English
As Dalhana points out, Susruta has in several places referred to the operation of all these causes. Thus the formation of the limbs of the body in the foetus- state is said to be due to nature (svabhava); God as fire is said to operate as the digestive fire in the stomach and to help digestion; time as seasons is said to be the cause of the increase and decrease of dosas; destiny means virtue and vice, and diseases and recovery from them are sometimes attributed to these. Jejjata, in com- menting on Susruta (as reported by Dalhana), says that all the above six causes, with the exception of God, are but different names of prakrti. Gayi, however, thinks that the above six causes represent the instrumental cause, though prakrti may still be con- sidered as being the material cause (upadana-karana). As Dalhana and Gayi think, there is no reason to suppose that Susruta described the Samkhya doctrine; for, immediately after describing the sixfold causes, he speaks of the elements as being constituted of the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas. Even the senses are regarded as being material. Souls are according to Ayur- veda eternal, though they are limited to their bodies and are not all-pervasive. They are manifested when the semen and the blood combine, and it is this bodily self, suffering transmigration owing 1 Susruta-samhitd, i. 1. 11. XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 373 to virtue and vice (called karma-purusa), with which medical science is concerned. When the self is in association with manas, it has the following qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, prana and apana (the upward current of breath and the downward force acting in the direction of the rectum), the opening and closing of the eyelids, the action of the intellect as decision or buddhi (niscaya), imagination (samkalpa), thought (vicarand), memory (smrii), scientific knowledge (vijfidna), energy (adhya- vasaya) and sense-cognitions (visayopalabdhi). The qualities of manas are divided into three classes, viz. sativika, rajasa and tamasa; of these the sa@ttvika ones are kind actions, the desire of enjoying gradually, mercy, truthfulness, virtue, faith, self-know- ledge, retentive power (medha), intelligence (buddhz), self-control (dhrti), and sense of duty for the sake of duty (anabhisanga) ; the rajasa qualities are suffering, impatience, pride, untruthfulness, cruelty, boastfulness, conceit (mana), joy, passion and anger; the tamasa qualities are dullness, viciousness, want of retentive power, idleness and sleepiness. Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute. Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asaz), and they can be investigated by the four pramdanas, viz. the testimony of trusty persons (aptopadesa), perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and the coming to a conclusion by a series of syllogisms of probability (yukiz)?. Those whose minds are free from the impurities of rajas and tamas through the force of their ascetic endeavours, who possess un- limited knowledge extending through the past, present and future, are to be considered as trustworthy (@pta). Such persons neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as absolutely trusty (apta), and their testimony may be regarded as true’. The valid and certain knowledge that arises as the result of the relation of self, senses, manas and sense-objects is called “perception.” This contact of the sense with the object is re- garded by Cakrapani as being of five kinds, viz. (1) contact with the dravya (substance), called samyoga; (2) contact with the gunas 1 Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 17. 2 Ibid. 1. 11. 18, 19. 374 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. (qualities) through the thing (samyukta-samavaya) in which they inhere by samavaya-(inseparable) relation; (3) contact with the gunas (such as colour, etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (ripatva), which exist in the gunas in the samavaya relation; this is called samyukta-samaveta- samavaya since the eye is in contact with the thing and the colour is in the thing by samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic character of colour by samavaya relation ; (4) the contact called samavaya by which sounds are said to. be perceived by the ear: the auditory sense is akasa, and the sound exists in Gkasa by the samavaya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound by a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya; (5) the generic character of sound as the sound universal (sabdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. It is only immediately resulting (tadatve) cognition of such a contact that is called per- ception (pratyaksa); for inference, memory, etc. also may come in as a result of such a cognition at later stages through other successive processes (paramparya). Cakrapani further notes that the four kinds of contact spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of perception; in reality, however, ‘knowledge that results as the effect of sense-contact” would be a sufficient definition of pratyaksa; so in the perception of pleasure, though none of these contacts are necessary, it is regarded as a valid case of direct perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all kinds of cognition. It is easy to see that the above theory of perception is of the same type as that found in the Nyaya system. The nir-vikalpa perception is not taken into consideration; for there is nothing corresponding to the term avyapadesya in the Nydya-siitra?. Inference must be based on perception, by which the concomitance of the hetu can first be observed. Inference is of three kinds, viz. from karya (effect) to karana (cause), as the inference of Sle bieten from pregnancy ; from cause to effect, as the inference of the future production of 1 Cakrapani on Caraka-samhita, 1. 17. 20, 2 The definition of pratyaksa given in Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 20, is: atmendriya-mano-’rthanam sannikarsat pravartate vyakia tadatve ya buddhih pratyaksam s@ nirucyate. The definition of pratyaksa in the Nydya-siitra i is as follows: indriyartha-sannikarsotpannam jnanam avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyavasayatmakam pratyaksam. For a discussion thereon see vol. 1, pp. 333-343- XIIT] Logical Speculations and Terms 375 fruit from a seed with the other attendant causes, sprinkling with water and the like; and inference by associations other than that of cause and effect, as the inference of fire from smoke!. Yukiti is not counted as a separate pramana by any other system of Indian thought. When our intelligence judges a fact by acomplex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations, through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called _ yukti?, As Cakrapani points out, this is not in reality of the nature of a separate pramana; but, since it helps pramanas, it is counted as a pramana. As an example of yukti, Caraka mentions the fore- casting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrapani rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as the combined application of a number of reasonings, is properly called aha and is current among the people by this name. It is here counted as a separate pramana. It is in reality an in- ference of an effect from causes and, as such, cannot be used at the present time, and hence it cannot be called tri-kala, valid in all the three times, past, present and future, as Caraka says. The Buddhist, writes Santaraksita in discussing Caraka’s doc- trine of yukti as a separate pramana, holds that yukii consists in the observation that, since, when this happens, that happens, and, since, when this does not happen, that does not happen, this is the cause of that. It may be argued that this is not a case of inference, since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a drstanta, or example, in Nyaya inference (e.g. whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen). It is held, as Kamalasila interprets, that the cause- effect idea is derived from the idea of “‘this happening, that hap- pens,”’ and there is no other idea in the notion of causality ; if in any case any particular example is given, then another example might be asked for, and after that another, and we should have regressus 1 pratyaksa-pirvam tri-vidham tri-kalam canumiyate vahnir nigiidho dhiimena maithunam garbha-darsanat. Evam vyavasyanty atitam biyjat phalam anagatam drstva bijat phalam jatam thaiva sadrsam budhah. Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 21, 22. 2 buddhih pasyati ya bhavan bahu-karana-yogajan yuktis tri-kdla sa jheya tri-vargah sadhyate yaya. Ibid.1. 11. 25. 376 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. ad infinitum). These arguments in support of yukti as the conclud- ing of the cause-effect relation from ‘‘this happening, that happens”’ relation are refuted by Santaraksita and Kamalasila, who point out that there are no separate cognitive processes which link up the relation of “this happening, that happens” with the cause-effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause- effect relation is the same as ‘“‘this happening, that happens.”’ It may be argued that, whenever anything invariably and un- conditionally happens on the happening of any other thing, then the two are considered to be related as cause and effect, just as a jug, etc. are invariably seen to appear after the proper operations of the potter and his wheels. If this is ywkti, then it is not a different source of knowledge.