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the assertion is by the other. The rest should be understood in the same way as stated below. Only here, the phrase "he is obsessed with the form realm, he is obsessed with the formless realm" is the difference. And that view belongs to the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas. This belongs only to the Andhakas. Explanation of the Discussion on Attachment to Form Being Included in the Form Realm and Attachment to the Formless Being Included in the Formless Realm. Explanation of the Discussion on Being Included in the Form and Formless Realms. The Sixteenth Chapter. 17. The Seventeenth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discussion on Whether a Worthy One Accumulates Merit 776-779. Now, the discussion is: "Does a worthy one accumulate merit?" Here, those who, seeing the deeds of giving, sharing, worshipping shrines, etc., of a worthy one, hold the view that a worthy one accumulates merit, like the Andhakas; regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own view, the assertion is by the other. Then, to rebuke him, saying, "A worthy one has abandoned both merit and demerit, so if he were to do merit, he would also do demerit," he says there is no accumulation of merit. The other, not seeing the act of killing living beings, etc., rejects it. Regarding "meritorious formations," etc., he rejects that there is karma leading to rebirth for a worthy one. Regarding "he might give a gift," etc., the proponent of one's own view asserts that the act of giving, etc., occurs due to the mind of action. The other, not valuing the mind, establishes the view merely by seeing the occurrence of the act. But that establishment, being established unwisely, is not established. Explanation of the Discussion on Whether a Worthy One Accumulates Merit. 2. Explanation of the Discussion on Whether a Worthy One Has an Untimely Death 780. Now, the discussion is: "A worthy one does not have an untimely death." Here, "Monks, I do not say that intentional actions, once done, Having not experienced the fruition of accumulated deeds, I do not declare their annihilation," taking the meaning of the sutta (A.N. 10.217) unwisely, and holding the view that "an arahant must experience the result of all deeds before attaining final Nibbāna, therefore there is no untimely death for an arahant," as held by the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās; regarding them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, the affirmation from the other. Then, to challenge him, "If there is no untimely death for him, then there should not be one who kills an arahant," he says there is no arahant-killer. The other denies the existence of those who commit deeds with immediate result and similar individuals. 781. In the question, "Would he not consume poison?" he rejects the view that "until previously done deeds come to an end, he does not consume it." The rest here follows the Pāli text. 782. This sutta, "I do not, monks," was spoken regarding this: having done intentional deeds, without experiencing their result, without finding, without undergoing, I do not declare the annihilation of those deeds, the non-circumscribed state of those deeds, and that is for deeds ripening in this very life, in this very life, not beyond that; for deeds ripening in the next life, having arisen in the immediately following existence, not beyond that; for deeds ripening at an indefinite time, in such an indefinite or other way when they find an opportunity for ripening. Thus, in all ways, while the cycle of existence continues, when a deed has the opportunity to ripen, there is no place in the world where one can stand and escape evil deeds. In such a situation, this establishment of the view that "even a deed that has not had the opportunity to ripen must necessarily be experienced by an arahant," based on the assumption that "there is no untimely death for an arahant," is simply a wrong doing. Explanation of the statement "There is no untimely death for an arahant." 3. Explanation of the statement "All this is due to karma." 783. Now, this is called the "All this is due to karma" story. Therein, relying on the sutta "The world proceeds by karma," "all this is due to karma, defilements, and results." "Everything is from action" is the doctrine of some, like the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās. Referring to them, this entire question is from the proponent of his own view, the admission from the other. Then, to challenge him, "If so, action also arises from action," he says, "action also from action." If action is indeed from action, the other refutes, "that action would be only a result." "Due to past causes?" To challenge, "If everything is from action, it must be due to past causes," he asks; the other, fearing the doctrine of past causes, refutes. "From the result of action?" To challenge, "If everything is from action, the action that was the cause in a past existence, would also be from action in a prior existence, thus the result of action arises, therefore, everything of yours arises from the result of action," he asks. The other, referring to the arising of the present action like a sprout from a seed, refutes. Asked a second time, he admits, since that seed of action also arises from a prior seed, like from a prior action. "One would kill living beings," etc. Said to challenge, "If everything is from the result of action, one would commit killing, etc., only from the result of action." The other, with the view that the intention of immorality is also a result in one way, born from prior action, admits. Then, to challenge him, "If killing arises from the result of action, like killing, the result would also be fruitful," he says, "fruitful?" The other, seeing the fruitfulness of killing in the form of leading to hell, etc., admits. But, not seeing a specific place where the result of action is said to have this name as a fruit, he refutes. The same method applies to taking what is not given, etc. "The requisites of medicine for the sick are fruitful?" He asks about the fruit of giving in terms of the gift of Dhamma. The sutta "proceeds by action" rejects the doctrine of inaction, "there is no action," and illuminates the doctrine of action, "there is action," and the ownership of action. Not everything arises from action. Therefore, it is not effective. This is the explanation of the talk about karma. 4. Explanation of the Talk on What is Bound by the Senses 786-787. Now, there is the talk on what is bound by the senses. Therein, there are two kinds of suffering – what is bound by the senses, and what is not bound by the senses. What is bound by the senses is suffering because it is the object of suffering, and what is not bound by the senses is suffering in the sense of being oppressed by arising and passing away, because it is included in "whatever is impermanent is suffering." Not grasping this distinction, those whose view is that "the holy life is lived for the full understanding of that which is bound by the senses, and not the other," like the causalists, to show the suffering nature of the other as well, the question is only about what is bound by the senses for the proponent of their own view, and the assertion is for the other. Then, to challenge them, saying "since the Blessed One said 'whatever is impermanent is suffering,' therefore that impermanence must be only what is bound by the senses," he said, beginning with "only what is bound by the senses is impermanent." Surely, what is not bound by the senses is impermanent? Surely, earth, mountains, rocks, etc., which are not bound by the senses, are also impermanent? 788. It should not be said that only what is bound by the senses is suffering, the proponent of their own view answers in agreement to the question. For what is not bound by the senses is the object of suffering and displeasure. For in hot weather, fire, and in cold weather, wind, are the object of suffering, and constantly, the loss of possessions, etc., are the object of displeasure. Therefore, even without the sense of impermanence, it should be said that what is not bound by the senses is suffering. But because it is not produced by karma and defilements, it should not be said to be suffering, the noble truth, nor because it cannot be fully understood by the path. Since the cessation of grass and wood, or the cessation of seasons and seeds, is not called the noble truth of the cessation of suffering, therefore, to show this difference that what is bound by the senses is both suffering and the noble truth, but the other is only suffering, he asserts. The statement beginning with "as of what is bound by the senses" indicates the dwelling in the holy life for the full understanding of what is bound by the senses, and the non-arising again of what has been fully understood. Therefore, the refutation was made here by the proponent of their own view. But with the statement, "What is impermanent is suffering," one cannot deny the state of suffering that is unassociated with the faculties, therefore, it is not valid. Explanation of the discussion on what is associated with the faculties. 5. Explanation of the discussion on setting aside the Noble Path 789-790. Now, there is the discussion called "setting aside the Noble Path." There, "since the Noble Path is said to be 'the path leading to the cessation of suffering,' therefore, setting aside the Noble Path, the remaining conditioned things are suffering," is the view of some, like the proponents of causality; regarding them, the question is by the proponent of his own view, the affirmation by the other. Then, to challenge him, "if so, the arising also incurs the state of suffering," he says, "is the arising of suffering also?" The other, referring to the characteristic of cause, denies it. Asked again, referring to the state of being included in the process, he affirms it. Rejecting "only three?" due to fear of contradiction with the Sutta, he affirms it according to his view.