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The rest here is to be understood according to the Pāli itself. Explanation of the Discourse on Non-Pervasiveness. The Fourteenth Chapter. 15. The Fifteenth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Conditionality 711-717. Now, there is the Discourse on Conditionality. Therein, the doctrine of those for whom the dhamma that is a condition by way of the root condition, is a condition only by way of the root condition, and not by way of the object, immediately contiguous, or contiguity condition; or for whom the dhamma that is a condition by way of the object condition, is not a condition by way of the immediately contiguous or contiguity condition, therefore conditionality is fixed, like the Mahāsaṅghikas; regarding them, the question is for the proponent, the affirmation for the opponent. The rest here is to be understood according to the Pāli itself. Explanation of the Discourse on Conditionality. 2. Explanation of the Discourse on Mutuality 718-719. Now, there is the Discourse on Mutuality. Therein, the doctrine of those for whom at the time, "Conditioned by ignorance are volitional formations," this is the only tradition, "Also conditioned by volitional formations is ignorance," this does not exist, therefore ignorance is a condition for volitional formations, but volitional formations are not a condition for ignorance, like the Mahāsaṅghikas; regarding them, to show that mutuality also exists for ignorance, volitional formations, etc., the question is for the proponent, the affirmation for the opponent. In "Ignorance by volitional formations," only demeritorious volitional formations are taken. Therefore, in "Also conditioned by volitional formations is ignorance," conditionality should be understood in terms of co-nascent, mutual, presence, and association. In "Also conditioned by clinging is craving," excluding sense-desire clinging, the remaining three clingings, like ignorance for volitional formations, should be understood as conditions for craving. The rest is to be understood according to the Pāli itself. The question "Conditioned by aging and death" is for the opponent, "Name-and-form is conditioned by consciousness" is for the proponent. Explanation of the Discourse on Mutuality. 3. Explanation of the Discourse on Time 720-721. Now, there is the Discourse on Time. Therein, "t Based on the sutta "These, monks, are topics of discussion" (A.N. 3.68), those whose doctrine is that time, reckoned as such, is an ultimately real entity, to show the distinction that "there is no ultimately real entity called time, only a designation of time. But the aggregates beginning with form are ultimately real," the question "Is time ultimately real?" is from the proponent of the view, the assertion from the opponent. Then, to challenge him, "If it is ultimately real, it must be one of these beginning with form," he said "form, etc." The other denies it. The rest is to be understood as in the text itself. Explanation of the Time Discourse. 4. Explanation of the Moment, Instant, and Muhurta Discourse 722-723. In the discourses on moment, instant, and muhurta, the same method applies. All these moments, etc., are merely synonyms for time. Explanation of the Moment, Instant, and Muhurta Discourse. 5. Explanation of the Taint Discourse 724-725. Now, there is the Taint Discourse. Here, since there is no taint higher than the four taints, by which the four taints would be tainted, therefore, those whose doctrine is that the four taints are untainted, just like the proponents of causality, with reference to them, the question is from the proponent of the view, the assertion from the opponent. Then, to challenge him, "If those taints are untainted, then they must have attained the characteristics of the path, etc.," he said "path, etc." The rest here is of obvious meaning. Explanation of the Taint Discourse. 6. Explanation of the Aging and Death Discourse 726-727. Now, there is the Aging and Death Discourse. Here, aging and death, being not ultimately real, should not be said to be mundane or supramundane. For in the pair "mundane phenomena, supramundane phenomena," aging and death are not specified in either the mundane or the supramundane category. There, those who, not accepting this characteristic, have the doctrine that the aging and death of supramundane phenomena are supramundane, just like the Mahasanghikas, with reference to them, the question is from the proponent of the view, the assertion from the opponent. The rest here is to be understood as in the text itself. Explanation of the Aging and Death Discourse. 7. Explanation of the Perception and Feeling Discourse 728-729. Now, this is called the Discussion of Perception and Feeling. Therein, the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling, is not any dhamma, but the cessation of the four aggregates. Thus, it is neither mundane nor supramundane. But since it is not mundane, those who hold the view that it is supramundane, just like the Hedonists; regarding them, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. The rest is similar to the previous discussion. Explanation of the Discussion of Perception and Feeling. 8. Explanation of the Second Discussion of Perception and Feeling 730-731. Now, since it is not supramundane, those who hold the view that it is mundane, just like the Hedonists; regarding them, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. The rest is similar to the previous one. Explanation of the Second Discussion of Perception and Feeling. 9. Explanation of the Third Discussion of Perception and Feeling 732. Now, since there is no fixed rule for beings, that "such a one is subject to death, such a one is not subject to death," those who hold the view that even one who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling might die, just like the Rajagirikans; for them, to show the time of death and the time of non-death, even for one who has attained it and is subject to death, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. Then, since one who is dying must experience death-proximate contacts and so on, therefore, to challenge him in that way, he says, "Is there," and so on. Asked about "the death of one without contact," he denies it with reference to other beings. Asked about "ingesting poison," and so on, he denies it with reference to the power of the attainment. The second time, he asserts it with reference to the nature of the body. But in that case, there is no power of attainment, therefore, he challenges him, "He has not attained cessation." 733-734. "He would not die," is the question for the opponent. But in the opponent's question, "Is there such a rule?" since there is no such rule, therefore, he denies it. "Possessing visual consciousness," and so on, is for the proponent to show that "even if there is no rule, he dies only at the time of death, not at a non-time." It was said. Here is the meaning: if death occurred without a fixed rule, it would also occur to one possessing consciousness of the eye. Then there would be a contradiction to the sutta, "One does not pass away or arise with the five kinds of consciousness." Just as death does not occur to one possessing consciousness of the eye, so too it does not occur to one who has attained cessation. Explanation of the Discussion on Perception and Feeling. 10. Explanation of the Discussion on Beings Without Perception 735. Now, there is the discussion on beings without perception. Therein, the cultivation that proceeds by way of detachment from perception, whether it be the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation, is called the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling. Thus, there are two attainments of cessation of perception and feeling: mundane and supramundane. Of these, the mundane is for the ordinary person, the beings without perception, and the supramundane is for the noble ones, and it is not the beings without perception. However, those whose view is that the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling is the beings without perception without making this distinction, just like the hetuvādins, are referred to in the question of the proponent and the assertion of the opponent. Now, since there are non-greed, etc., for one who has attained the attainment of non-perception, but not for one who has attained the attainment of cessation, therefore, to challenge them based on these, he says, "Is there?" etc. 736. Here too, in the question "Is there no perception?", the absence of perception is allowed because of having attained detachment from perception, even there, only as a being without perception. Therefore, by taking this assertion and establishing a view, it is established by deception. Or here, the absence of perception is allowed with reference to the attainment of cessation. Even there, for an Anāgāmi who has passed away from here, it is only the attainment of cessation, therefore, even by this assertion, the established view is indeed not established. Explanation of the Discussion on Beings Without Perception. 11. Explanation of the Discussion on the Accumulation of Kamma 737. Now, there is the discussion on the accumulation of kamma. Therein, those whose view is that the accumulation of kamma is something other than kamma, disconnected from consciousness, unmanifest, and without an object, just like the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas, are referred to in the question of the proponent, "Is kamma something else?", and the assertion of the opponent. Now, To refute him, saying, "If the accumulation of karma is different from karma, then contact and so on must also be different from the accumulation of contact and so on," he said, "Is contact different?" The other denies it due to the absence of such a view. 738-739. To the question "Co-arisen with karma?