Jiianamrta, the pupil of Uttamamrta; another is the Naiskarmya-siddhi- vivarana of Akhilatman, pupil of Dagarathapriya; and there is also another commentary, called Sarartha, by Ramadatta, which is of comparatively recent date. Suresvara’s Naiskarmya-siddhi is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with discussions regarding the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of Vedantic wisdom. Avidya is here defined as the non-perception in one’s experience of the ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place, and it is the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation (tan- naso muktir atmanah). The Mimamsists think that, if one ceases to perform actions due to desire (ka@mya-karma) and prohibited actions, then the actions which have already accumulated will naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits, and so, since the obligatory duties do not produce any new karma, and since no other new karmas accumulate, the person will naturally be emanci- pated from karma. There is, however, in the Vedas no injunction in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. So one should attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties alone. As against this Mimamsa view Suresvara maintains that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote bearing, in the way of purifying one’s mind, but it has certainly no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. Suresvara states a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the Vidyd-surabhi commentary, that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the identity of oneself with Brahman, as propounded in Vedanta texts, but through long and continuous meditation on the same. So the right apprehension of the Upanisadic passages on the identity of the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce salvation; one has to continue to meditate for a long time on such ideas of identity; and all the time one has to perform all one’s obligatory duties, since, if one ceased to perform them, this 7-2 100 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. would beatransgression of one’s duties and would naturally produce sins, and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation. So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties ( jfiana-karma-samuccaya), which is vehemently opposed by Sankara. Another view which occurs also in the Varttika, and is there referred to by the commentator Anandajfiana as being that of Mandana, is that, as the knowledge derived from the Vedantic texts is verbal and conceptual, it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge, but, when these texts are continually repeated, they produce a knowledge of Brahman as a mysterious effect by just the same kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial or other Vedic duties. The Varttika refers to various schools among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and of duties (jfdna-karma-samuccaya), some regarding jridna as being the more important, others regarding karma as more im- portant, and still others regarding them both as being equally important, thus giving rise to three different schools of j#ana- karma-samuccaya.