English
The definition of hetu in the Nydya-sitra refers only to the perceived hetu in the case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a 1 It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions that are admitted in the Nydya-siitra. 380 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. relation is established by inference!. Here Caraka points out that a hetu may be either perceived, inferred or found by analogy or from the scriptures, but, in whichever way it may be found, when it leads to knowledge, it is called a hetu. Thus, when I say, ‘The hill is fiery, because it smokes” (parvato vahniman dhiimavattvat), the smoke is the hetu, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But when I say, “‘He is ill, because he is of low digestion,” the hetu is not directly perceived, but is only inferred; for the fact of one’s being in low digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when it is said, ‘‘Purusa is eternal, because it is uncreated” (mtyah purusah a-krtakatvat), the uncreatedness (a-krtakatva) is the hetu, but it is neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the testimony of the scriptures. Again, in the proposition, ‘‘ His face is most beautiful, because it has been compared with the moon” (asya mukham kantatamam candropamatvat), the fact of being com- pared with the moon is the hetu and it is known by upama?. Thus Caraka’s definition of hetu does not really come into conflict with that of Gautama: he only says that a hetu may be discovered by any of the pramanas, and, by whichever pramana it may be discovered, it may be called a hetu, if it is invariably and uncon- ditionally (a-vina-bhava) associated with the major term (sadhya)?. Caraka then proceeds to describe uttara, which is in purport the same as the jati of the Nya@ya-siitras. When an opponent wants to prove a thesis on the basis of a similarity of the subject of the thesis with the hetu, attempts have to be made to upset the thesis by showing its dissimilarity to the hetu. Thus one may say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from causes similar to them; in reply it may be said that effects are dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be an effect of cold. 2 udaharana-sadharmyat sadhya-sadhanam hetuh tatha vaidharmyat. Nydya-sitra, I. 1. 34, 35- 2 See Gangadhara’s Falpa-kalpa-taru, 111. 8. 122. 3 hetus cavinabhava-linga-vacanam yady api, tathapiha linga-pragrahakani pratyaksddi-pramanany eva yathokta-hetu-miilatvena hetu-sabdenaha. Cakrapani on Caraka, 111. 8. 6. 25. 4 sadharmya-vaidharmyabhyam pratyavasthanam jatih. Nydya-siitra, 1.2.18. There are twenty-four kinds of this 7dtz, e.g. (1-2) sadharmya-vaidharmya-sama, (3-8) utkarsapakarsa-varnyavarnya-vikalpa-sadhya-sama, (9-10) prapty-aprapti- sama, (11-12) prasanga-pratidrstanta-sama, (13) anutpatti-sama, (14) samsaya- sama, (15) prakarana-sama, (16) ahetu-sama, (17) arthapatti-sama, (18) avisesa- sama, (19) upapatti-sama, (20) upalabdhi-sama, (21) anupalabdhi-sama, (22) nitya- sama, (23) anitya-sama, (24) karya-sama. Sdadharmya-vaidharmya-sama is that in which, when an argument is given on XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 381 The long list of jatis given in the Nydya-siitra and explained in the commentaries and in the Nydya-majijari is not referred to the basis of the similarity or dissimilarity to a certain hetu, it is pointed out that quite the opposite conclusions may be drawn from other points of similarity or dissimilarity with other hetus. Thus, when it is said, ‘“‘ Sabda is non-eternal, because it is produced by an effort, and whatever is produced by an effort is non-eternal, as a jug,” it may be answered, ‘“‘Sabda is eternal, because it is partless: a partless entity like the @kdasa is found to be eternal; there is no special reason why on account of its similarity to a jug sound should be non-eternal, and not eternal owing to its similarity to dkasa.’”’ An escape from the dilemma is possible by enquiring as to what may constitute an unconditional and invariable (avyabhicari) similarity. Utkarsapakarsa-varnyavarnya-vikalpa-sadhya-sama is that in which similarity is pressed too far. Thus it is urged that, because sound is non-eternal like a jug, it must also be visible like a jug, and, if it is not so, it cannot be non-eternal like a jug. Moreover, it may be said that the reason why sound is expected to be non-eternal like a jug is that the former is produced by an effort (prayatnantariyaka). But things which are produced by efforts differ in many of their qualities; thus a cloth is soft, and a jug is hard, though both of them are produced by effort; so it may be argued that, though sabda is as much a product of effort as a jug, it may not agree with the jug in being non-eternal. Moreover, instead of arguing that sound is like a jug, it may as well be argued that a jug is like sound; so that the status of the jug is as uncertain as sound itself (yadi yatha ghatas tatha sabdah praptam tarhi yatha sabdah tatha ghata iti sabdas canityatayG sadhya iti ghato ’pi sadhya eva syad anyatha hi na tena tulyo bhavet—Nydya-mafjari, p. 624). In answer to these kinds of fault-finding the proper argument is that no similarity should be extended beyond its limits, and an example (drstdnta) should not be considered to have the same status as a probandum (sddhya); for an example is that which is already agreed upon among the disputants and the common people (laukika-pariksakanadm yasminn arthe buddhi samyam sa drstdntah). Prapty-aprapti-sama is that in which it is urged that, if the hetu and the probandum are together, they cannot be distinguished from each other; if they are separate, hetu cannot lead us to the sadhya. The answer to this is that a hetu can produce an effect either by direct contact (e.g. the rope and the stick in contact with clay produce a jug) or from a distance (e.g. the syena sacrifice can destroy an enemy from a distance). Prasanga- sama is that in which a reason for the hetu is asked. Thus, if the character of immediately following an effort (prayatndntariyakatva) is the cause of non-eternality, what can establish the prayatndntariyakatva of a jug, etc.? The answer to this is that a reason is necessary only for that which is not directly experienced as being evident in itself. That a jug immediately follows the efforts that produce it is directly experienced and does not require any argument or reason to establish it, as no light is required to see a burning lamp. Drstdnta-sama is that in which from the same hetu two different conclusions are seen to result. Thus it may be said that both the jug and akdsa have the character of immediately following an effort (e.g. as by digging new space is produced in underground wells which before the effort of digging were solid earth without space—kupa-khanana-prayaindnantaram tad-upalambhat—and this character is therefore to be regarded as prayatndantariyaka); yet, as a jug is non-eternal and akdSa eternal, so sabda, though it immediately follows an effort, is eternal. The answer is that, if such an opposite conclusion is drawn, a separate hetu has to be given, which is not done in the present case. If sound is non-eternal, it must possess the character of coming into existence immediately after an effort that produces it; but how can it possess that character before being produced or coming into existence? If it cannot at that stage 382 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. by Caraka; nor does the technical name of jati find any place in Caraka’s description of it. If these elaborate descriptions of jati possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternality is absent. This objection is called anutpatti-sama. The reply is that, unless the sound is in existence, its eternality or non-eternality cannot be discussed. If it is non-existent, of what is the eternality to be affirmed by the opponent? Again, it may be argued that sabda has prayatnantartyakatva, and therefore it may be expected to be non-eternal ; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects. This doubt is called samsaya-sama. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known. Prakarana-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to hetus, so that no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both prayatnanta- riyakatva and niravayavatva (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second hetu cannot be pressed as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist. Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a hetu; for, if there is no sadhya (probandum), what is it that the hetu produces? and again, if there is no hetu before the saddhya, how can the sddhya be produced? So, as hetu is only a concomitant of sadhya, no inference is possible from it. The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing hetu the non-existing sddhya should be produced. Arthdpatti-sama is where, for example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to akasa and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being prayatndntariyaka.