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Cakrapani, however, points out that these criticisms are all beside the point, since yukti, according to Caraka, is not karya- karanata from tad-bhava-bhavita; it is the arriving at a conclusion as a result of a series of reasonings. But it is important to note that in 11. 4. 6 and 7 Caraka speaks of three kinds of pramanas, viz. pratyaksa, anumana and sabda, and describes anumana as being tarka depending on yukti. Tarka is explained by Cakrapani as being the knowledge of things which cannot be perceived (tarko *pratyaksa-jfianam), and yukti is here paraphrased by Cakrapani as the relation of a-vina-bhava. It is said in this connection that a disease is to be determined by pratyaksa, the medical texts (apto- padeSa) and inference. But in 111. 8. 6. 33 and 34 Caraka counts aitihya as @ptopadesa, though ordinarily aitihya is considered in 1 drstante *py ata eva tad-bhdva-bhavitvat kdaryatd-pratipattih, tatrapi drstanto ’nyo ’nvesaniyah, tatrapy apara ity anavasthad. Kamalasila as quoted by Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 25. Santaraksita misrepresents Caraka’s view of yukti in a very strange manner. He says that, when from the fact that in all cases when A is present B is present and in all cases when A is absent B is also absent one thinks A to be the cause of B, this is regarded by Caraka as the new pramdna of yukti. Santaraksita’s exact words are: asmin sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asatiti ca tasmdd ato bhavaty eva yuktir esa ’bhidhiyate pramanantaram eveyam ity aha carako munih nanumanam tyam yasmdad drstanto ’tra na labhyate. Tattva-samgraha, p. 482. This, however, is entirely different from what Caraka says, as is pointed out by Cakrapani in his commentary on Caraka-samhita. Caraka’s idea of yukii is the logic of probability, i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called yukii, and, as it is different from inference or any of the other accepted pramdnas, it is to be counted as a separate pramdna. So far as I know, this is the only example of the introduction of the logic of probability in Indian thought. XIIT] Logical Speculations and Terms 377 Indian philosophy as being “‘tradition” or long-standing popular belief, different from aptopadesa; upamana, under the name of aupamya, is also referred to. It may not be out of place here to note that the obstacles to perception referred to in the Samkhya-karika are all mentioned here. Thus it is said that even those things which have colour (ripa) cannot be perceived if they are covered by a veil, or if the senses are weak, or if the mind is unsettled, or if they are mixed up in any homogeneous medium indistinguishable from them, or when in the case of smaller lights they are overcome by stronger luminaries, or when they are too fine or too subtle?. Logic was of use with Indian medical men not only in diag- nosing a disease, but also in the debates which they had with one another. The rival practitioners often had to show their skill and learning in debates on occasions of the treatment of illness of rich patients. The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was con- sidered an important acquisition among medical practitioners. Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes, such as are never found in any other literature, excepting the Nydaya-sitra. In the Caraka-samhita almost the whole of the chapter called the ‘‘ Roga-bhisag-jitiya-vimana”’ (111. 8) is devoted to this purpose. It is well to remember that different kinds of disputes and fallacies are mentioned in the Nydya-sitra, and it will be useful to refer to these when dealing with similar topics from either the Caraka-samhuta or the Susruta-samhita. The four terms referred to in connection with disputes in the Nydaya-siitra are tarka, vada, jalpa and vitanda. Tarka is said to be the same as @#ha, and this is explained as a process of reasoning carried on in one’s mind before one can come to any right con- clusion. It is a name for the subjective weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt before a conclusive affirma- tion or denial (irnaya) is made. Disputes are said to be of three kinds, vada, jalpa and vitanda. Vada means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, jalpa a dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly, and vitanda a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent’s thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. Vdda is thus essentially different in its purpose from jalpa and vitanda; for vada is an academical discussion with pupils, 1 Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 8. 378 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. teachers, fellow-students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gaint. Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair methods of argument. Caraka, in 111. 8, says that a medical man should hold discussions (sambhasa) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal for knowledge (samharsa), clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech and of achieving fame, removes doubts in the learning acquired before and strengthens convictions. In the course of these discussions many new things may be learnt, and often out of zeal an opponent will disclose the most cherished secret teachings of his teachers. These discussions are of two classes, friendly (sandhaya sambhasa) and hostile (vigrhya sambhasa). A friendly discussion is held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such discussions, even though there may be the fallacies de- scribed, no one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant over the other’s defeat and no attempt is made to mis- interpret or misstate the other’s views. Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one should behave in an assembly where one has to meet with hostile disputes. Before engaging oneself in a hostile discussion with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his opponent is inferior (para) to him and also the nature of the assembly (parisat) in which the discussion is undertaken. A parisat may be learned (jfanavati) or ignorant (midha), and these again may be friendly (suhrt), neutral (udasina), or hostile (pratinivista). When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand, whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a fearful nature, etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is superior to him in these qualifications or not. 1 vadam ca nirnaya-phalarthibhir eva sisya-sabrahmacari-gurubhih saha vita- ragath, na khyati-labha-rabhasa-prativardhamana-spardhanubandha-vidhuratma- bhir aGrabheta. Nydya-mafijari, p. 594. XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 379 No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant, friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by pro- ceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by reciting long sitras and to demoralize or stun them, as it were, by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language. When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection with such disputes. Like the Nyaya, Caraka divides such hostile disputes (vada) into two classes, jalpa and vitanda. Pratijfd is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. ‘“‘The purusa is eternal.” Sthadpana is the establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with hetu, drstanta, upanaya and nigamana. Thus the above thesis (pratiyna), “‘The purusa is eternal,” is to be supported by a reason (hetu), ‘‘ because it is uncreated”’; by an example (drstanta), ‘“‘'The sky is uncreated and it is eternal”; by a proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya), viz. ‘‘ Just as the @kasa is uncreated, so the purusa is also uncreated ”’; and finally by establishing the thesis (nigamana), ‘‘ Therefore the purusa is eternal}.”’ Pratisthapana is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus, when the thesis of the sthapand is ‘‘ Purusa is eternal,” the prati- sthapana proposition would be ‘‘ Purusa is non-eternal,”’ because ‘it is perceivable by the senses,’ and ‘‘ The jug which is per- ceptible to the senses is non-eternal,” and ‘‘ Purusa is like the jug,” so ‘‘ Purusa is non-eternal.”’ Caraka defines hetu as ‘‘the cause of knowledge” (hetur nama upalabdhi-karanam), and the cause of knowledge is the pramanas of pratyaksa, anumana, aitihya and aupamya.