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) XIII] The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry 365 (in the modern sense) of medicines on human organs were known, the most obvious way in which the medical effects of herbs, roots, etc. could be classified was on the basis of taste, and by Caraka and Susruta we are told the effects of the different rasas on the different morbidities of the body, vayu, pitta and kapha. As the main source of all diseases was unequal increase or decrease of vayu, pitta and kapha, a classification which described the rasas in such a way that one could know which rasa increased or decreased which of the morbidities was particularly useful. But it is obvious that such a classification, though simple, could not be universally true; for, though the taste is some indication of the medicinal property of any substance, it is not an infallible one. But no other mode of classification was known; it was supposed that the taste (rasa) of some substances changed altogether after digestion and that in such cases the taste which changed after digestion (paka) would be operative. Cakrapani says that in those cases where the taste on the tongue (rasa) agrees with the taste as produced after the digestive process, the effect in that direction becomes very strong, but in the case where the latter differs from the former the operation of rasa becomes naturally weak, because the force of the taste produced by the final operation of the digestive process is naturally strong!. Caraka thought that there were only three rasas as the result of digestion, viz. katu, madhura and amla; Susruta rejected the last, as has already been described. But even this was not sufficient; for there were many other effects of medicine which could not be explained on the above suppositions. In explaining this, the theory of virya was introduced. In addition to taste substances were considered to possess other properties of heat and cold, as judged by inference, tactual properties of slipperiness, movement, moisture and dry- ness, etc., sharpness, etc. as manifested by odour, and these were supposed to produce effects in supersession of rasa and wipaka. It was only in the cases where no sensible data of any kind could be found to indicate the medical properties of the thing that the idea of prabhava was introduced. The chapters in Ayur-veda on dravya 1 Cakrapani on Caraka, 1. 26. 65. Cakrapani points out that the hot (katz) taste is at first useful in cleaning the phlegm of the throat, but, since it becomes sweet after digestion, it acts as a nutrient (vrsya). But, except in the case of such local actions, it is difficult to understand why the rasa which was altered ‘by digestion should have any such effect as Cakrapani suggests (viparyaye tu durbalam iti jfieyam). 366 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. and guna deal with the enumeration of prabhava and also of rasa, vipaka and virya wherever there is a divergence among them, as determined by empirical observation. This is very necessary not only for the selection of medicines and diet in the cure of diseases, but also for prevention of diseases. It is well to remember that many diseases were supposed to arise through eating together things which are opposed to each other in rasa, vipaka or virya. The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories. Caraka in the eighth chapter of the Sétra-sthana counts the senses as being five in number. Though both the Samkhya and the Vaigesika systems, to which Ayur-veda is largely indebted for its philosophical ideas, admit manas, or mind-organ, as a separate sense (indriya), Ayur-veda here differs from them and, as Cakrapani says, separates manas from the ordinary senses by reason of the fact that it has many functions which are not possessed by any of the other senses (caksur-adibhyo ’dhika-dharma-yogitaya)+. Caraka himself, however, in another place speaks incidentally of a sixth sense (sad-indriya) in connection with the description of sweet taste?. Manas is, however, here described as transcending the senses (atindriya). Cakrapani, in explaining the atindriya character of manas, says that it is called atindriya because it is not a cause of the knowledge of external objects like the other senses. Manas is, indeed, the direct cause of pleasure and pain, but it is the superintendent of all the senses (adhisthayaka). Manas is also called sattva and cetas. The self is, however, the permanent subject of all acts of consciousness (cetana-pratisandhata). When the manas comes into contact with its objects, viz. pleasure or pain or the objects of thought, and the self makes an effort at grasping these objects, then there is a movement on the part of manas, by which it feels pleasure or pain, or thinks the objects of thought, or moves the sense-organs. Thus, when the self makes an effort and the objects of pleasure or pain or thought are present, then the manas turns to these as its objects and moves the senses, and the senses, guided by it, grasp their respective objects and produce their knowledge. 1 Cakrapani’s commentary on Caraka-samhitd, 1. 8. 3. ® Caraka-samhitd, 1. 26. 41, tatra madhuro rasah...sad indriya-prasddanah. xml] Psychological Views and Ontological Categories 367 The one manas appears as diverse on account of the diversity of its objects of thought (e.g. the mind may sometimes take religious thoughts and appear religious and at other times take lustful thoughts and appear lustful), diversity of sense-objects with which it is associated (e.g. the mind may grasp colour, smell or sound, etc.), and diversity of ways of imagination (e.g. ‘This will do good to me” or “‘ This will do me harm,” etc.). In the same man the mind may scmetimes appear as angry, ignorant or virtuous. But in reality the manas is one and the same for each person; all these differences do not appear at the same time with the same person, as might have been the case if there were many minds for one and the same person. Moreover, the manas is atomic; for otherwise many different objects or functions could be performed by one and the same manas at the same time. It may be asked, if one and the same manas can show different kinds of moral propensities, sattva, rajas or tamas, how can any person be characterized as sativika, rajasika or tamasika? The answer is that a man is called sattvika, rajasika or tamasika according as predominance of one or other of these gunas is observed in that man. Manas is supposed to move the senses, which are constituted of akaga, air, light, heat, water and earth; and the seats of the senses are the physical sockets of the eye, the ear, the nostrils, the tongue and the skin. The five sense-cognitions are produced through the contiguity of the senses, the sense-objects, manas and soul. They are short-lived (ksantka), but not exactly momen- tary, as the Buddhists would like to have them}. They also are of determinate nature (miscayatmikah). As Cakrapani says, it is quite possible for transitory sense-cognitions to give a determinate report of their objects. Though all the senses are made up of the five elements, yet those senses which contain any element in a pre- ponderating degree were conceived as made up of that element. The sense that has a particular eiement in a preponderating degree is regarded as having by virtue of that a special capacity for grasping that particular element?. The connection of the body, ine senses, the manas and the self 1 Cakrapani’s commentary on Caraka-samhitd, 1.8.11. Ksanikd ity Gsutara- vindsinyah na tu bauddha-siddhantavad eka-ksanavasthayinyah. 2 tatra yad-yad-atmakam indriyam visesat tat-tad-aGtmakam evartham anu- grhnati tat-svabhavad vibhutvdc ca. (Caraka, 1. 8. 14.) 368 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. is called life (jivita)+. The self is everywhere regarded as the agent which unites the acts of consciousness (jf#ana-pratisandhata). Cakrapani says that, since the body is momentary (sarirasya ksanikatvena), it may be argued that the union of the self with the body is also momentary. The answer that Cakrapani gives to such an objection is that, though the body is momentary, yet, since the momentary bodies are repeated in a series, the series as a whole may be looked upon as one; and, though the union of the self with each term of the series is momentary, yet, since the series may be looked upon as one, its union with the self may also be regarded as one (santana-vyavastlito ’yam ekataya ucyate)?. In another place Caraka says that the manas, the self and the body are connected together like a tripod, on which life rests; if any one of the components is missing, the unity is broken’, It has already been pointed out that, according to Caraka, the self is active and that by its activity the mind moves; and it is by the operation of mind that the senses move. The self is also regarded as being cetana (conscious). But this consciousness does not belong to the self in itself, it is attained only by its connection with the senses through manas*. It is, however, necessary to note that apart from this self there is, according to Caraka, another transcendent self (parah atma), different from the self which participates in the union of the body and the senses (which is also technically called the samyogi-purusa)®. The subtler, or transcendent, self is unchangeable (mr-vikara). Knowledge implies a process and a change, and this self manifests con- sciousness only in those parts where it becomes associated with manas and the senses. Thus, though the self is eternal, yet the rise of consciousness in it is occasional. The unchangeableness of the self consists in its being able to unite with itself its past and future states*. If the self were not permanent, it could not unite with itself all its past experiences. The sufferings and enjoyment * Caraka, 1.