English
The word nava means “‘nine” as well as ‘‘new,”’ and if, when one says about one’s opponent, ‘‘This physician is nava- tantra” (has newly learnt his texts), and the opponent replies, **T have not nine text-books, I have one text,” the other person objects, “‘I do not say you have nine texts, I say that you are navabhyasta-tantra”’ (have newly learnt the texts), navabhyasta- tantra might also mean “read nine times”’; and then the opponent might well say, “‘I have several times read the texts, and not nine times, as you say.” This is an example of vak-chala. Again, when a physician says “‘ Medicine cures diseases,” the opponent may take the most general characteristics of the terms DII 25 386 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. and say that the above statement comes to this, that an existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then, since bronchitis exists (san kasah) and consumption exists (san ksayah), bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure another existent entity, consumption. This is called s@manya-chala’. Fallacies (a-hetu) are of three kinds, prakarana-sama, samsaya- sama and varnya-sama*, Prakarana-sama is where that which 1 Chala is treated in the Nydya-siitra exactly on the same lines as here. Thus the definition of chala there (NyGya-siitra, 1. 2. 10) is vacana-vighato ’rtha- vtkalpopapattya chalam (to attack one’s speech by a wilful misinterpretation of it is chala). This is divided into three classes, vdk-chala, samdnya-chala and upacara-chala; of these vak-chala is exactly the same as in Caraka-samhitd, and so also the samdnya-chala (because a Brahman is well-read in scriptures, a uratya (outcast Brahman) is also well-read, because he also is a Brahman in some sense). Upacdra-chala, which, however, resembles vak-chala, is not men- tioned in the Caraka-samhita. Its definition in the Nyd@ya-sitra, 1.2.14,is dharma- vtkalpa-nirdege ’rtha-sad-bhava-pratisedha upacara-chalam (to make-one’s state- ment impossible by taking it in one sense, say the primary, when the secondary one was intended). Thus, if it is said, ‘‘ This porter is an ass,’ it may be objected that the porter, being a man, cannot at the same time be an ass. Gautama, however, tentatively raises the objection that chalas should be regarded as three in number and not two, taking upacdra-chala within sadmdnya-chala. This means a criticism in view of Caraka’s division of chala into two classes. For Gautama argues that, if on account of some similarity upacdra-chala should be included within sdmdanya-chala, and chalas should be counted as being of two kinds instead of three, then for the very same reason of similarity chalas may as well be regarded as being of one kind instead of two. So, in view of the specific differences that exist between the chalas, they should be regarded as being of three kinds. 2 Nydya-siitra, 1. 2. 4, describes the fallacies (hetv-abhdsa) as of five kinds, sa-vyabhicara, viruddha, prakarana-sama, sadhya-sama and kdalatita. Sa-vyabhicara hetu is that which has no invariable concomitance with the probandum, e.g. sound is eternal because it is untouchable, and that which is touchable is non-eternal, like a jug. But untouchability has no invariable concomitance with eternality; for an atom is touchable and at the same time eternal, and thoughts (buddhi) are untouchable and at the same time non-eternal. Viruddha hetu is where the reason (hetu) demolishes the very theory on which its security depends, e.g. this changeable world (vikaro) disappears (vyakter apaiti), because it is non-eternal (ityatva-pratisedhat); but, though it disappears (apeto pi), yet it exists (astz), because it is not destructible (vindsa- pratisedhat). Now a thing which is non-eternal cannot but be destructible. Destructibility and eternality cannot abide together. ; Prakarana-sama is where two opposite hetus exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of them. Thus it may be argued with as much force that “sound is eternal, because it has in it the qualities of eternal things,”’ as that “sound is non-eternal, because it has in it the qualities of non-eternal things”’; so no conclusion can be drawn from either of these hetus. Sddhya-sama is where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument, “‘shadow is a substance because it moves,”’ the movability of shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives rise to the formation of shadows at different places? Kaldtita is where the hetus in the case of the accepted example and the case to be proved vary, because in the latter case the hetu is not properly a XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 387 is given as the hetu remains to be proved. Thus, when it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is eternal, and because the body is unconscious it is non-eternal, it may be urged (as by the Carvaka school of philosophers) that both the points, viz. that the self is different from the body and that the body is not endowed with consciousness, which are offered as the hetu, are themselves to be proved; for according to the Carvakas the body is endowed with consciousness and is non-eternal. A re- ference to the footnote below shows that this prakarana-sama is different from the prakarana-sama of the Nydya-sitra. Samsaya- sama is that in which that which is the cause of doubt is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person quotes a passage from Ayur-veda—is he or is he not a physician? Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage from Ayur-veda leaves us in doubt as to the man’s being a physician or not. If this itself is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion and if it is said, ‘‘ He is a physician because he has quoted a passage from Ayur-veda,” it becomes a case of samsaya-sama. Gautama speaks of samsaya-sama as an instance of jati; but the former is a case where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of any of these characteristics. Here, however, samsaya-sama is used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the reason for a particular conclusion. Varnya-sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous affirmation, e.g. ‘‘Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is un- touchable, like the latter.”” But the non-eternality of sound stands as much in need of proof as that of buddhi, and the former afirma- tion cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy is hetu; for the hetu and sddhya exist in two successive moments and are therefore not concomitant; but in the former case they are concomitant and simultaneous, e.g. sound is eternal, because it is manifested, like colour, owing to a particular contact, like light, being manifested by the contact of a stick and a drum, just as colour is manifested by the contact of light with a thing. But the similarity fails ; for, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the contact of light and the things, sound is heard at a moment different from that at which actual contact of the stick and the drum takes place. 25-2 388 Speculations in the Medica! Schools [cH. similar to the jati called sadhya-sama and the fallacy sadhya-sama of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386. Atita-kala is that in which that which should be said first is said later, e.g. the thesis, or pratijna, should be stated first and the conclusion, or nigamana, last; if instead the migamana is stated first and the pratifa after, then we have the fault of kalatita. Upalambha (criticism) is the finding fault with the hetus, also called a-hetu, as described above, or hetv-abhasas. Parthara (reply) means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent ; e.g. theself is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different from the body and is eternal. Pratinda-hani (to give up one’s thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to give up one’s original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis that purusa is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and say that purusa is not eternal. Abhyanujfa (to bring a counter- charge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects!. Hetv-antara (dodging with a wrong reason) is where, when the cause of some root fact (prakrti) is asked, the reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations (vikrit) of that root fact. Arthantara (wrong answer) is where, when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given*. Nigraha-sthana is where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the migraha- sthanas many of the cases which have already been enumerated and described. Thus he counts pratyfia-hani, abhyanujna, kalatita, a-hetu, nyiina, atirikta, vyartha, aparthaka, punar-ukta, viruddha, hetv-antara, arthantara'*. 1 This corresponds to matdnujnd of the Nydya-sitra, v. 1. 42. 2 In Nydya-sitra, v. 2. 6, we hear of a hetv-antara, but that seems to be different from this. The significance of hetv-aniara, as it stands there, may be illustrated as follows.