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Suresvara tries to refute all these views by saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the same thing, and that it does not in the least require the per- formance of any kind of Vedic duties. Suresgvara also refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of karma and jnana on the view of those modified dualists, like Bhartrprapafica, who thought that reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences was as true as that of unity, and that, therefore, duties have to be performed even in the emancipated state, because, the differences being also real, the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any stage of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity. Suregvara’s refutation of this view is based upon two considera- tions, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies experience of duality and difference!. The second chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi is devoted to the exposition of the- nature of self-realization, as won through the proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upanisads by a 1 See also Prof. Hiriyanna’s introduction to his edition of the Naiskarmya-siddhi. XI] Suresvara 101 proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the dis- tracting effects of the antahkarana. When true knowledge dawns, the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes. All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of ajfiana on the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unper- turbed unity of this pure self. It is the antahkarana, or the intellect, that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same. Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects is not a substantive entity like the prakrti of the Samkhya; for its appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world- appearance is only a product of nescience (ajfidna) or false and indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real substance as the Samkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell as soon as truth is realized. In the third chapter Suresvara discusses the nature of ajfana, its relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself a product of ajfana (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded as its support or object; so the ajfiana has for its support and object the pure self or Brahman; the ignorance of the self is also in regard to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is possible—the entire field of objective appearance being regarded as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that according to Suregvara, unlike Vacaspati Misra and Mandana, the avidya is based not upon individual persons (iva), but upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This ajnana, as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is ex- perienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to 102 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. see that this view of the relation of ajidana to pure intelligence is different from the idealism preached by Mandana, as noticed in the previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much an extraneous product of ajfdana as the so-called external objects, then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To this Suregvara replies that, when the antahkarana or mind is trans- formed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (ahamkara) is produced to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres, and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The category of the ego, being immediately and intimately related to the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objec- tivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the pure intelligence is reflected through the ajfana product of the category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it, and all that is associated with it is experienced as the ‘‘this,”’ the object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed in the realization of Brahman, when Vedantic texts of unity are realized. In the third chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi the central ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the Varttika Suregvara discusses the very same problems in a much more elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to enter into these details. PadmapAada (a.D. 820). Padmapada is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Sankaracarya, and, since the manner of his own salutation to Sankaracarya confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Sankaracarya. There are many tradi- tional stories about him and his relations with Sankaracarya; but, since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are attributed to him, viz. the Pafica-padika, which is a commentary on x1] Padmapdada 103 Sankara’s commentary on the first four sittras of the Brahma-siitra and Sankara’s introduction to his commentary knownas the adhyasa and the sambhavana-bhasya, and the Atma-bodha-vyakhyana, called also Vedanta-sara. This Pafica-padika is one of the most important of the Vedanta works known to us. It was commented on by Prakasatman (A.D. 1200) in his Pafica-padika-vivarana'. The Pafica- padika-vivarana was further commented on by Akhandananda (A.D. 1350), a pupil of Anandagiri, in his Tattva-dipana. Ananda- purna (A.D. 1600), who wrote his Vidya-sagari commentary on Sriharsa’s Khandana-khanda-khadya and also a commentary on the Maha-vidya-vidambana, wrote a commentary on the Pafica-padika*. Nrsimhagrama also wrote a commentary on the Pafica-padika- vivarana, called the Pafica-padika-vivarana-prakasika, and Srikrsna also wrote one on the Pafica-padika-vivarana. Aufrecht refers to another commentary by Amalananda as Pafica-padika-sastra-dar- pana; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Sastra-darpana, which is noticed below. Amalinanda was a follower of the Vacaspati line and not of the line of Padmapada and Prakagatman. Ramananda Sarasvati, a pupil of Govindananda, the author of the Ratna-prabha commentary on the Sdankara-bhasya, wrote his Vivaranopanyasa (a summary of the main theses of the Vivarana) as a commentary on Sankara’s Bhasya; but this was strictly on the lines of the Pafica-padika-vivarana, though it was not a direct commentary thereon. Vidyaranya also wrote a separate monograph, called Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, in which he interpreted the Vedantic doctrines on the lines of the Pafica-padika-vivarana. Of all these the Vivaranopanydasa of Ramananda Sarasvati was probably the last important work on the Vivarana line; for Ramananda’s teacher Govindananda, the pupil of Gopala Sarasvati and the pupil’s pupil of Sivarama, refers in his Ratna-prabha commentary to Jagannathasrama’s commentary on the Sankara-bhasya, called the Bhasya-dipika, and also to Anandagiri’s commentary as “‘orddhah,” p. 5 (Nirnaya-Sagara Press, 1904). Jagannatha was the teacher of Nrsimhasrama; Govindananda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Ramananda may 1 Prakagatman also wrote a metrical summary of Sankara’s Bhdsya and a work called Sabda-nirnaya, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testi- mony as valid cognition. 2 As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahda-vidya-vidambana, it seems that Anandapirna lived after Sankara Misra (A.D. 1529), as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Khandana-khanda-khadya, p. 586 (Chowkhamba). 104 The Sankara School of Vedanta (cH. therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. Govindananda himself also in his Ratna-prabha commentary followed the Vivarana line of interpretation, and he refers to Prakagatman with great respect as Prakasatma-sri-caranath (Ratna- prabha, p. 3). Padmapada’s method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakas- Atman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedanta.