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A History of Indian Philosophy - Surendranath Dasgupta, 1922

English

But the Sankara-dig-vijaya is a mythical biography, and it is certainly very risky to believe any of its statements, unless corroborated by other reliable evidences. There is little doubt that Suresvara was 1 Some of these commentaries are: Brahma-siitra-bhasyartha-samgraha by Brahmananda Yati, pupil of Visvesvarananda, Brahma-sitrartha-dipika by Venkata, son of Gauri and Siva, Brahma-siitra-vrtti (called also Mitaksara) by Annam Bhatta, and Brahma-sitra-bhdsya-vyakhya (called also Vidya-sri) by Jianottama Bhattaraka, pupil of Jianaghana. The peculiarity of this last work is that it is the only commentary on the eka-jiva-vdda line that the present writer could trace. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned, such as Brahma-siitra-vrtti by Dharma Bhatta, pupil of Ramacandrarya and pupil’s pupil of Mukundasrama, Satra-bhasya-vyakhyana (calied also Brahma- vidya-bharana) by Advaitananda, pupil of Ramananda and pupil’s pupil of Brahmananda, Brahma-sitra-bhasya-vyakhyd (called also Nyaya-raksa-mani) by Appaya Diksita, Brahma-tattva-prakasikad (which is different from an earlier treatise called Brahma-prakastka) by Sadagivendra Sarasvati, Brahma-sitro- panydsa by Ramesvara Bharati, by a pupil of Ramananda, Sariraka-mimamsa- siitra-stddhanta-kaumudi by Subrahmanya Agnicin Makhindra, Veddanta-kaustu- bha by Sitarama; none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century. But Ananyanubhava, the teacher of Prakagatman (A.D. 1200), seems to have written another commentary, called Sdriraka-nydya-manimala. Prakasgatman himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Sankara’s Bhasya called Sarivaka-mimamsda-nyaya-samgraha, and Krsnanubhiti, in much later times, wrote a similar metrical summary, called Sariraka-mimamsd-samgraha. xt] Mandana, Suresvara and Visvariipa 83 the author of a Varttika, or commentary in verse, on Sankara’s Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad (which was also summarized by Vidya- ranya in a work called Varttika-sara, which latter was further commented on by Mahesvara Tirtha in his commentary, called the Laghu-samgraha). The Varttika of Suresvara was commented on by at least two commentators, Anandagiri in his Sdastra-prakasika and Anandapiirna in his Nydya-kalpa-latika. In a commentary on the Parasara-smrti published in the Bib. Ind. series (p. 51) a quotation from this V4Grttika is attributed to Vigvariipa; but this commentary is a late work, and in all probability it relied on Vidyaranya’s testimony that Visvariipa and Suresvara were identi- cally the same person. Vidyaranya also, in his Vivarana-prameya- samgraha, p. 92, quotes a passage from Suresvara’s Varttika (iv. 8), attributing it to Visvartipa. But in another passage of the Vivarana- pramey-samgraha (p. 224) he refers to a Vedanta doctrine, attri- buting it to the author of the Brahma-siddhi. But the work has not yet been published, and its manuscripts are very scarce: the pre- sent writer had the good fortune to obtain one. A fairly detailed examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in a separate section. The Brahma-siddhi is an important work, and it- was commented on by Vacaspati in his Tattva-samiksa, by Anandapirna in his Brahma-siddhi-vyakhya-ratna, by Sankhapani in his Brahma-siddhi-tika, and by Citsukha in his Abhipraya- prakasika. But only the latter two works are available in manu- scripts. Many important works however refer to the Brahma-siddhi and its views generally as coming from the author of Brahma-siddhi (Brahma-siddhi-kara). But in none of these references, so far as it is known to the present writer, has the author of Brahma-siddhi been referred to as Suregvara. The Brahma-siddhi was written in verse and prose, since two quotations from it in Citsukha’s Tattva- pradipika (p. 381, Nirnaya-Sagara Press) and Nyaya-kanika (p. 80) are in verse, while there are other references, such as Tattva- pradipika (p. 140) and elsewhere, which are in prose. There is, however, little doubt that the Brahma-siddhi was written by Mandana or Mandana Miéra; for both Sridhara in his Nydya- kandali (p. 218) and Citsukha in his Tattva-pradipika (p. 140) refer to Mandana as the author of the Brahma-siddhi. Of these the evi- dence of Sridhara, who belonged to the middle of the tenth century, ought to be considered very reliable, as he lived within a hundred years of the death of Mandana; whoever Mandana may have been, 6-2 84 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. since he lived after Sankara (a.D. 820), he could not have flourished very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century. It is, therefore, definitely known that the Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Varttika were written by Suregvara, and the Brahma-siddm by Mandana. The question regarding the identity of these two persons may be settled, if the views or opinions of the Brahma-siddhi can be compared or contrasted with the views of the Naiskarmya- siddhi or the Varttika. From the few quotations that can be traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to it it is possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions!. Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the Brahma-siddhi in the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha (p.224). Itis said there that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi it is the individual persons (jivah, in the plural) who by their own individual ignorance (svavidyaya) create for themselves on the changeless Brahman the false world-appearance. Neither in itself, nor with the maya, or as reflection in maya, is Brahman the cause of the world (Brahma na jagat-karanam). The appearances then are but creations of individual ignorance, and individual false ex- periences of the world have therefore no objective basis. The agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illu- sions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive effects of the same kinds of ignorance; this may thus be compared with the delusive experience of two moons by anumber of persons. Not all persons experience the same world; their delusive ex- periences are similar, but the objective basis of their experience ‘is not the same (samvadas tu bahu-purusavagata-dvitiya-candravat sadrsyad upapadyate). If this account is correct, as may well be supposed, then Mandana Misra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedantic doctrine of drsti-srsti-vada, which was in later times so forcefully formulated by Prakagananda. Again, in Prakagatman’s Patica-padika-vivarana (p.32), it is held that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi both maya and avidya are nothing but false experiences (avidya maya mithya-pratyaya iti). About the function * A copy of the manuscript of the Brahma-siddhi and its commentary was consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. Sanskrit MSS. Libraries after the above section had been written, and a thorough examination of its contents, I am happy to say, corroborates the above surmises. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be shortly published by Prof. Kuppusvami Sastri, and I con- sulted the tarka-pada of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof. Sastri in Madras in December 1928. A separate section has been devoted to the philosophy of Mandana’s Brahma-siddhi. x1] Mandana, Suresvara and Visvariipa 85 of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as reported in the Nyaya-kandali, p. 218) that doubt regarding the validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. In the Nyaya-kanika (p.80) it is said that Mandana held that reality mani- fests itself in unlimited conceptions of unity or universality, whereas differences appear only as a result of limited experience. Again, in the Laghu-candrika (p. 112, Kumbakonam edition) Mandana is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge or Brahmahood. According to Sankara, as interpreted by many of his followers, including Suregvara, the dissolution of ignorance (avidya-nivrtti) is not a negation, since negation as a separate cate- gory has no existence. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brah- man. But according to Mandana there is no harm in admitting the existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance; for the monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity. It has no reference to negations, i.e. the negation of duality only means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman (bhavadvaita). The existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed. Again, Sarvajiiatma Muni in his Samksepa-sariraka(11. 174) says that ignorance (avidya) is supported (asraya) in pure consciousness (cin-matrasrita-visayam ajfanam),and that,even where from the context of Sankara’s Bhasya it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (jiva) as being the support of ajfdna, it has to be interpreted in this sense. Objections of Mandana, therefore, to such a view, viz. that ignorance rests with the individuals, are not to be given any consideration ; for Mandana’s views lead to quite different conclusions (parihrtya Mandana-vacah tad dhy anyatha prasthitam):. The commentator of the Samksepa-sariraka, Ramatirtha Svamin, also, in commenting on the passage referred to, contrasts the above view of Mandana with that of Suresvara, who according to him is referred to by an adjective bahu-sruta in the Samksepa-sariraka text, and who is reported to have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajfidtma Muni, as against the views of Mandana. Now many of these views which have been attributed to Mandana are not shared by Sureévara, as will appear from what will be said below concerning him. It does not therefore appear that Mandana Misra and Suresvara were the same 1 Mr Hiriyanna, in ¥.R.A.S.