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Explanation of the Discourse on the Perfume-Born 809. Now, there is the discourse on the perfume-born. Therein, for those who, due to unwise affection for the Buddha, the Blessed One, say, "The urine and feces of the Blessed One exceedingly surpass other kinds of perfumes, there is no perfume more fragrant than that," ...such is the view, like that of some Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas; concerning them, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. The rest here is to be understood as in the text itself. Explanation of the Gandha Jātaka Story. 5. Explanation of the One Path Story 810-811. Now, there is the One Path Story. Therein, for those who, out of unwise affection for the Buddha, believe that "The Blessed One, having become a stream-enterer, became a once-returner, having become a once-returner, became a non-returner, having become a non-returner, realized arahantship, but realized the four fruits with only one noble path," such is the view, like that of those same people; concerning them, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. Then, to challenge him by way of the combined arising of the four contacts, etc., that arise together with the four fruits, he said, beginning with "of the four contacts." "By the path of stream-entry," etc., is said for the purpose of asking, "By which path does he realize it?" And when "by the path of arahantship" is said, he challenges him by way of the non-abandonment of views of self, etc., by that. "The Blessed One is a stream-enterer" refutes that the state of being a stream-enterer exists for one who has become a Buddha. In the two questions that follow, the same method applies. The rest here is to be understood as in the text itself. Explanation of the One Path Story. 6. Explanation of the Jhāna Transition Story 813-816. Now, there is the Jhāna Transition Story. Therein, for those who, relying on this sequential teaching, "Here, monks, a bhikkhu, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, enters and abides in the first jhāna, with the subsiding of thought and examination, the second jhāna, the third jhāna, the fourth jhāna, enters and abides" (Saṃ. Ni. 5.923-934), believe that "without the occurrence of the access to each jhāna, he transitions from jhāna to jhāna," such is the view, like that of the Mahīsāsakas and some Andhakas; concerning them, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. Then, to challenge him, "If, without attaining the access to the second jhāna, he transitions from the first jhāna to the second jhāna in sequence, from the first to the third..." To challenge, "Could one transit from the second to even the fourth [jhāna]?", he begins with "The first jhāna," etc. "That of the first," etc., is stated to challenge, "If one attains the second immediately after the first, or the third after the second, etc., could one attain [them] with a single moment of adverting?" "Seeing the danger in sensual pleasures" means first considering the danger in sensual pleasures, then it arises. But in the jhāna moment, one considers only the sign. "Is that the same?" he asks to challenge, "If it were to arise immediately like the last javana thought after the first, setting aside the state of first and last, would that be the same in characteristic?" In this way, the meaning should be understood everywhere. By "Quite secluded from sensual pleasures," etc., he indicates that the jhāna states are taught in order, not to indicate immediate arising; therefore, it is not proof. Explanation of the Jhāna Transition Discourse. 7. Explanation of the Intermediate Jhāna Discourse 817-818. Now, there is the Intermediate Jhāna Discourse. There, those in whose system "in the fivefold method, the five jhāna states are distinguished, but only three concentrations are specified," not knowing the opportunity for a concentration that is merely without initial application and sustained application, [hold] the view that "this is called the intermediate jhāna between the first and second jhāna," like the Sammītiyā and some of the Andhakas. Regarding them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, the affirmation from the other. Then, to challenge him, "Jhāna is also mental states, as are contact, etc.; therefore, if there were to be an intermediate jhāna, there should also be an intermediate contact, etc.," he begins with "Is there an intermediate contact?" etc. "Of the second jhāna," etc., is stated to challenge, "If there were to be an intermediate jhāna, the second, third, etc., are also jhāna states; there should also be an intermediate state for them." He merely rejects and affirms due to the absence of the view. "Of the first," when asked, he affirms based on the view. 819. "With initial application, with sustained application," etc., [means] "when the state of concentration is the same for all three concentrations, why is only the concentration without initial application but with sustained application "Is one who is in between jhānas, not the other?" This is said as a question of objection: What is the specific reason here? 820-822. He asks referring to the first and second jhānas, "Of two jhānas, which are present?" The other affirms, according to his doctrine, "Among those present, in between, there is only thought-free, examination-only concentration, which is called 'in between jhānas'." Asked "Is the first jhāna ceased?", he affirms, "The simultaneous occurrence of three is not fitting." "Is thought-free, examination-only concentration the first jhāna?" He asks according to the fourfold method. The proponent of his own view rejects it, because of its absence in that method. "Surely, are there three concentrations?" Here, the intention is this: Just as among those three concentrations, two concentrations are only jhānas, not in between jhānas, so also the other must be only a jhāna, not in between jhānas. Explanation of the Discourse on Being in Between Jhānas. 8. Explanation of the Discourse on "One Who Has Attained Hears a Sound" 823-825. Now, there is the discourse called "One Who Has Attained Hears a Sound." There, "Since sound is said to be a thorn to the first jhāna by the Blessed One, if one who has attained does not hear it, how could it be a thorn? Therefore, one who has attained hears a sound." This is the doctrine of some, such as the Pubbaseliyas. Referring to them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, the affirmation from the other. "Does one see a form with the eye?" etc. This is said as a question of objection: "For one who has attained, there is no occurrence through the five doors. If that is not present, if he hears a sound, he would also see a form." "Sound is a thorn" is said because it causes distraction. For when the ear is struck by a coarse sound, it causes arising from the first jhāna. Therefore, this is not a valid reason. "Of the second jhāna" etc. This is said to indicate that "Just as another thorn is not present in inner attainment, so also is the hearing of sound." All of that is of obvious meaning. Explanation of the Discourse on "One Who Has Attained Hears a Sound." 9. Explanation of the Discourse on "One Sees a Form with the Eye" 826-827. Now, there is the discourse called "One Sees a Form with the Eye." There, "Does one see a form with the eye?" Because of the statement, "seeing a form with the eye," those who hold the view, such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, that "it is the sensitive eye that sees form," this question is directed at the proponent of their own doctrine, and the assertion is made by the other. Then, to challenge him, "If the eye sees form, would form see form?" he said that form sees form. The other, referring to the form element, denies it, and when asked again, referring only to the eye, he asserts it. Here, the meaning of "recognizes" is this: we ask about seeing with the intention of asserting, not merely the presence of the eye. Therefore, first say, "Does your eye recognize form with form?" The other, in the same way as before, both denies and asserts. Then, to challenge him, "In that case, form falls into mind-consciousness, for that is what is called recognizing," he said that form is mind-consciousness. The other, finding no loophole, simply denies it. "Is there an attending of the eye?" etc., he asks to challenge, "If the eye sees in the sense of recognizing, there must be attending for it, just like for eye-consciousness." The other denies, "No, indeed," because the eye is not bound to attending, it does not arise immediately after attending. The same method applies to "sound with the ear," etc. Here, monks, "a bhikkhu sees form with the eye" is said in the way of a statement with its requisites. Just as one who pierces with an arrow is said to "pierce with a bow," so too, one who sees with eye-consciousness is said to "see with the eye," therefore this is not proof. The same method applies to the rest as well. Explanation of the discourse on seeing form with the eye. The eighteenth chapter. 19. The Nineteenth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Abandoning Defilements 828-831. Now, there is the discourse on abandoning defilements. Therein, "Since there is such a thing as abandoning defilements, and for one who has abandoned defilements, past defilements are already abandoned, as are future and present defilements, therefore one abandons past defilements, future defilements, and present defilements." "Empty of clinging" is the view of some, like certain northerners; referring to them, the question about the past, etc., is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. The rest proceeds as in the text. But in the opponent's question, "Does not abandon defilements?" since one abandoning rubbish has no effort in the past, etc.