English
Avisesa-sama is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of pra- yatnantariyakatva, Sabda and ghata are said to be equally non-eternal, then, owing to all things having the same quality of existence (satta), they are all the same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality in all respects. Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing to its prayatnantartyakatva and eternal owing to its being partless like G@kdaga. Upalabdhi-sama is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort (prayatnanta- riyakatva), and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between prayatnantariyakatva and non-eternality and not between non-eternality and prayatnantariyakatva; so that all that is produced by human effort is non- eternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by prayatnantartyakatva emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are pro- duced. Anitya-sama is an objection where it is urged, for example, that, if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal, then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some simi- larity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal. The mitya-sama objection runs as follows: Is non-eternality in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal. If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal. The karya-sama objection suggests that prayatndntariyakatva leads to pro- duction in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled condition; and it remains undecided what sort of prayatndntariyakatva applies to sabda. The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta’s Nydya-mafijari. XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 383 were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed them over without referring to them. An example (drstanta) is that on which the common folk and the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot, water is liquid, the earth is firm. A siddhanta, or conclusion, is that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and demonstration by proper reasons. This siddhanta is of four kinds, viz. (1) sarva-tantra-siddhanta, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g. “There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones can be cured”’; (2) prati-tantra-siddhanta, or conclusions which are not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons: e.g. some say that there are eight vasas, others say that there are Six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six; (3) adhtkarana-siddhanta, or conclusions which being accepted or proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted: e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits of karma, as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the existence of soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted ; (4) abhyupagama-siddhanta, or conclusions which are accepted only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined critically nor considered as proved}. Sabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz. (1) drstartha—of experienced purport (e.g. ‘‘ The dosas lose their equilibrium through three causes”); (2) adrstartha—of unper- ceivable purport (e.g. “‘ There is after-life ; there is emancipation’) ; (3) satya, or truth, that which tallies with facts (e.g. ‘There is Ayur-veda ; there are means for curing curable diseases”) ; (4) anrta, the opposite of truth, untruth?. Samsaya, or doubt, occurs with reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether in this world death happens timely or untimely. Prayojana, or the object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may 1 All these stddhantas occur under the same names in the Nydya-siitra, Tt25, 20,130,135 : . ® The first two divisions, drstartha and adrstartha, occur in the Nydya-sitra, 1. 1. 8, sa dvividho drstadrstarthatvat. 384 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. not touch me}. Sa-vyabhicara means variability, e.g. “This may or may not be a medicine for this disease®.” Jyfasa means ex- perimenting ; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments (jijfiasa). Vyavasaya means decision (mScaya), e.g. “This is a disease due to predominance of vayu; this is the medicine for this disease.” Artha-prapti is the same as the well-known arthapatt1, or implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g. the statement, ‘“‘This disease cannot be cured by allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink,” implies that it can be cured by fasting, or, if it is said, “He should not eat during the day,” this means that “‘ He should eat during the night*.”” Sambhava is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six dhatus may be considered as the sambhava of the foetus ; wrong diet, of disease ; and right course of treatment, of health. Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omits such details as should have been given in the answer, e.g. “This disease can be cured by purificatory action”; such an answer is faulty, as it does not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting or purging. Ananuyojya is what is different from anuyojya. Anuyoga is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned colleague: e.g.a learned man says, ‘‘ Purusa is eternal,” and another learned man asks, “‘ What is the reason?”’ Such a question is called anuyoga. A counter-question, such as ‘‘ What is the reason for your asking such a question?”’ is called praty-anuyoga. Vakya-dosa, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz. nyina, adhka, anarthaka, aparthaka and viruddha. Nyiina, or the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of 1 Prayojana, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Nydya- ‘siitra, 1. 1. 1, though it is nowhere critically examined. It is explained by Vatsyayana as that which goads men to action (yena prayuktah pravartate). Uddyotakara explains it as the realization of pleasure and the fear of pain (sukha- prapti-duhkha-hanit). 2 anaikantikah sa-vyabhicadrah. Ny@ya-sitra, 1.2.5. E.g. “sound is eternal”? because it is untouchable; but untouchability does not lead to eternality, since the touchable atoms are eternal, whereas untouchable thoughts are short- lived. ® Cakrapani says that Caraka does not think that artha-prapti is a separate pramdna; according to him it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of pramanas. XIIT] Logical Speculations and Terms 385 reasons, only one is offered and others are omitted, materially affecting the strength of the support of the original statement. Thus several reasons are given in support of the eternality of purusa, viz. beginninglessness, not being the product of any effort, un- changeableness, etc. Proposing to give all these reasons, and giving only one, is an instance of nyiina. Adhika is where, when Ayur- veda is being discussed, the opponent makes irrelevant references to learned works on politics or the art of government. It may also mean cases where words or statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two kinds, verbal repetition and sense repetition. Verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different words may be used. Amarthaka and aparthaka mean the use of meaningless and unconnected words or expressions. Viruddha, or contrary statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the example (drstanta-viruddha) or the accepted conclusion (stddhanta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever; or when a medical man (vaidya) says that medicine does not cure diseases. Samaya-viruddha is the making of any statement against the accepted conclusions of any particular sastra. Thus, for example, if a Mimamsaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it will be against his accepted doctrine that animals should be sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of emancipation (moksa- Sastra) it be said that injury to living beings is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of that sastra. Vakya-prasamsa is that kind of statement in which the faults mentioned above in vakya- dosa do not occur. Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent is wilfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, vak-chala and samanya- chala.